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
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
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
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
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The Plaque.

WAR-TIME LINK WITH MALTA G.C.

DURING World War II, part of the Anti-Aircraft defence of Malta G.C. was provided by 79 H.A.A. Regiment, R.A. (then known as 7 H.A.A. Regiment, R.A.).

Since then, as happens so much in the Royal Regiment, there has been a great changeover in the officers and men serving with the regiment, and until recently, only the R.Q.M.S., who had served with the regiment in Malta G.C., remained.

With his departure to the Middle East, our last personal link has gone.

This complete with the fact that the Regiment no longer wears the Maltese Cross Flash made our links with Malta G.C. very tenuous, and all Ranks wished for some more lasting memorial to be provided.

Accordingly a memorial plaque was sent to Malta G.C. and on 1st May 1952 a presentation parade was held in the Palace Square, Valetta, at which the G.O.C. Troops, Malta—Major-General W. E. G. Hemming, C.B.E., handed the plaque to His Excellency The Governor, who in turn presented the plaque to Dr. Borg Oliver, the Prime Minister of Malta. After the presentation the plaque was placed in the Library, Malta G.C.

A Guard of Honour was provided by 36 H.A.A. Regiment, R.A., 1 Coast Regiment, R.M.A., and 2 H.A.A. Regiment, R.M.A.

The plaque is in the form of a polished wooden rectangular base, with two Maltese Crosses at the top. Under these are the Royal Cipher and the Royal Artillery Badge; at the bottom of the plaque are the words:—

“Ubique”. Presented to Malta G.C., by All Ranks, 7th H.A.A. Regiment, R.A. (now 79 H.A.A. Regiment, R.A.), in commemoration of their association with Malta G.C. Throughout the Siege during World War II Until the Regiment left the Island, 5th March, 1944. “Quo Fas et Gloria Ducunt”.

"THE VALUE OF MILITARY HISTORY".

*A Lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution,
Thursday, 3rd April, 1952.*

By CAPTAIN CYRIL FALLS.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL H. G. MARTIN, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E., in the Chair.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my very pleasant task this afternoon to introduce to you an old friend, Captain Falls, who has very kindly come to talk to us about "The Value of Military History". He really needs no introduction because we all know of his work in that sphere and there could be no one better qualified to talk to us about military history than the Chichele Professor of the History of War. I will not, therefore, take up your time with any more introductory remarks.

CAPTAIN FALLS: I do know, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the Royal Artillery is proverbially the deafest community in the world! However, if you can all hear me, I do not think I will bother about the "mike".

In this building, which has in recent years been, if one may say so, largely devoted to the study of military history—for even the last campaign belongs to military history; as soon as it is over it passes into the province of history—I should not need to stand on the defensive on this subject; and I have, indeed, no intention of being apologetic about it. Yet we all have to recognize that a number of people nowadays, including some distinguished soldiers, are inclined to question the value of military history, at least with regard to the military profession. The tendency at military educational establishments is to devote less time to history than used to be the case. At our Staff College, for example, with its course reduced by half, that is certainly so. That tendency is probably a correct one in the circumstances existing to-day because the number and complexity of the subjects which have to be taught has increased. I do not know how much history is taught to-day in the military educational establishments of the United States of America but I do think that I detect among American officers a certain impatience with even the most recent military history which I do not find so much with our own officers. The American soldier's outlook on war seems to be strongly influenced by the fact that his approach to it is to so great an extent material, naturally so because his material is so abundant, so high in quality and, as a rule, so superior to that of foes or allies. His mind seems to be filled with the problem of creating techniques by which the best possible use may be made of this material. I am not, of course, suggesting that any other problem can take as big a place as that in the mind of an officer of a modern and up-to-date army, but it does appear that in the minds of our officers a rather greater space is left for other subjects: political background, moral and psychological elements and history, which is related to both of these. I think that this difference of outlook has

been made clear in recent discussions and books about the last war, and I must say frankly that, to my mind, our outlook has a great deal to recommend it because although war has become more and more a matter of material, more and more an affair to be managed on the lines of a business enterprise, there are other familiar elements still forming part of it, and there always will be while there is war.

I have said that there may be a tendency in our Army to devote less attention to history than used to be the case but that we still seem to approach war in a more historical spirit than do our American friends. Now to get to grips with the subject of this address—the value or use of military history.

First, what is the use of history in general? If you ask an intelligent boy or girl that question the answer will probably be "Because we want to know what the people of other times were like". That simple and direct answer is probably better than the one which the average adult will give. That, after all, is the one thing that we look for in general history, and I think in military history too. We want to know what the soldiers and sailors of other times and old wars were like, how they lived, what were their weapons and how they used them, and, if we can, we want to find out what they thought about their wars and their battles.

Secondly, in general history we look for the seeds of customs, institutions, habits, politics and lines of thought. There again, surely, the historian and the reader of military history find interest in the development of ideas on strategy, tactics, administration, discipline and theories of war.

Thirdly, the student of politics will look in general history for the lines of policy adopted by the nations with which his own has been in contact in the past and he will try to find out how far these are characteristic, how far they tend to reappear in different ages.

Once again, I will try to apply the general to the particular. It is not only interesting but necessary for the soldier and the military student to study those lines of policy and their translation into action. In the age of Peter the Great—who is, perhaps significantly, the most popular figure of the Czars among those who guide modern Russian thought—and again at the outbreak of the Crimean War we see a resemblance between ancient and modern Russian expansionist policy. The yearning for the Bosphorus and Dardanelles was always burning in the mind of Alexander I. Some, indeed, hold that if Napoleon had permitted him to take them there would have been no war with France, no fatal Russian expedition, perhaps no overthrow of the Napoleonic régime. But that eagerness to lay hands on the straits was not confined to Alexander. In the last few years it has perhaps only been restrained by the likelihood that if it were translated into action it would bring about another world war forthwith.

Finally, great numbers of people read general history for pure pleasure and because it helps them to understand themselves, if I may so put it. It is, when you come to consider it, a remarkable thing that a book like *The England of Elizabeth* by my friend A. L. Rowse, should have had so enormous a circulation that it should then have been taken up and published in the United States. The size of that book's circulation suggests that a large proportion of its readers fall right outside the body of people who read history in any professional sense. I grant that it is extremely well written and that the writer's name is well known; yet it is serious and profound history covering a vast

amount of unfamiliar ground, even in that familiar age. It is read for its information, certainly, but it is read also for its fascination. History is fascinating. Theories about its material value may be disputed but there can be no doubt about the fascination of history, and military history has its fascination also. To those who have not experienced it, the best advice I can give is not to abandon hope too readily because the pleasure is one which does not generally overcome the reader with a rush but steals gradually over him. The unfortunate thing is that so large a proportion of our home-produced military history is not of the highest, and not, on the whole, up to the standard of the French.

One practical thing that history will not do (or will do, at the most, very rarely) is to teach the soldier what to expect on the battlefield or how to act in those surroundings. History does not, in fact, repeat itself—not exactly, anyhow. And if a military event were to repeat itself as nearly as possible, the second sense would probably differ from the first owing to the difference in weapons and equipment that had come about in the interval between them. And yet, there can be no doubt of the possibility of extracting from the study of history, not rules for exactly how to act but certain broad principles that should govern us. Although scenes do not repeat themselves, general situations do and the student of history may profit from recognizing them. After all, soldiers acknowledge this, by implication if not in so many words, and the sceptics about the value of historical reading acknowledge it as fully as do the believers. Our training is all founded on history—mostly recent history, it is true, but with occasional elements from older wars—and so, of course, is our doctrine; and doctrine is mainly the lessons of the past reduced to handy form so that we shall not have to argue our way all over the ground again when we have to decide what ought to be done.

By chance, while I was preparing these notes I happened just to hear a discussion on German tactics in the last war, and one officer related a method of German defence that he had seen and that he thought might possibly be common. Well, in fact, that form of action had originated in the first World War and had been carried through in principle and adapted to the circumstances of the second, which was the only war of which the speaker or any of those present except myself had had experience. It was an excellent thing that the speaker should have shown observation and curiosity about it but it would have been better still, surely, if he or one of the others had recognized a principle in action. He had no means of knowing that what he had seen was anything on the German side but the inspiration of the moment or something belonging to the particular circumstances in a campaign, whereas, in fact, it was of almost universal application.

It has often been said—and it is true—that strategy changes less than tactics. Logically, therefore, the history of strategy ought to be more useful than the history of tactics. I believe that it is, but at the same time I would not agree that the history of tactics is useless. Even tactics as ancient as those of the Mongols, firing their arrows from the saddle and having two or three spare ponies for each bowman so that they could keep on the move as long as those very tough warriors could sit in the saddle, may furnish the student of mobility in war with useful ideas.

I cannot hope to convince you of the truth of my claims regarding the

value of military history, if only for the exercise of the military mind, without trying to illustrate them. I shall have time only for, what one may call, a few strokes of the pencil, but I shall not follow the example of Marshal Foch, who (among others) held that the military history which could most profitably be studied was the modern history of the nation in arms and largely confined himself to two wars, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. I think that there is something to be said for the view of Marshal Foch but perhaps if my case is a good one I can make it all the better by being bold enough to go much further afield to much more distant times. I think you will agree that it is distant enough if I start with the third century B.C.

Hannibal in Italy had won great victories over the Romans but had fallen; he had lost the initiative; he was inferior in numbers; he was baulked by the fortifications of Rome and the reinforcements from Carthage that he needed to be certain of success had not come. Then in the year 207 his chance arrived. At last there lay before him an opportunity to destroy the Roman armies in the field and possibly even to capture Rome itself. His brother Hasdrubal had crossed the Alps to his aid and the Romans had had to split their armies. One of the consuls, Marcus Livius Salinator, marched north to face Hasdrubal. His colleague, Claudius Nero, stayed watching Hannibal. Hasdrubal came on in superior strength and his opponent Salinator fell back before him across the Metaurus river. Hasdrubal's aim, rather than to fight, was to make a junction with his brother, which might have led to final and decisive victory. Unluckily for him, his despatch riders, who had been sent to give Hannibal a rendezvous in Umbria, fell into the hands of the Romans, and Nero acted at once. With a small body of about 7,000 men he slipped away by night from his camp in front of Hannibal and went racing northwards by forced marches. The armies of that campaign were very small and that reinforcement was enough to give the Romans facing Hasdrubal superiority. On the morning after Nero's junction with Salinator two bugle calls (symbols of consular rank) were sounded in their camp and Hasdrubal knew that both consuls were in front of him. He fell back, but, again, fortune was against him. The Metaurus was in flood and he had to stand. The annihilating defeat which he suffered entailed the loss of the second Punic War. Before Hannibal had realised Nero's absence, he was back again and, as a token of triumph, Hasdrubal's head was thrown into his brother's camp.

There is an episode from which, it seems to me, we can draw lessons which are not yet out of date on the use of interior lines against divided forces, on great risks being justified in great emergencies and on the value of strategic surprise. Here, not only was there no tactical surprise, but none was attempted. The consuls actually sounded their two bugle calls for moral effect so that Hasdrubal's troops should realize their danger. If you ask whether such a manœuvre is possible in modern times I answer that it is not really so very different from that which was carried out by Rommel in Tunisia in February 1943 to strike at the First Army as the Eighth approached, and it brought him, uniting his forces with the German forces already in Tunisia, at least one smashing victory in the Kasserine Pass, although, unlike Nero's venture, it ended in failure.

The second illustration I am taking is from a campaign which has long fascinated me. In 1511 the French had possessed themselves of the Republic

of Genoa in satisfaction of an old family claim of Louis XII. They had seized a portion of Venetian territory, including the strong fortress of Brescia and, beyond the Po, the Papal city of Bologna. The King's nephew and lieutenant-governor, Gaston de Foix, now found himself facing very great odds, the army of the so-called Holy League founded by the Pope, Ferdinand the Catholic of Spain, and by Venice, and on top of this he suddenly had to deal with 10,000 Swiss pikemen, the best in Europe, who poured through the Saint Gotthard. He was twenty-two, the age of Condé at Rocroi and, with him, the youngest military genius of all time. I did not think that a slightly academic lecture like this needed a map and I am sure that your memories of North Italy will show you Milan in the centre of the plain, Brescia about 50 miles east more or less on the fringe of the foothills, Bologna something like 100 miles south of Brescia, and Ravenna, which I shall come to in a moment, on the coast, south of Lake Commachio.

The superiority of strength against him in the whole of Italy may not have been enormous but many of the French troops were in garrisons and could not be moved and the superiority in the field which he had to face was well above two-to-one. He had to protect Brescia from the Venetians, he had to protect Bologna from the main forces of the Holy League and Lombardy from the Swiss. He had to guard against disaffection in French-occupied territory north of the Po and his final ambition was to overrun the whole of the Papal States and the Spanish domains of Naples. If he fought the Swiss he could hope to beat them but he would be terribly mauled and quite incapable of fulfilling his other tasks. So he would not fight the Swiss. He knew that they were ex-mercenaries out of a job and in search of loot primarily so that they might not remain very long in the field of battle. He drew back from their country and took refuge in the fortress of Milan while his lieutenant, the celebrated Byard, harried them, and although they brushed him aside he gave them a very uncomfortable time. The winter was appalling. Decembers in Italy, you remember, can be most unpleasant. Suddenly the Swiss turned and retreated in considerable disorder back over the pass into their own country. It looked like a great chance but Gaston was strong-minded enough to let them go. The Spanish Viceroy was marching on Bologna, where the garrison was too small to man the great perimeter of the walls. The Venetians were advancing on Brescia where, again, the garrison was inadequate and the citizens were hostile. At Bologna Gaston hesitated. Bologna was the more important but if he moved to its aid he not only left Brescia to its fate but uncovered the Milanese to the Venetians and the possible return of the Swiss. But he put Bologna first. Then a message came in that the forces of the Holy League were not big enough completely to invest Bologna and had not done so, that they had, in fact, already breached the walls with their own artillery but that the northern gate was so far clear. He was already on the move and by that time had reached Finale, south of the Po, and during the very foul night of February 12th, 1512, he marched well over 25 miles in the dark to Bologna and managed to get in by that uncovered gate. The following night the army of the Holy League drew off. The commander, Ramon de Cardona, did not want to storm the place now. Before we condemn him we have to understand one very prominent characteristic of those wars fought very largely by mercenaries and hired troops. The Spanish Viceroy knew that the ally of the French, the

Emperor Maximilian, was cooling off and might at any moment withdraw the German Landsknechte, which was a valuable force in the French Army. Once again Gaston did not pursue them, and on the very day that he left Finale the Venetians had, with the aid of the Swiss, fought their way out and the French garrison had taken refuge in the citadel. He marched again and this time, to shorten his route, he demanded a passage through the neutral territory of Mantua, and got it. On the way he surprised and routed a Venetian force escorting guns to Brescia, and, once again, he did not pursue them.

By February 15th he had completed that march of over 100 miles. First, he was able to do rather characteristic siege warfare, much the same as what he had done at Bologna but this time as regards the citadel and not the city. In the darkness and under heavy rain he slipped a reinforcement into the city and then he ordered his Gascons and the Germans to take off their shoes so as not to slip on the wet ground and led them to the assault on the city, himself barefoot. He took the city and, having done so, he learned that a day later the citadel would have surrendered. In order to excite the troops, he had promised them the loot from this very rich place, with the consequence that the most horrible massacre followed. That was the custom of the time, but it does not make it a particularly agreeable episode. It paid by the loot they obtained from the assault but it certainly did not pay afterwards because his troops were completely loaded with loot and it is believed that a great number deserted forthwith in order to dispose of their profits. It looked very likely now—more likely than ever—that the alliance with the Emperor would lapse and that the German contingent would be withdrawn, so he had to act quickly. Now, at last, having secured the two cities, he could seek out and fight the Army of the Holy League.

First, he had to give his troops a little rest, and then south he went again, in this appalling weather, crossed the Po and concentrated at his old halting-place, the town of Finale. There he was held up by flooded roads but he received reinforcements from France and, most important of all, he was joined by the artillery train of Alfonso d'Este, Duke of Ferrara. He had left his own artillery behind and had had to face the Spanish artillery. The Spanish Viceroy was still in the same frame of mind: he was still not eager for battle but hoped that the Germans would withdraw first from the French Army, and he knew very well that the French were short of supplies, which he was not. It was naturally Gaston's aim to make him fight and to do that he moved on to the fortress of Ravenna which he did not think the Spaniards could afford to lose. He breached the walls and actually launched an assault which was repulsed but which served its purpose. The Army of the Holy League came marching up to the relief of Ravenna and there, on Easter Sunday, April 11th, Gaston de Foix attacked it on the banks of the Ronco. That was the fiercest and greatest of the French wars in Italy. The details of it are of very great interest to artillerymen in particular because it is credited with having the first, what one may call, "artillery preparation" in a battle in the open field and it certainly was marked by the first tactical shift of artillery on the battlefield. I cannot describe that here, but I will only add one story which I would describe as a tribute to the prestige and leadership of Gaston, although you may prefer to call it the most extraordinary luck.

The story goes that the German commander came to him before he went

into battle, showed him a letter from the Imperial Court ordering him to withdraw his forces from the Army and told him that he was going to put it into his pocket and fight that day. Gaston gained a great and decisive victory but when all was over he ran into a little Spanish detachment that had broken through and was fighting its way out again; he was killed on the spot. It is very seldom that military history can prove as convincingly as here the influence of inspired leadership.

On the removal of Gaston the French cause collapsed absolutely and in a very short time they lost all their Italian holdings and were right back behind the Alps. Byron, composing "Don Juan" near the scene, wrote:—

"I canter by the spot each afternoon
Where perished in his fame the hero-boy
Who lived too long for men, but died too soon
For human vanity, the young de Foix!
A broken pillar, not uncouthly hewn,
But which neglect is hastening to destroy,
Records Ravenna's carnage on its face,
While weeds and ordure rankle round the base".

We will freely admit that the genius of the nephew of the King of France counted a great deal more than in the case of a humbler person, but even apart from the question of pure leadership I think we can see an example of the principle, not confined to warfare, of dealing with first things first. The Swiss invasion, the safety of Milan, Bologna, Brescia and, through them, Lombardy and the French holdings in the Papal States, and Venetia, were all of high importance, but behind them stood the Army of the Holy League with its contingent of a majority of first-class Spanish infantry. The other tasks had to take precedence of the task of meeting it but while it was in being they had to be carried out with the very strictest economy. They were, none-the-less, adequately performed.

You may think that the story that I have told you, whether true or not—in fact, I believe that there is fair evidence of it—of the threatened withdrawal of the Landsknechte could not be reproduced to-day. Perhaps not exactly, yet something like it occurred in modern times.

In July 1918 Foch, knowing that a great German offensive was coming in Champagne (the last German offensive, as it proved to be) called upon Haig to send British divisions to the flanks of the Châteaux-Thierry salient, and Haig complied, although his own front, far north, was very heavily threatened. The British Government did not actually countermand the order but invited Haig to appeal against it, which would have been in accordance with the power which had been given to him. Haig took the risk. He came near enough to imitating Gaston's loyal German commander.

If you will bear with me, I will cite one more campaign, more recent but still more than a century-and-a-half ago. It is the German campaign of 1796.

The Archduke Charles had been pushed back from the Rhine and was now facing the advance of two separate French armies on separate lines, in separate columns: Moreau on the road on the left, or north bank of the Danube; Jourdan on the main road which runs through Nuremberg in the direction of Vienna. The archduke struck a blow—not a decisive blow—at Moreau at Neresheim and then broke away and crossed to the south bank of the Danube. Moreau

followed but lost him and the archduke again marched east and crossed the river lower down, this time in secret and unseen, with a small part of his force and marched to the aid of his detachment facing the French army of Jourdan. He came in suddenly on the French right flank. He inflicted successive sharp defeats on the French at Amberg and Wurzburg and then hustled Jourdan back to the Rhine. By this time Moreau was on the go to avoid being isolated and the archduke marched southwards, attacked Moreau in the Black Forest and pushed him also over the Rhine, with a force inferior in numbers to the French clearing them right out of Germany east of the Rhine. It has always been considered a brilliant campaign and it was fought by a general in his twenties!

I think that we can all see the merits of the course pursued by the archduke and I will not discuss them. There is, however, something more to be said. First, it seems to me that after his blow against Moreau at Neresheim he took an extraordinary risk in crossing to the south side of the Danube because he left Moreau free to join Jourdan. Did he know then that Moreau would follow him? That has never been made clear, despite the mass of writing about this campaign.

Another point illustrates the eternal problem to be solved by a commander fighting on interior lines against a divided enemy and making up his mind to fall on one or other of the hostile forces. In most cases he would have to leave a retaining force to watch the other. How great must the retaining force be in relation to his total resources? Whatever the result, he is sure to be assailed by fervent appeals and supplications from the commander of the retaining force who feels that he is being sacrificed. The only answer is that it should not be strong enough to allow that commander to fight a pitched battle, and, if he is known to be an enterprising customer, not strong enough even to tempt him to do so. His force is a containing and delaying force and the only actions it should try are rear-guard actions.

Here comment is easy because we have a great military critic to give us a lead. You may be astonished to hear who it is—the archduke himself! In my experience of generals, ancient and modern, I find little disposition on their part to tell us about their mistakes! They tell us all about the other fellow's mistakes with great candour but very rarely about their own. I suppose, for that matter, that if a surgeon removes the wrong organ, as I imagine sometimes happens, he does not usually write to *The Lancet* and say so. But the Archduke Charles, himself a great writer as well as a great commander, goes in regularly for this astonishing practice. And he was a far better general than many who never appear to have made any mistakes at all. He always writes in the third person and includes such sentences as: “Here the archduke, owing to youth and inexperience, was assuredly in error”.

In the conduct of a campaign of that sort, with inferiority of numbers, the commander obviously cannot be strong enough to meet the enemy everywhere on equal terms. If he concentrates against one wing of a divided enemy he must, in any case, leave the force containing the rest in great inferiority. If his great blow succeeds he has nothing more to worry about but he must steel his heart against allotting the containing force more than is economically necessary: a surplus will do it no commensurate good but will weaken the execution of his plan. This campaign seems to me to illustrate usefully both the

great principles that we are told to bear in mind to-day: what is called "economy of force" and maintenance of the objective.

I have been talking chiefly in terms of strategy. I am not prepared to admit, however, that no material profit can be had from the study of tactics. Take, for example, the question of rear-guard tactics in retreat. I have no time to embark on another military story so I cannot really illustrate that, but I can just allude in passing to an instance which, to some of you, may be so well known that it does not require to be discussed. I refer to Massena's retreat from the Lines of Torres Vedras and the conduct of the rear-guard by Ney. This has always been considered a notable exposition of the art of rear-guard tactics, especially in view of the fact that it was carried out with jaded, hungry, ill-fed troops against fresh, well-fed men, who had been sitting in the lines at Torres Vedras with ships coming in regularly into Lisbon with their quick-footed general in Wellington. The principle, of course, is that of forcing the pursuer to make a succession of deployments delaying his advance until the last safe moment but not allowing the rear-guard to be over-run. Ney did on one occasion hold on just a few minutes too long and suffered thereby more loss than was necessary, but otherwise his tactics and use of ground could hardly have been bettered, and the same may be said of Wellington's tactics of pursuit. "Interesting", the sceptic will say, "but what is the material value of it to-day?" He will say "To-day we have artillery with ten times the range of the artillery used in the Napoleonic wars; we have aircraft which may prevent any movement of considerable columns in daylight; we have armoured forces which can turn a rear-guard position in a quarter of the time that it would take infantry to do it. On the other hand, we have engineers who, in the defiles of country like the Valley of Tagus and its tributaries, can bring down the sides of a cliff across the roadway or mine it to delay pursuit. So much has changed since the day when Wellington, Massena and Ney manœuvred that the lessons that this operation provides are out of date". I do not agree. It seems to me that one might just as well say that the general doctrines on which British tactics are founded to-day cannot be applied to Cyrenaica, Western Europe and Korea. I do not agree that that is the case. Sweeping modifications must, of course, sometimes be made for varying terrain and hostile tactics and these modifications will affect time, distance, concentration and intervals between concentration; yet the broad principles cover differences of circumstances for a given moment of time and to some extent also they cover differences of conditions historically—that is, over a period of time.

I have nearly done and I will not call upon your patience or the attention you have been so kind as to give me much longer. You have at least *looked* interested, which is always a compliment to any speaker. The last few words that I want to say will be more of a general and abstract nature. I will suggest that military history, studied with imagination, apart from the concrete examples that it can give, can also be, as it were, food and sustenance for the mind of the professional fighting man, and for others too. It is a part of general history, without which that becomes lopsided, incomplete and sometimes only half comprehensible. The political and economic development of the world has been profoundly influenced by war. Science, habits, literature, art, architecture, they have all had its mark stamped upon them. Its terms and phrases are woven into the language with which we express ourselves in speech or with

the pen. The course of events, which people called "Determinists" look upon as inevitable, has, in fact, constantly been shaped by war. Often it has been abruptly altered in unexpected and unpredictable ways by decisions achieved in war, and as actors reappear on the stage in different coats in successive scenes, so warriors pass before us in different guises but all playing their parts in the eternal and unending drama of history.

"The story of the human race is war". Those words were written by our present Prime Minister 23 years ago. "Except for brief and precarious intervals", he went on, "there has never been peace in the world and before history began murderous strife was universal and unending". War is brutal and irrational, but it exists. Perhaps it may one day be abolished. I do not expect to see that day and the youngest of those of you who are listening to me will not expect to either. If great leaders, great armies and navies and, in more recent times, great air forces, have upset the apparently inevitable in destiny, have created new powers while eliminating others, then surely it must be both interesting and profitable to trace the course of their wars, campaigns and battles, why they took place, why victory awarded her palms as she did, what were the effects of these conflicts, how far and with what variations they are likely to be reproduced. Whether or not I have convinced you, I hope that you have found my plea to be at least worthy of your attention. (*Applause.*)

THE CHAIRMAN: If anyone would like to ask any questions, Captain Falls will be delighted to answer them.

I would like to ask one. In your study of history what value do you place upon the work of previous professors of the study of war, such as Clausewitz?

CAPTAIN FALLS: I am not at one with the man who taught me most about war, who had a great down on Clausewitz and considered Jomini a much more valuable writer. Personally, I think that the work of Clausewitz contains a great deal of considerable value, greater than that of Jomini. I appreciate that Clausewitz was wordy and rather woolly and that his work was left in considerable disorder, and I really think that the three volumes of the English version would probably go quite comfortably, and with certain improvements, into one.

Hamley, I always think, is on a lower plane but I think that he is very interesting. He is a very good writer, which Clausewitz was not. Foch, also, I think is very interesting.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would you not distinguish between the strategical and political parts of Clausewitz and the tactical?

CAPTAIN FALLS: I do not think that anybody reads the tactical chapters of Clausewitz.

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are always told that the principles of war are few and good. I suppose that that must be true because nobody ever seems able to invent any new ones; they go from one edition of Field Service Regulations to another more or less unchanged. Captain Falls has shown us those principles very clearly. He said that they illustrated tactics as well as strategy, and I think that that is undoubtedly true, and we must all agree with him.

Throughout history the examples that our lecturer took were extremely interesting—those of the Carthaginian War and the two consuls, Gaston de Foix in the sixteenth century, Jourdan and Moreau and the archduke. I was rather

interested in that because the other day I had a talk with General Eisenhower in Paris and he spoke about the organization of higher commands of N.A.T.O. He said that what N.A.T.O. was busy trying to do now was to try and organize commands at the highest practicable level. He used as examples Napoleon in Italy and Jourdan on the Rhine in '97 and how in those days it did not matter "tu'pence" to Jourdan or Napoleon what the other was doing because they were completely in watertight compartments of their own. Then he went on to talk about his own command, the Mediterranean Command and the Middle East Command. He said that in present conditions all three of those were inextricably mixed up one with another, that no directive you could give to one commander-in-chief or supreme commander would serve for another one so that the only thing to do was to get the right chaps in command so that they could meet and reach understanding by give-and-take.

At the moment we have been unable to reach agreement with the Americans as to where the dividing line comes in that particular area because I gather the Americans want a Mediterranean commander and we think that Mantini has as much as he can practically control.

I always think that Ney is one of the most fascinating characters in history. I forget who it was that described Ney handling the retreat from Moscow: the observer saw the rabble of the Grand Army going by, straggling and dishevelled, when a red-capped chap came along to whom he said "Where is the rear-guard of the Grand Army?" and Ney replied "I am the rear-guard of the Grand Army!" It seems to me to have been one of the tragedies of history that Ney was shot. No doubt he did technically commit treachery, but can you forgive Wellington's action, Ney having been sentenced to death and having begged for clemency, in saying that he saw no reason to interfere with the course of justice? That, I do think, was a pity.

That is all that I have to say, beyond thanking our lecturer enormously for a most fascinating lecture. (*Applause.*)

QUO VADIS.

By "SCREW GUN".

IN 1946 a parliamentary statement told us that, except for Special Occasions, parades to attend Divine Worship were to be abolished and that henceforth all ranks of His Majesty's Forces were to be free to worship as and when they pleased. The announcement, coming so soon after the struggle against the powers of evil filled many with dire apprehension. They saw the apparent national forsaking of a power which had sustained them on the naked battlefield but which apparently was still to be enlisted on "Special Occasions". However, be that as it may, the innovation appealed to the masses of the public, many of whom it must be remembered had, at one time or the other served in some branch of the Armed Forces.

Six years have passed since the innovation and it is both right and proper to take stock of the position as it exists after a fair testing period. With National Service in full operation, the Army in particular, has a responsibility both to the Nation and the Commonwealth. To permit a problem which may affect the future well-being of our Commonwealth to pass undiscussed into the limbo of forgotten things is to shirk the responsibility that greatness imposes upon our services. To discuss this problem it is essential to know the history of it and perhaps to view it through a pre-war "other rank's" eyes may be a new angle for many who never had the pleasure of serving in the pre-war ranks.

My regiment was, I suppose, very much like any other, and the officers, W.Os., N.C.Os. and men, much the same as one would have found in a regiment in Northern, Southern, Eastern or Western Commands. That we were stationed in Aldershot Command probably added to our chores as well as (at least we thought so) to our efficiency. Until a matter of two years before the war we were horsed and in fact only in 1937 did our beloved old nags give way to grease, oil, petrol fumes and accident reports. The demise of the horse and the advent of mechanization brought about a social change in the life of a sub-section which is directly associated with the problem we are discussing. Whilst we had our horses, life in a sub-section was based on a seven-day week, our friends in the stables requiring that amount of attention.

Sunday was reserved for such chores as clipping manes, pulling tails, scrubbing out the stable, barrack-room decorating and "buzzing". Of course the inevitable mess-cart and spare-wheel set had to be cleaned. As well as all these jobs (which cropped up every week) there was the Church Parade detail to be found. Planning all these jobs, and the details for Church was the duty of our No. 1, a fine upright soldier of many years service, whom we respectfully knew as "Daddy Miles".

Because we seldom wanted a "week-end" we didn't mind these stable chores but the Church Parade used to rankle. Perhaps at this stage I'd better

say that I was U.B. and I automatically had to attend "U.B." once a month. However, U.B. or not I was still on "Daddy's" shadow roll for "C. of E." and often I "stood in" for a "C. of E." who wanted a week-end or who was "Required in the Lines". We were a very happy sub-section, run by a most competent sergeant, who seldom spoke to us except to serve out a detail, a pat on the back, or if needs be (and always merited) a resounding kick in the pants.

It is not disrespectful to say that until Mechanization arrived to upset our daily pleasantries we seldom saw the officers, and only once during stable-hour was it likely an officer would appear in the lines. This of course was due to the dire shortage of officers and the great capabilities of persons like "Daddy" with whom the battery was well posted.

Such then was the position in the days of the horse. To summarize, Sunday was not a wholesale rest day except for the horses. In the lines there were jobs to be done and if one wasn't on a job then it was a pretty safe bet one was on Church. However, "Jack being like Paul" everything leant itself to a contented atmosphere.

Why then did the Church Parade rankle? To answer this question it is necessary to draw on one's memories and although I believe the views to be essentially true, no doubt they can be debated.

After the first World War the Nation as a whole, had largely lost the habit of church going. This indifference was due to a variety of reasons. The general frustrations that followed in the wake of wholesale economic difficulties at family level, the failure to produce "Homes for Heroes", the dire problems of wholesale unemployment all helped to add grist to the devil's mill of discord and apathy. The advent of "mechanical" entertainments such as the cinema all helped to add for apathy in the mind if not the body. It was under such conditions as these that the recruit of the "years between the Wars" had been weaned. Empty grates and ill-filled stomachs produced material not always amenable to the accepted standards of the golden Edwardian age. The church of the day had, of necessity, to bear its share of the blame for that shocking state of affairs.

If such was the end of the story then indeed the tale would be tragic. Fortunately it does not end with all the described pent-up misery and apathy. Once in the Army, many found that the problems of civil life no longer marched with them. Once in uniform, a man's body and mind were kept active. The pay received was meagre in the extreme but at least it fostered intent for promotion and careful fellows always had a few shillings in their pockets on the night before pay day.

Sound man-management by the officers ("May their tribe increase") and first-rate N.C.Os. soon produced a frame of mind in their soldiers which did much to eradicate the cancer that had enveloped the minds of many of their charges. Many soldiers soon learned to appreciate the thrill of communal worship, and without doubt further progress was made towards making them better citizens. With added length of service the only real moan that the soldier had as far as church was concerned was the never-ending session of inspections which preceded the parade. Many saw, in this succession of inspections the very negation of the self-respecting individualism they had discovered whilst serving "with the Colours". That this was true can be borne

out by any pre-war ranker. They had learned to accept the church service as a part of a well regularized existence and indeed in many cases thoroughly enjoyed a service in which a thoughtful padre had included well-known hymns, a popular short lesson and an even shorter sermon. The string of inspections however continued to receive caustic comment.

Such was the case during the days of the horse. With the advent of Mechanization there came in its wake a major upheaval in the life of the battery. The seven-day week disappeared and the expert in the stable either had to learn a new trade or cease to be an expert. Many chose to leave and thus the steadying influence of those stalwarts (among whom alas was included such competent fellows as "Daddy") was lost. We did our best to grapple with what was indeed a dire problem. Perhaps a fair simile is the "Five-day week" in the coal industry to-day.

The war.

As the war came and progressed through its catalogue of failure to ultimate victory, the soldier re-discovered the value of communal worship. Indeed it seemed that units had once again discovered the value of unremitting toil and a seven-day week. True enough, many of our services were informal and devoid of that unpopular succession of inspections but the value both officers and men received from these services was beyond measure. The soldiers enjoyed the services.

Out of action most units held services as acts of Commemoration and Dedication, which were formal parade services. As far as my battery was concerned these parades were devoid of all inspections above that conducted by the No. 1. Now a battery commander, I insisted on detailed inspection at No. 1 level and no higher. My Nos. 1 knew that their responsibilities went further than technical and field ability and embraced every aspect of man management.

A sub-section was a family and the No. 1 was the undisputed head, so long as he maintained the standard expected. Fail once he was rebuked and helped, fail twice and he was replaced.

1946.

The years 1945-46-47 saw the breaking up of all those intimate sub-section "families" for many fine Nos. 1 had "passed on" just as "Daddy" had gone in 1936-37. Many of the officers had returned to civil life and all continuity had fallen by the wayside. Many of the padres had also left to take up ministrations within their parishes. That rapid demobilization was undoubtedly politic and indeed necessary for the well-being of the nation as a whole, there can be no doubt, but the wholesale departure from the armed forces of its well-tested regimental officers and N.C.Os. had a grave effect on the moral outlook and discipline of those who remained, the newly-enlisted and conscripted.

These grave inadequacies in the fabric of the Post-War army were apparent and great efforts were made by our senior officers to put the matter right. They recognized that the solution to the evil problem which beset the army in those days lay in the re-establishing of the N.C.O. as a competent commander, the thorough grounding of the National Servicemen in his initial training and above

all in the return to the policy of "energetic work". The only partial success which was the fruit of these labours was only due to the fact that the paucity of good N.C.O. material precluded from the beginning the wholesale success their labours deserved. It is a relatively easy job to make a soldier technically efficient but the quality of leadership so necessary in junior N.C.Os. can only come with experience, which must largely depend on length of service. Thus the order issued in 1946 was received by an army devoid of any semblance of its former self, an army which through no fault of its own had had its basic structure shattered.

The trumpetings in the Press which accompanied the order talked of "Freedom"—but failed to mention that discipline—personal discipline, is a prerequisite of "Freedom" as we like to define it. What has happened since the conclusion of "War-Time Demob" is not interesting.


The war-time amity of the major powers has not found itself strong enough to equal the crucial test of peace. As a result, we have found ourselves at war in Malaya and Korea. There is trouble in the Canal Zone and over the whole world an atmosphere of mistrust, fear and frustration reigns. Political feelings at home have run so strong that the unity with which we fought the war seems like a fond illusion. In all spheres Moral leadership has suffered a sad setback. There has been of course exceptions, none greater than that of our late Captain-General, but their great examples have been lost in a myriad of lamentable, misplaced theories of undisciplined freedom, personal greed and selfishness. The army, being a servant of the people, has of necessity been affected by such theories.

Can anyone whose heart and soul is vested in the interests of his regiment say that such a state of affairs is as he would like it to be?

To anyone who has a love of country, pride of race, family and regiment there can only be one conclusion.

The present arrangement is wrong for it denies us a mutual strength which, because of our inability to exert ourselves we are incapable (apparently) as a race, to embrace by spontaneous effort.


What we require is to re-dedicate ourselves and thus by our continuous efforts set an example to our country. We must needs brace ourselves for the good of our service and regard every day as a "Special Occasion" in the service of our country and not necessarily ourselves. To attain this ideal it will be necessary to accept every assistance and it is assuredly true that there is nothing more powerful than the re-establishing of the Christian faith as an integral part of our daily disciplined existence. To that end undoubtedly the act of communal worship as a part of regimental life should be re-instituted.



ROYAL GARRISON CHURCH of ST. GEORGE - WOOLWICH
partial demolition & protective works - garden layout

DESIGNED BY LEONITA LINDY TRIDA
LEONITA LINDY, JOSEPH HILL & PARTNERS
25 ST. MARK AVE., LONDON, E.C.3. 1952.

FIG. 1.



LINDY
1952

FIG. 2.




FIG. 3.

REGIMENTAL PLAN TO REBUILD THE ROYAL GARRISON CHURCH OF ST. GEORGE, WOOLWICH.

THE Garrison Church at Woolwich was severely damaged by bombs during the late war. The extent of this damage was such that not only was it impossible to continue worship in the Church, but the question of rebuilding after the war could not even be considered in view of the financial situation and the grave shortage of building materials.

When it was decided to make Woolwich the Headquarters of the Royal Artillery, the Regiment tried very hard to persuade the War Department to rebuild the Garrison Church but without success. The need for a Regimental plan then became clear, and a civilian architect was engaged to produce plans for the progressive rebuilding of the Church. These plans have been approved by the D.R.A. and have been designed to preserve certain parts of the old Church and the memorials, so that past, present and future Gunners will feel that all was not lost through the bombing.

The plans envisage rebuilding the Church in three stages—the first stage will involve the partial demolition of the old Church, leaving only the outside side walls at a height of 5 feet, the Sanctuary, the West porch and the old pillars and beams of the Nave. The effect of this tidying up of the ruins is illustrated by figures 1 and 2: the scheme is simple, costs only £1,150 and enables the Church to be used for open-air services for congregations of up to 1,500.

As more funds become available and as the demand grows, the second stage will be implemented; this includes roofing in the East End (the Sanctuary Apse) in its new form, completing the West Wall with modified flanking porches as seen in figure 3, and building the roof structure and temporary walls of the Nave along the line of pillars shown in figure 1. The Church will then seat 500 and will cost about £11,500. A further sum of about £2,000 will be needed for church furniture (including repair of the organ).

Finally, Stage 3 will complete the new Church as shown in figure 3. This will be a costly business and estimates show that about £21,000 will be required.

This article is not an appeal for money to carry out the Regimental plan. Money for Stage 1 is being found under Woolwich arrangements; Stages 2 and 3 are still out of sight in the future, but it is believed that the Regiment—past and present—want to know what is being done about their Church at Woolwich and it is felt that the Regiment will be grateful to those who have made this effort to preserve a heritage of the past and plan—with the eye of faith—for the future.

WHY NOT AN AIR O.P.?

By MAJOR P. W. MEAD, R.A.

(Illustrations by CAPTAIN JOHN MOSS, M.C., R.A.)

ONE of the most remarkable features of the Royal Regiment at the present day is that there is a shortage of Air O.P. pilots. This is due, no doubt, partly to the somewhat short tour which an officer performs in Air O.P. units, and to the consequently large percentage of qualified pilots who are employed in other jobs, but nevertheless the basic cause of the shortage is simply that insufficient Gunner officers volunteer for Air O.P. Training.

When one considers that an officer who so volunteers is not only taught to fly and trained to a standard far in advance of that necessary for a civilian "A" licence, that he not only receives such training free of charge, but is actually paid flying pay, when one considers that his service in an Air O.P. unit introduces him to Field Gunnery at a far higher level than he will ever encounter it as a subaltern or captain in a field regiment, then it seems quite incredible that officers from all branches of the Regiment are not tumbling over one another to get into Air O.P.

There seem three possible causes of the present lack of enthusiasm to get into Air O.P., and the cynic will say that the chief cause is purely and simply lack of enterprise among young Gunner officers. Unquestionably the post-war years have bred in many young Britons—not only in young soldiers—the tendency to await direction, to take the line of least resistance, to go where they are told to go, and many a Field Artillery subaltern clings no doubt to the humdrum routine of the command post and the garage, rather than take the risk of launching out into the unknown waters of Air O.P. If such lack of enterprise is, however, the whole story, it is a poor outlook for the Regiment, and one sincerely hopes it is not.

Many officers are loth to embark on a long course without having before them a reasonable prospect of success. In most courses of over six months, the majority of the starters survive to pass the course, but some prospective volunteers for Air O.P. are no doubt discouraged by the fear that they will fail to qualify as pilots, and be left stranded, as it were, after having wasted two or three months. This is certainly a risk which Air O.P. volunteers must take. People do fail to qualify as pilots, but the majority of those who fail do so, not because of any physical or mental failings, but simply because they do not apply themselves to the course with sufficient care and concentration. If the prospective Air O.P. pilot realises that his flying training is likely to be strenuous and resolves to work hard throughout it, he has the best possible prospects of qualifying.

The third of the reasons that may deter possible volunteers is that many officers in the Regiment undoubtedly harbour considerable misconceptions as to what Air O.P. officers and Air O.P. units are like. A particular fallacy one


sometimes meets is that the Air O.P. officer is a sort of Pilot Officer Prune, an exaggeration of the Fighter Pilot of fiction and cartoon, a being that, swathed in flying helmets, parachutes, and Irving jackets, lounges against bars, a "birdman" rather than a Gunner. Another fallacy (more dangerous than the first) is that Air O.P. is a backwater, divorced from the main stream of the Regiment and unprofitable to the careers of ambitious young Gunner officers. Both these fallacies, and others no doubt, have been from time to time "tolerated", shall we say, if not actually fostered by C.Os. who do not wish to lose their best young officers.

Perhaps the best way of dispelling the various fallacies that exist about Air O.P. is to describe the progress of a Gunner officer, from the planting of the first seeds of the idea in his mind, to his final retirement, thirty years later, covered with medals, marshal's batons and wings.


Preparation.

The conditions of service for Air O.P. officers are contained in Army Council Instruction 372 of 1950. Since, however, A.C.Is. are perhaps not the most widely read of our national literature, it might be as well to state here that Regular Gunner officers must have had three years service and must be medically fit (F.E.) before they can apply for Air O.P. training. National Service officers, however, who agree to join later an Auxiliary Air Force Air O.P. Squadron, can apply for Air O.P. training during their period of full-time service.

If an officer with leanings towards Air O.P. duties has any doubts on the score of air-sickness, the easiest way to resolve them is to get in touch with the nearest Air O.P. unit and ask for one or two passenger flights. If he explains the reason for his request, the squadron will be delighted to co-operate. Slight air-sickness, particularly in bumpy weather, is quite normal for many people when they first start flying either as pilot or passenger. It very soon passes



"— a sort of Pilot Officer Prune."



*"covered with medals,
marshal's batons and wings".*

attachment to a Field Regiment will undoubtedly be best. Instead, or in addition, he should apply for and complete a School of Artillery correspondence course in Field Gunnery. Until recently Air O.P. trainees did a short Gunnery Course at Larkhill before starting their flying training, but this no longer takes place.

In due course the applicant will no doubt be ordered to report to an R.A.F. Medical Board for his preliminary medical examination. This examination is thorough but not really formidable. The least popular item is usually the so-called mercury test, in which the victim has to blow into a tube for about a minute, to keep a column of mercury at a required level, while the doctors interest themselves in such matters as pulse and blood-pressure. A little practice with a football bladder, before the actual date, has always proved beneficial to the writer, and some experience of standing on one leg with one's eyes shut may prevent humiliation and damage when the time comes.

No fit Gunner officer is likely to fail this inspection, and the next communication the applicant is likely to receive is a posting to the R.A. Depot

off. If, however, the subject is one of those unfortunates who will always be air-sick, he will be aware after his first few flights of a deep yearning desire to keep both feet firmly on the ground. This is obviously best discovered before he gets to the Air O.P. School.

The next step is clearly to apply for Air O.P. training, and intending applicants may be interested to hear that commanding officers are not permitted to hold up such applications, even if the officer concerned does happen to be the "keystone" of the Regiment.

While awaiting the result of this application, it will be wise to brush up one's Field Gunnery, in relation both to G.P.O's. and C.P.O's. work and also to the engagement of targets. An officer in an active Field or R.H.A. regiment will probably find that a few extra periods of miniature range are all that he requires, but an A.A. Regimental Officer should prepare more fully for the Air O.P. course. If it can be arranged, a short but concentrated

with instructions to report on a given date to the Air O.P. School, Middle Wallop, Salisbury Plain.

The Air O.P. School.


Middle Wallop is situated on the main Andover-Salisbury road, some fifteen miles north of Winchester, in pleasant undulating Salisbury Plain country. The Air O.P. School shares this airfield with 657 Air O.P. Squadron.

Like all Air O.P. units, the Air O.P. School, while an R.A.F. unit, is composed of both Army and R.A.F. personnel. The Chief Instructor is a Gunner Lieutenant-Colonel, while the Chief Tactics Instructor and the Chief Instructor in Gunnery are both Gunner Majors. The Chief Flying Instructor is a Squadron-Leader. The School is organized into three flights—Elementary, Intermediate and Exercise; the first of these being commanded by a Flight-Lieutenant and staffed chiefly by R.A.F. Flying Instructors, the other two being commanded and staffed mostly by Gunner captains who are qualified Flying Instructors.


The newly arrived student will go first to Elementary Flight, where he will be introduced to the elementary trainer aircraft; unless the long-awaited Chipmunk aircraft have arrived by then, he will be astounded to discover that biplanes did not, after all, go out in the 1914-18 War. The Tiger Moth is however a most excellent little aircraft, combining the maximum of safety and manoeuvrability with the most ruthless revelation of the pilot's smallest faults. The student will find he flies always with the same instructor, and after some 8-12 flying hours (about a fortnight) he may expect to be sent off solo. One's first solo is a remarkable sensation and utterly unlike any other experience of this life—it is never forgotten.

The student will spend some ten weeks in Elementary Flight, before taking the first of his three practical flying tests with the Chief Flying Instructor (C.F.I.). Besides flying, he will be initiated by various ground instructors into the mysteries of such things as Navigation, Meteorology, Principles of Flight, Airmanship, Aero-engines and Aircraft instruments. He will also be introduced or re-introduced to morse-code by lamp and buzzer. Sometime about the middle of the whole course he will have to take an examination in these subjects set by the Central Examination Board (C.E.B.) of the R.A.F. Many harsh words have been spoken, and much literature directed, against the C.E.B. test, and it is no part of the writer's duties to add to that literature here. Suffice it to say that the test is simple but quite exasperating.

From Elementary Flight, the student, after a week's much needed leave, will move to Intermediate Flight, where he will meet the Auster for the first time. There are two kinds of dual-controlled Auster in current use, the Auster V and the Auster VII. Which of these will be encountered in Intermediate Flight the writer will not attempt to forecast. Air O.P. pilots are divided into those who claim that the Auster VII is sluggish, sloppy and difficult to land while the Auster V is a lovely dream, and those others who extol the virtues of the Auster VII while doubting their ability to land the Auster V at all without some form of anchor. Whichever school of thought is in the ascendant will determine the type of Auster to be used in Intermediate Flight. In either case the student will find a warm, comfortable all-weather aircraft,



"Auster V-11 - sluggish,
sloppy and difficult to handle"



"Auster V-5 - cannot be landed
at all without some form of anchor"

in which he can sit without first trussing himself up like a deep-sea diver, and in which his instructor is a substantial being seated beside him rather than a peevish tickling in the receivers of his flying helmet.

He will probably go solo in the Auster after a couple of hours flying, and will quickly learn to do all the same exercises, as he did in the Tiger Moth. He will now be taught to fly lower than was permitted before, and to do cross-



"- a substantial being seated beside one."

country flights at a low level. He will also be taught to land in and take off from suitable fields in the district. Later he will practice landings on short narrow strips, sometimes cross-wind. During this part of the course he will probably have his first introduction to night-flying. His ten weeks in this flight will conclude with the C.F.I.'s. second test.

The period in Intermediate Flight is undoubtedly the most testing time in the course. There is a definite tendency for pilots to go stale at this stage, and this is where the student's tenacity and concentration will be most needed.

Side by side with flying instructions, there will now be instruction in Gunnery, Wireless and Air Photography, besides the other ground subjects taught in Elementary Flight. One or two days' shooting will take place on the Larkhill ranges, students taking shoots from Ground O.P.s. The weeks leave at the end will be needed even more than before.

Exercise Flight comes to most students as a considerable relief. Less time is expended in routine flying exercises, and more time in interesting forms of applied flying. Besides shooting on the Artillery ranges, students carry out map-reading, wireless, flash-spotting and photographic exercises. They are now flying the Auster VI, which is the operational Air O.P. aircraft.

The Range days are extremely pleasant. Strips are laid out in close proximity to suitable ground O.P.s., and the aircraft are based there for the day. Custom has decreed that, instead of the austere stale-sandwich fare traditional on the Larkhill ranges, Air O.P. students and instructors shall be regaled with hot toothsome meals transported in thermos containers from Middle Wallop. Each student can expect to have anything from fourteen to twenty live Air O.P. shoots during his ten weeks in Exercise Flight, a very generous allotment indeed.

As the end of the course approaches students have an opportunity to state their preference for a posting, but there are still a few last-minute hurdles to cross. There is a final written examination, covering all aspects of Air O.P. and likely to catch-out the unwary who have studied no Meteorology or Principles of Flight since the C.E.B. test. There is the big final exercise ("Round-up"), designed to last one, two or three days according to circumstances, and involving a number of reconnaissances and occupations of landing grounds, shooting, photographic and other sorties. And there is his final trip with the C.F.I., though this holds far fewer terrors than did the previous two C.F.I. tests. And then, rather to his surprise, the student finds himself being presented with his Air O.P. wings.

As has been indicated before, the Air O.P. course is a strenuous one. No student can afford to drift along and hope the machine will churn him out as a qualified pilot. But his future is, in almost every case, in his own hands. Although there exist people who can never be made into safe pilots, they are few and far between; if they are not detected by the medical examination they will probably be detected during the first five weeks of the course.

When the now-qualified Air O.P. pilot leaves the school and joins his squadron he should be able to carry out the four basic types of sortie—shooting, information, photographic and inter-communication.

The Air O.P. Squadron.

There are Air O.P. units in the Far East, the Middle East, Germany and the United Kingdom. Although all squadrons are organized and trained to carry out the basic Air O.P. roles, local conditions place the emphasis in different directions in different theatres, and what is hereafter written about the squadron in Germany will not necessarily apply to other squadrons. The Air O.P. officer's responsibilities do not, however, vary much between theatre and theatre.

The Air O.P. Squadron is a R.A.F. Unit, and its officers and other ranks are administered under R.A.F. law. The Squadron is, however, operationally under command of the Commander Corps Royal Artillery, or of other appropriate Artillery Commander.

Each Air O.P. Flight is affiliated to one of the Infantry or Armoured Divisions in the Corps or Theatre, and is under command of the C.R.A. of that Division.

Each R.H.A. and Field Regiment (and where possible each Medium and Heavy Regiment also) has affiliated to it one Air O.P. Section. Where necessary in Operations the C.R.A. may place this section under command of the Regimental Commander.

These affiliations are carefully preserved during training, each Air O.P. Section accompanying its affiliated Regiment to Practice Camp and on exercises.

All the officers of the squadron are Gunner officers except for two R.A.F. officers, the Adjutant and the Equipment Officer. Other ranks of both Royal Artillery and Royal Air Force are, however, intermingled in all sub-units down to the smallest of all, the section. The section (which the newly-joined Air O.P. pilot will certainly command) consists of one Auster and pilot, one jeep and one 3-tonner. A Driver-Batman and a Driver Operator look after the Section Commander, the vehicles and the wireless sets respectively. Two airmen (an Engine-mechanic and an Air-frame-mechanic) look after the aircraft. A considerable load of responsibility falls upon these four other ranks, who have to select, prepare, and maintain the section landing grounds, in addition to their normal duties.

Attached to each squadron is a Mobile Servicing Section, composed mostly of R.A.F. technicians. Its function is to supervise or carry out such aircraft inspections and repairs as can be completed within the unit.


An Air O.P. Officer's Year.

In many respects the individual training season of an Air O.P. Squadron resembles that of any other Gunner unit. In the autumn the Squadron Commander and Flight Commanders take stock of their next year's personnel position, and calculate how many new drivers and signallers must be trained. In addition, during the winter months, all soldiers and airmen must complete their annual musketry course, and receive training in map-reading (most important in Air O.P. units), in the selection and preparation of Landing Grounds, and in aircraft handling. Section pilots inevitably find themselves deeply committed in the Squadron and Flight training programmes.

Unlike his counterpart in a Gunner regiment, however, each Air O.P. Officer has also the duty of keeping his own flying up to scratch, and indeed of improving it. He will normally be given a flying syllabus to complete,

including the practising of such things as Field Landings, Forced Landings, Concealed Approaches, Evasive Action, Cross-countries, Instrument Flying and many others, and this syllabus will involve pretty steady and regular flying. The newly-trained pilot will find he no longer receives the degree of supervision he had at the Air O.P. School, and unless he is careful he is very apt to acquire bad habits. He must also guard against carelessness and over-confidence, lest one day he finds himself extricating himself gloomily from some humiliating position and preparing to complete the extensive forms the R.A.F. produce for just such an emergency. Every section pilot has also to train a rear observer, a task which needs care, thought and sympathy, particularly in the early stages of his training.

About March, section training starts in earnest. The section pilot has now to train a team not only to find their way unerringly to what place they are ordered to go, overcoming by brilliant improvisation the thousand and one accidents which may befall them *en route*, not only to search for and discover




"— extricating himself gloomily from some humiliating position."

a suitable field for a landing ground and to determine the most favourable direction of approach, not only to prepare the landing ground for the pilot to land, but also to conceal, maintain and keep ready for instant action at any time both the aircraft and the two vehicles of the section. The leader of the section ground party, known in Gunner parlance as the "Number One", carries an enormous load of responsibility and must be a man of great initiative. Our benevolent Treasury does not grant him so much as a Lance-appointment.

Next comes Flight training, during which the Flight Commander practises the battle drills which enable him to control, move, and deploy his sections in the field.

By now summer will have broken out with its usual severity. Passenger carrying flights will have been rare in the cold, wet, bumpy weather of winter, but, with the return of sunshine and stable weather, those who formerly shunned Air O.P. now become possessed of a deep urge to travel by air. Other forms of co-operation, including reconnaissance and photographic sorties, are also demanded. Wherever possible these are carried out by the flight or section affiliated to the demanding H.Q. or unit.




"— a deep urge to travel by air."

As Brigade and Divisional training proceeds, sections and Flights accompany their affiliated Regiments and Divisional H.Qs. on the various exercises that take place. The whole countryside seems now ploughed up and under cultivation, and the selection of landing-grounds in suitable areas becomes a source of headache to the Air O.P. officers taking part in these exercises. It is only too easy to land in a field from which it proves impossible to take off—a situation fraught with embarrassment for the pilot. Section and Flight personnel become adept in the art of camouflaging aircraft and vehicles.

Throughout the summer R.H.A., Field and Medium Regiments are going to Practice Camp, always accompanied of course by their affiliated Air O.P. Section.

Gradually the scale and frequency of the exercises increase, until finally the Army/Air Force manoeuvres take place. Practical experience of evasive action from hostile fighters is normally obtained during these manoeuvres, which are consequently most valuable to Air O.P. units. With their conclusion ends the annual training cycle.



"— practical experience of Evasive Action."

Careers in Air O.P.

The official length of a Section Pilot's tour is only two years, which may however, be extended to three. During this tour he draws Flying Pay at 5/- a day, subject, needless to say, to Income Tax. (While under training at the Air O.P. School the rate of Flying Pay was only 3/- a day, however.)

It is possible for a Section Pilot to become a Flight Commander during his first tour, though this will depend largely on chance, according to the age,

service and flying experience of the other officers passing through the squadron during the period concerned. A Flight Commander's tour is automatically extended to three years.

At the end of this first tour, the Air O.P. Officer, with 600 to 900 flying hours to his credit, will return to Regimental Duty for a few years. During this period he can and should keep his hand in by flying with the nearest Air O.P. unit. If he is in England he can, if he wishes, join the Royal Artillery Aero Club, which gives him the additional advantage of being able to take up his wife or girl-friend and to shoot a pretty line to her. The powers-that-be have ordained that the Air O.P. officer shall not aspire to both the Gunnery Staff Course and the Staff College also, so if he has designs on the latter he must avoid being inveigled into the former.

After a few years in the wilderness, he should expect to be posted for a second Air O.P. tour, and this time he should, without difficulty, become a Flight Commander. He will certainly find this the best Captain's appointment in the British Army. If he is senior enough, of course, he might get a squadron on this or a subsequent tour.

Beyond this there will be few purely Air O.P. jobs for him, but a considerable number of staff and other appointments for those with experience of Army/Air co-operation.

The best Air O.P. officers are those who are primarily Gunner officers and only incidentally pilots. They will rightly regard flying as only a means to the end, the application of artillery fire on to vital targets. For the officer who becomes so bitten with the bug of flying that he cannot regard it in so secondary a light, a career as a flying instructor is clearly indicated. His tours of duty in that capacity will be the same as that of other Air O.P. pilots, but he will do much more flying during those tours.

Advantages of Service in Air O.P.

Enough has been written to give the Regimental Officer some idea of life in an Air O.P. unit, and to persuade him, surely, of what a very enjoyable life it is. It only remains to summarize some of the many advantages a Gunner officer may reap by applying for Air O.P. training.

To start with, he is, at his Majesty's expense, taught to fly an aeroplane. Flying is undoubtedly a notable, useful and enjoyable experience, and is normally a most expensive business.

Service in an Air O.P. unit is a most enjoyable experience. There are many reasons for this. One reason is the Air O.P. officer himself, for only the more enterprising, determined and capable officers win through to squadrons. Another reason is the existence in the unit of so many independent commands. A Flight Commander exercises a command of almost complete independence—certainly during the collective training season. Section Commanders too have enormous latitude to enable them to support their affiliated regiments in the manner worked out between C.Os. and Section Commanders. A third reason is the unusual degree of initiative which has to be accorded to other ranks of the unit. Air O.P. units in action naturally split-up into a number of small independently-moving groups, mostly under command of N.C.Os., Gunners or

Airmen. This delegation of initiative leads quickly and automatically to high morale and a fine team-spirit.

Technically there is little doubt that service in Air O.P. is most excellent preparation for the appointments of Troop or Battery Commander in Field or R.H.A. units. Air O.P. pilots have the opportunity of taking an unusually large number of live shoots both at the Air O.P. School and in Squadrons. They also have somewhat more intimate relations with their wireless sets than is the case normally. Field Branch C.Os. are almost always glad to receive tour-expired Section Pilots as Troop Commanders. Service in Air O.P. is of equal value as a prelude to the Gunnery Staff Course, should the officer's ambition lie in that direction.

No officer can serve in an Air O.P. unit without acquiring knowledge of R.A.F. methods and procedure, and of the R.A.F. attitude to certain problems. This knowledge and experience, and the fact of having been a pilot, may prove useful qualifications for future appointments on Army/Air Staffs, and for similar posts. The Army must, in time, achieve more and more control over its own air support, and appointments of the type referred to must surely therefore become more numerous and more important?

Most important of all, however, among the benefits conveyed by Air O.P. to those who serve in it, is the broadening of the individual's outlook.

The Section Pilot sees the battle, sees training, on the Regimental level. If he were still in a battery he would never see beyond the troop. The Flight Commander is the C.R.A.'s adviser, and his viewpoint is that of the division—in a Field Regiment his viewpoint would not be higher than that of the battery. This is of the greatest possible value to the Gunner officer's future career.

The performance of an unusual job (as is my job in Air O.P.), the command and administration of both Army and R.A.F. personnel, such things cannot fail to render the mind more flexible, and quicker to react to future crises. And surely it is not too long a shot to claim that the broader view habitually obtained by the pilot while flying cultivates a better eye for country when on the ground.

Every healthy young Gunner officer should aim to become an Air O.P. Pilot at the very earliest opportunity. He can be assured of a job of absorbing interest at the time, and of the greatest value to his career.

TEACHING ONE'S GRANDMOTHER.

By MAJOR R. L. DODD, R.A.

1030 Hours and in the middle of an Annual Inspection: the troops had been inspected; found to be in good order, although already rather hot and damp and the D.A.A.G. was in the office of Detachment Commander of the Guard Company in Lagos having, what he considered to be, a well-earned cup of tea. The phone rang: the Detachment Commander, with an air of a much harassed and badly treated officer, answered it.

He sprang to life; "Yes, Sir", "No, Sir", "What, Sir", "Yes, he's here with me". The D.A.A.G. took the phone. A voice said, "This is the G.O.C. You know that the proclamation of Her Majesty is taking place, well, a 21-gun salute is required to start at 1200 hours to-day. You are a Gunner—get going and do something about it: I have arranged for the 4 old 18-pounders outside the Ordnance Depot Office, to be on the Racecourse in Lagos at 1130 hours: there are no blanks, but the Sappers will make the necessary bangs. You get the Guard Company to parade the men you want, dress them up, teach them gun drill and be on the Racecourse at 1130 hours. I will be down for a few minutes". There was no answer, but, "Yes, Sir".

In the miraculously short time, 20 Hausa Infantrymen were on parade in ceremonial kit. Four chairs (Windsor), with poles laid across them were on the parade ground at satisfactory intervals and gun drill of a type which would horrify Larkhill, was being carried out. In no time the Hausas could take post, go through the motions of loading and laying and kneeling round the "guns" in an almost convincing manner. Of necessity the drill was abbreviated and simple in the extreme, but looked to the uninitiated, fairly reasonable.

The time soon went and by 1125 the D.A.A.G. was leading his four D.P. (Very) guns on to the very centre of the Racecourse as far away from the public view as possible. An "Action Right" (of sorts) and then some rapid modified drill. The Sappers at last, delighted to be allowed to produce some bangs, were laying charges in rows at a small distance from the front of each gun. The D.A.A.G. thought sadly of the inevitable courts of enquiry if they were perhaps a little too close. Arrangements were made that each time he ordered "Fire", fire by order by guns being considered the most satisfactory way of avoiding difficulties, the Sappers would fire a charge in front of the appropriate gun.

Noon arrived and the salute commenced, the whole 21 guns firing without mishap; much to the relief of the D.A.A.G.—the only Gunner within some 700 miles.

At 1300 hours, he ordered "Detachments rear", and in Hausa thanked the men for their enthusiasm and help and hinted that, given time, he might even make Gunners of them.

The Hausa S/Sgt. in charge returned the compliment in his most flowing style, but remarked that there was one thing they could not understand, that was, unless things had changed very much, the gun drill just taught them by the D.A.A.G. was certainly not the same as he taught them when they were Gunners in 1941 before they transferred to the Infantry!! There was no answer.

COURTS-MARTIAL APPEALS COURT.

By MAJOR F. L. LEE, M.C., R.A. (retired).

ON the 26th May of this year, for the first time in history, three of Her Majesty's High Court Judges sat at the Law Courts in London and heard the first appeal against a conviction by court-martial. The Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951, which came into force on the 1st May last, provided for the setting up of a Courts-Martial Appeals Court to hear appeals against conviction by Navy, Army and Air Force Courts-martial. The judges of the Court are the Lord Chief Justice and puisne judges of the High Court and such puisne judges as are nominated in Scotland and Northern Ireland and such other persons, "being persons of legal experience, as the Lord Chancellor may appoint". The Court shall consist of an uneven number of judges, not being less than three, and if the Lord Chief Justice so directs, the Court may sit outside the United Kingdom.

This Court is likely to have a far-reaching influence on the administration of military law as, for the first time, civil courts and Courts-martial are brought into close association.

In the past civil courts refrained from interference with the domestic affairs of the Services and only did so where the civil rights of the subject were endangered. This was not done by way of appeal from Courts-martial but by the issue of one of the prerogative writs. For instance, where an order or sentence of a court-martial affects civil rights, or a court-martial has acted in an irregular manner, application may be made to the High Court of Justice for a writ of *certiorari* calling upon the court-martial to certify and return the record of the proceedings. If the order or sentence is found to be invalid it will be quashed by the High Court. The writ will not, however, issue when the only matter involved is a question of military regulation or status. For example, if a court-martial has not observed the Rules of Procedure, that is a matter for the Convening Officer and, if necessary, the Judge Advocate General, but it is not for the High Court which will only interfere with military courts and matters of military law in so far as the civil rights of the soldier, or other persons with whom they deal, may be affected. In the same way, where it is alleged that a court-martial has exceeded its jurisdiction, a writ of Prohibition will issue to restrain it. So also, where a person alleges that he is illegally detained, a writ of *habeas corpus* may issue to test the legality of the detention.

From time to time since the Great War the question of a Courts-martial Appeals Court has been raised in Parliament and its advocates stressed that a court-martial was the only criminal court from which there was no appeal. That was true enough, but the convicted person had his case reviewed before confirmation by the Convening Officer and again by the Judge Advocate General. However excellent was this system of review, it had the fault of being carried out behind closed doors and consequently did not fulfil the principle that, "not

alone must justice be done, but it must manifestly be seen to be done". Indeed, the public and press were surprisingly ignorant of any such review as was evident in a recent case when a newspaper began to organize a petition against a conviction by court-martial before the conviction and sentence were confirmed. In that case, the then Attorney-General replying to a question in the House of Commons said the case was *sub judice* until confirmed and such action might be a contempt of court, whereupon the newspaper abandoned the petition.

In 1938 the Government set up a Committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Ronald Oliver (now Mr. Justice Oliver) to consider, *inter alia*, whether it was desirable and practicable that a person convicted by court-martial should have the right of appeal to civil judicial tribunal against conviction, and to make recommendations. The recommendations made by that Committee were left in abeyance owing to the outbreak of War in 1939. The Committee did not, however, recommend the right of appeal.

In 1946 another Committee was set up under the chairmanship of the late Mr. Justice Lewis with wider terms of reference which included consideration of the right to appeal against sentence also. This Committee made its report in 1948 and many of its recommendations, which did not require legislation, were brought into operation. The outstanding recommendation was that there should be a right of appeal against conviction, but not sentence, which was to remain a matter for Service Authorities whose power to mitigate, remit or commute should be preserved, as should the right to petition the reviewing authority and the Sovereign.

The Government's decision as to how far effect should be given to the recommendations of the Lewis Committee and the Committee on the Administration of Justice under the Naval Discipline Act has been embodied in the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951, part I of which is now in force.

A person convicted by Navy, Army or Air Force Court-martial who pleaded "not guilty" may, with leave, appeal to the Courts-Martial Appeals Court against conviction on the grounds that the findings of the court-martial is unreasonable, or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence, or involves a wrong decision on a question of law, or, that on any ground, there was a miscarriage of justice. If the appeal is allowed the Court will quash the conviction.

The Court also has fairly wide powers to deal with special cases and, in certain circumstances, it may substitute findings and sentences, but in every such case the sentence is not to be of greater severity.

The decision of the Court is final except where the Attorney-General grants a certificate that the decision of the Court involves a question of law of exceptional public importance when appeal to the House of Lords will lie.

As an additional safeguard, the Act provides for a special reference to the Court by the Judge Advocate of Her Majesty's Fleet and the Judge Advocate General, on a point of law of exceptional importance, and by the Admiralty and the Secretary of State, of matters not brought before the court-martial at the trial, such special reference shall be treated as an appeal by the person convicted against his conviction. Further, the Act does not take away the existing right of a person convicted by court-martial to petition the Sovereign, and there is nothing in the Act which affects Her Majesty's Royal Prerogative

to quash a conviction by a court-martial before an application for leave to appeal is made, and the Act preserves Her Majesty's Royal prerogative of mercy.

The Courts-Martial Appeals Rules 1952 prescribes the procedure to be followed by a convicted person desiring to appeal. The First Schedule contains Forms for use for that purpose. Form I is the application for leave to appeal. This is a simple form which can be filled up without difficulty except perhaps for the "grounds of appeal" which may require professional assistance. The Second Schedule sets out in different circumstances the persons to whom a petition is presented or an application is lodged. For example, in the case of an appellant serving with an army, air force or Royal Marines unit, to the Officer commanding the unit, and in the case of an appellant in detention elsewhere, to the commandant of such establishment, prison or barrack where confined.

The Rules also prescribe the period within which a person convicted by court-martial must present a petition as a condition precedent to the exercise of his right of appeal, which is, in the case of a conviction by an army or air force court-martial, 90 days next following that on which the finding of the court-martial was promulgated.

With regard to Question 4 on Form I—Application for leave to Appeal against Conviction—the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Goddard, when presiding at the first sitting of the Courts-Martial Appeals Court already referred to, made an important statement with regard to this. His Lordship said that the right of a person convicted by a court-martial to be present at the hearing of his appeal differed from that of a person appealing in civil life, since the former could only be present if the court gave him leave. His Lordship thought it very undesirable, especially in the case of men serving abroad, that the proceedings be held up in order to bring the appellant home. The Courts-Martial Appeals Court had no power under the Act of 1951 to deal with sentence, a respect in which it differed from the Court of Criminal Appeal, so that it would normally be considering only questions of law, or possibly mixed law and fact. The Court would, in those circumstances, give leave only if it were satisfied that the presence of the appellant would be useful and would serve the ends of justice. He went on to observe that in the experience of the Court of Criminal Appeal no useful purpose was served by the presence of the appellant in the vast majority of cases, except perhaps in appeals from sentence when the Court might decide to alter the sentence to probation. On the whole, Lord Goddard thought, it was a matter for regret that prison officers should have the additional burden of bringing prisoners to the Court when no useful purpose could be served thereby.

The Courts-Martial Appeals Court resembles the Court of Criminal Appeal and no doubt will also follow its procedure. As the Court will be presided over by a High Court Judge, except when sitting outside the United Kingdom no doubt a body of case law will be built up in time. This will throw a heavy burden on officers without legal training concerned with courts-martial and it may be that, in the future, the Services will have to train specialist officers for courts-martial work, or else the character of a court-martial will change and come to resemble a Civil Criminal Court with the Judge Advocate as judge and members of the Court as jury, which is not a desirable solution.

TOURING ON THE GERMAN ECONOMY.

By CAPTAIN E. J. FLETCHER, R.A.

IT was the end of Practice Camp, and we were about two-thirds through the usual B.A.O.R. Training season, when Peter, Geoff, my wife and I decided that a short leave was indicated, though a long one would have been preferable. So, in one of those all too brief lulls between exercises, we armed ourselves with maps one evening and repaired to the local beer garden to discuss a motoring holiday in Germany. Our main consideration was to have a leisurely tour, possibly in the region of the Black Forest and sample life on the German economy.


Our imaginative journeys were varied indeed. Geoff was determined to eat snails in Luxembourg. My wife thought we ought to "do" the Rhine and the Moselle Valleys. Not to be outdone, Peter, the more romantic-minded member of the party, was determined to meet a Princess in Liechtenstein, the little principality sandwiched between Austria and Switzerland. A brief calculation of the mileage showed us that we could consider everyone's wishes and still be well under 2,000 miles, averaging about 120 miles a day.

The route we were to take was, firstly, the Rhine Valley from Bingen, north of Wiesbaden, to the confluence of the Rhine and Moselle rivers at Koblenz, thence up the Moselle to Trier. From Trier we were to motor to Luxembourg and then head towards the Black Forest *via* Saarland. We decided to motor down the West side of the Black Forest from Pforzheim to Freiburg, then to Lake Constance, and along the southern shore, through Switzerland, to Liechtenstein.

The return journey was to be made *via* Austria and the northern shore of Lake Constance up the East side of the Black Forest, then across country *via* Wiesbaden, Bad Ems and Koblenz, towards the Nürburg Ring and the Aar Valley, eventually reaching Bonn, Cologne, and returning to our home station.

As this was to be a short leave, we were determined that it should be both economical and enjoyable—in other words to last 14 days and cost no more than 100 DM per person. A mark is worth about 1/9, so in sterling DM 100 is £8/15/0. It was agreed a continental breakfast, a light lunch and a substantial evening meal would answer our eating requirements. As for sleeping, we took safari beds, bedding rolls and a tent in the hope of having good weather. Very early on, my wife declared that it was "running h. & c." for her and, as we had "wide experience" in sleeping out, we could continue to do so to our heart's content, but she intended to sleep with a roof over her head. The "h. & c." later proved to be most useful and it simplified our shaving requirements.

One Monday evening a heavily-loaded Vanguard was seen to glide out of the barrack gates with cheerful occupants. Our first halt was Dusseldorf and then on to Wiesbaden, a famous spa.



Touring on the German Economy.

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The next day we went down the Rhine, from Bingen, a well-known starting point for the prettiest part of the Rhine. We drove along the West bank of the river with its picturesque riverside villages, silhouetted against the vine-covered slopes. The Rhine Castles could be seen across the river. Shortly we came to St. Goar and the famous Lorelei Rock on the East Bank came into view.

Here we stopped for lunch, where Peter, who was messing member, hastened off to buy some crisp Vienna rolls, a pound of fresh butter and a Camembert cheese. We also tasted our first wine grapes which, although a trifle sharp, helped to round off an appetising repast. While basking in the warm sun after lunch, we saw all four modes of transport—a train on the busy line along the West bank, a lazy barge leisurely making its way to Switzerland, to the background hum of the motor road, and a plane overhead.

By mid-afternoon we reached Koblenz. This fascinating old town lying at the confluence of the Rhine and the Moselle, guarded by a fortress on the East bank is famed for its beautiful old *Castor Kirche* and the *Wilhelm I Monument* at the *Deutsches Esk*. As it was quite early in the afternoon we continued slowly up the Moselle. Not being such a busy river as the Rhine, the valley was more scenic.

We halted for the night at Ernst, having covered 92 miles. Here we found a charming *Weinstube*, *Weinhaus Heinrich Andre*, where the landlord produced some good wine, from the village on the opposite bank of the river, which we drank with an excellent *Wiener Schnitzel*. We decided to put the tent up before it was dark and repaired to bed. The next morning the mist from the river gave us a rude awakening. However, hot baths at the hotel were readily available to resuscitate us, followed by breakfast which included rolls, fresh butter, home-made apple jelly, fresh cream and coffee. As coffee is rather expensive in Germany it is advisable to have one's own tin of *Nescafe* or coffee and we invariably found that the *Gasthofs* were used to providing the necessary boiling water, milk and sugar.

After breakfast, the mist cleared and we moved on up the river. Shortly we passed *Beilstein* on the opposite bank of the river. This is quite the most attractive village on the Moselle, dominated by its twelfth century ruined castle. It is a village of well-made grey stone houses built against the vine-covered hills.

We travelled on to *Bernkastel*, the centre of the Moselle wine industry. Peter, who had been in this direction before, took us to look over a wine cellar. We stopped at a house that looked like any other, but on going round to the back, were led into a maze of cellars, packed to the ceilings with bottles of wine. To our delight, our guide opened a bottle of wine for us to taste. Meanwhile, Peter disappeared, muttering something about going to see the "*Herr Direktor*". Our guide was most helpful, showed us the vats, the bottling process, and how the wine is stacked according to vineyard, district and year. Our fourth member having been absent for some considerable time, we returned to the office to look for him. He was comfortably ensconced in front of several bottles of wine, which he was tasting in turn, and forming rather hazy opinions on the merits of each bottle. The wine-tasting continued and finally we gave our modest order, and returned to the car. This sort of visit is welcomed by the local people and they do not expect one to give them a large

order. They are proud of their wines and like visitors to taste them. We naturally pandered to their pride.

That night we stopped at Niedor Emmel. Our mileage for the day was 89 miles. The Gastheaus, the Hotel Mosel Lorelei, was poor but clean. It had the three essentials, clean bathrooms, clean beds and plain but well-cooked food. Geoff, Peter and myself slept once again in the open in the orchard behind the hotel. It was here that we had our first mishap when the car fan-belt broke, but a German garage soon rectified that.

Continuing the next day in lovely sunshine, we set out for Trier, the oldest city in Germany. It has many ancient Roman remains, including an amphitheatre, the Roman baths and the Porta Nigra, the old gateway to the city, considered one of the finest Roman structures in Germany. The Dom is one of the oldest German Cathedrals. Later we crossed the frontier into Luxembourg, a lovely city built on hills and, until a hundred years ago, the best fortified city in Europe. It was here that Geoff fulfilled an ambition and took us to a restaurant to eat snails. They had a mixed reception. Two members of the party were inconsiderate enough to suggest they tasted rubbery.


From Luxembourg we went through the Saarland. This was our first mistake. Not only was it heavily industrialized, but it seemed as if they had forgotten to clear away the rubble of the last two wars. Streets covered in dust followed each other mile after mile and, on running out of petrol, we discovered our tri-zone coupons were not acceptable and had to pay rather more for petrol than in Germany. Our first fault, of course, but it had not struck us that the country was independent.

Dusty and grimy we passed into the more picturesque country of the French Zone of Germany—near Pirmasens. We had by this time covered 189 miles and as it was about 8 o'clock, ran through Pirmasens with the object of finding a Gasthof on the other side of the town. We found one about 3 miles out of the town in beautifully wooded and hilly country. The host and his family made us welcome and comfortable, and we were sorry to leave the next morning for the Black Forest and Triberg. *En route*, we passed through Karlsruhe, a well-laid out town which resembles a garden city. We joined the Autobahn and had a quick cheap meal at an American Px snack bar near Pforzheim.


The same day we drove through the Black Forest, and the lovely wooded and hilly country to Freudenstadt. As it was early autumn, the leaves were turning red-gold and gave the forest, in some parts, the appearance of a russet mantle. Freudenstadt is a popular tourist centre and, in consequence, a commercialized town. We continued along very steep and winding roads and really lovely country to Triberg, passing Hornberg, a climatic resort at the foot of the Schlossberg. Triberg itself, is a charming town with several excellent hotels of very high standard. We arrived and were greeted by the colourful scene of a local fair and market, which stretched for about a quarter of a mile along the main street. Nearby is the famous waterfall, the largest in Germany, which drops from the hills behind Triberg through the pinewoods, in several cascades.

We stayed the night in Schoenwald, an attractive little village, 500 feet above Triberg. The road between the two towns is steep and winding, but well worth the effort. Schoenwald is also a well-known winter sports resort. Whilst making inquiries from a local as to a suitable camping ground, he informed us

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Liechtenstein Castle.



The last of the Liechtenstein Army.

there was nowhere suitable nearby and that we would be better off spending the night in the school. Thinking this very odd, we called on the local schoolmaster, who produced a room for us and the male members of the party went to sleep to the strain of the village brass band playing martial music upstairs. This was their weekly practice night. The schoolmaster informed us afterwards, that he is often asked to accommodate small parties of youth organizations and that we were no exception. The hotel here was most comfortable and the food excellent.

Next day we descended gradually to Freiburg. Freiburg is an attractive old university town situated on the slope of the Schlossberg. The Cathedral is a good example of Gothic architecture. The Rathaus and University date back to the 16th century. If one has the time, a trip in the Cable Car to Schauinsland is well worth it, as the view from 4,200 feet is magnificent. From Freiburg, we went to Titisee, the most beautiful lake in the Black Forest. The road then passes Donau Eschingen, where we saw the famous "Donau Quelle", the source of the river Danube, a spring set in the Emperor's Castle. Unfortunately, the castle itself cannot be visited as it is occupied by the French Military Administration.

We spent the night at Binningen, having motored 118 miles. Binningen appears to be a fairly prosperous village. The Gasthof was rather noisy. The village is built up with no suitable ground to pitch a tent so once more we spent the night in the local schoolhouse. The schoolmaster thoughtfully turned on the central heating and put up curtains at the windows. To our surprise the next morning, we discovered that several of the Gasthofs in this part of Germany make a habit of closing on Mondays, so we were unable to have breakfast in Binningen. This turned out to be to our advantage as we found a most pleasant restaurant in Singen where we paid 1.50 DM for an excellent breakfast with good service.

We crossed into Switzerland at Konstanz. Unhappily, as it was misty, we did not get a good view of Lake Constance. Except for a short distance the road on the Swiss side does not run along the side of the lake. However, about 30 miles further on, we crossed the Rhine and reached the Principality of Liechtenstein, the climax of our tour.

We drove in to Vaduz, the capital, and stopped outside the post office. Seeing a tourist agency across the road, we walked in. The proprietor, not only spoke English, but his wife was English, and he himself is a Liechtenstein Baron, Equerry and official photographer to the Crown Prince of Liechtenstein. He was most helpful with the usual currency transactions, and gave us the address of a very comfortable hotel, called the Samina, in Rosenboden, about half-way up the hill, overlooking the town. We all stayed in the hotel that night.

The Baron informed us that a trip up the mountain to Malbun, 8,000 feet high, was well worth-while, for the view from there over the whole of Liechtenstein, and the valley of the Rhine into Switzerland was simply wonderful. A rather macabre touch was added by the fact that our road took us through a tunnel, which had been built and presented to the Principality by the Crown Prince for the annual trip of the cattle to and from the mountain pastures, and not primarily for the use of cars. The road rises steeply to Malbun by a series of hairpin bends, which requires constant changing of gear

and was quite a trial for our heavily-laden car. To our disappointment on reaching the summit, there was a heavy mist, but we did manage to see some lovely views the next day when the mist cleared.

Liechtenstein has an overall tax of 2% on everything, which compares very favourably with the 10% charged in Switzerland. Cigarettes are 10/- a hundred and, other than Austria, it is probably one of the cheaper countries in Europe to visit. However, realizing this, the Principality charges a small fee of £5,000 per head on those desirous of residing there permanently. . . . Even at that, it might be worth it, as it is such a friendly and hospitable country. Its police force consists of 8 policemen, and to our delight, we were pulled up for a parking offence by the policeman of the day. Its army of one man died in 1939, and with him died the Liechtenstein Army. Boasting no ski-lift, there is no winter season and so by October, when we were there, the last of the visitors had all but gone.

Next day we started on our return journey which took us on the Austro-German side of Lake Constance. The sun was shining and we were able to get some views of the Lake and the Alps. For lunch we stopped at Lindau. It has a 15-century town hall and an antique collection. This side of the lake is not, however, so pretty as the Swiss side, since there is no lake-side road, and the banks of the lake are marred often by strip building. We continued on to Ludwigshafen, where we left Lake Constance and drove on to Spaichingen to spend the night at the Hotel Waldhorn. This appeared to be a form of trust house run by the brewery next door and was most comfortable. We spent the evening competing with the local populace in the bowling alley. They were not impressed with our prowess, and we retired to bed with aching arms. A very English touch was added in the morning when we were told we were having breakfast in the "breakfast room", which was cosy and warm, and panelled in light oak.

The following day we motored up the eastern side of the Black Forest, *via* Calw and Blomberg. This side differs in that it is not so pretty and the people, at any rate to us, were not so pleasant. Being near the Autobahn, the villages are more commercialized. Unable to find moderate accommodation in or near Pforzheim, we motored on to Kandel and we all stayed at the Hotel Weisser Baer—not as successful as some of the other hotels at which we had stayed. Had we arrived earlier in the town we would have found better accommodation.

In the morning we went up the Autobahn towards Wiesbaden and then up the hilly road which runs between Bad Schwalbach and Koblenz, *via* the old town of Nassau. From Koblenz, we motored through uninteresting country to the Nuerburg Ring, the Brooklands of Germany, where one can drive round the Ring for the fee of 1DM each. Racing enthusiasts come from all over the country with their high-powered German cars and exercise their skill. Our car was so heavily laden and had served us so faithfully that we did not think we would risk wrecking it on the hairpin bends of the Ring.

We continued through Adenau in the Aar Valley, which is the beginning of one of the loveliest and most unspoilt valleys in Germany, and appealed to us far more than the Rhine and Moselle Valleys. The river at some places is no more than twelve feet wide, but each village is a picture in itself, and there is a succession of attractive little inns all along the valley. The one we

selected for our night's rest was at Schuld, the Hotel Waldfrieden, and had been recommended by friends. The proprietress was helpful and kind and very pleased to see English visitors. We all four stayed in the hotel as it was a cold night.

Next day we joined the Rhine to Sinzig and followed it along to Cologne, passing through Remagen, of World War II fame, and Bonn, capital of the Federal Republic. We lunched at Bad Godesberg at an American Transit Hotel. The food was superb. This hotel stands on the bank of the Rhine and is overlooked from the heights on the other side by the Rheinhof Dreesen, where Hitler received Chamberlain during the fateful days before Munich. It is now a Tripartite Mess. That evening we reached Cologne after visiting the Bundeshaus and Beethoven's birthplace, the former a modern and unimpressive building. We stayed with friends in Cologne and visited the Cathedral the next morning. It is a beautiful structure but the Roman ruins, which have just been unearthed there, were not yet on view to the public. The shops are well stocked and cheaper than most other parts of Germany. The last lap of our journey was completed that night. We had covered a distance of 1,804 miles.

In all the holiday cost 100 DM each, and our budget is shown briefly below. We were only able to be so economical through careful selection of hotels and eating places, and by leaving the main roads behind and taking to the by-ways.

Day	From	To	Distance	Hotel	Camped	Cost
1	Lippstadt	Langenfeld	112 miles	—		—
2	Langenfeld	Bad Kreuznach	238 "	—		—
3	Bad Kreuznach	Ernst	92 "	Weinhaus Heinrich Andre	Yes	31.79 DM
4	Ernst	Nieder Emmel	89 "	Hotel Mosel Lorelei	Yes	17.10 DM
5	Lieder Emmel	Pirmasens via Luxembourg	159 "	Hombaurerhof	Yes	21.00 DM
6	Pirmasens	Schoenwald	160 "	Hotel Hirschen	Yes	27.00 DM
7	Schoenwald	Binningen	118 "	Krone	Yes	12.50 DM
8	Binningen	Vaduz	114 "	Samina	No	38.10 DM
9	Vaduz	Spaichingen	108 "	Hotel Waldhorn	Yes	22.00 DM
10	Spaichingen	Kandel	138 "	Weisser Baer	No	34.00 DM
11	Kandel	Wiesbaden	138 "	—		—
12	Wiesbaden	Schuld	128 "	Waldfrieden	No	39.20 DM
13	Schuld	Koeln	85 "	—		—
14	Koeln	Lippstadt	125 "	—		—
			Total 1804 miles			DM 242.69
						Per Person DM 60.67

Where no hotel is shown we stayed with friends. The balance of DM 39.33 per person covered lunches and small purchases. The six nights spent under canvas, had they been indoors instead, would have increased the

expenses by two pounds at the most. Bed and breakfast in a pension is never more than 7/6 a night. Stages 1, 2, 13 and 14 above could have been reduced to two had we taken a more direct route.

Food was not lacking in variety and when carefully selected was unexpensive, as below:—

Breakfast:—Rolls, butter and jam, coffee (own) 1/6.

Lunch: Rolls, butter, cheese, liverwurst, fruit, milk, 2/-.

Dinner: Soup or Hors d'œuvres, Wiener Schnitzel, Saute Potatoes, Salad, Sweet and/or Cheese, Wine, 6/6.

A reasonable local wine costs between 5/- and 8/- per bottle.

The roads were good and well serviced with petrol stations. Looking back we decided that we had not enjoyed a holiday so much as this one, or visited so many attractive places.

"R.E.M.E. PHASE II".

By MAJOR C. J. GITTINGS, O.B.E., R.A.

1st October, 1951, was a date of some moment for the Royal Artillery since, from that day, the responsibility for the work of all repair tradesmen, excepting Equipment Repairers, passed from the Regiment to R.E.M.E. This meant that many Gunner tradesmen changed their cap-badges voluntarily and that even those in the category which did not transfer would from then on be employed by R.E.M.E.

Since moreover this operation affected the careers of some 1,200 Regular members of the Regiment, as well as altering the repair organization in all units, the present writer—who was the R.A. representative on the "R.E.M.E. Phase II Transfer Board"—felt that it might not be inappropriate to place on record some account of how certain portions of this re-organization were planned.

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"R.E.M.E. Phase II", which was the name given to the present transfer of responsibility, is a continuation of the formation of R.E.M.E. in 1942 as a centralized repair Corps for the Army. It is interesting to find that the idea of this new Corps arose from a report by Sir William Beveridge—as he then was—on the employment of man-power.

It was decided at the time that the re-organization should take place in two Phases. Phase I was the formation of R.E.M.E. as a Corps with the assumption by them of the responsibility for 3rd and 4th Echelon repair in all Arms and 2nd Echelon repair for all but the R.A.S.C. Phase II was the transfer of responsibility for 2nd Echelon repair in the R.A.S.C. and 1st Echelon repair for all Arms except the R.E. It was decided, however, that Phase II should not be implemented until after the war in order to avoid too great an administrative dislocation during war-time. The only effect that

Phase I had on the Regiment, therefore, was the transfer from R.A.O.C. to R.E.M.E. of L.A.D's. and of higher echelon repairs to guns and vehicles.

It was not until late in 1949 that the Army Council, after considering the most economical means of using the limited money and man-power available for the repair-services of the Army, approved in principle the implementation of "R.E.M.E. Phase II".

A Working Party was established under the chairmanship of Brigadier B. P. Hughes to make recommendations on how Phase II could best be brought about. Included in the terms of reference were the provisos that there should be no compulsory transfer of Regulars and that the transfer should be phased by Corps.

It is not within the competence of the present writer to discuss in detail the findings of the Working Party, but the following decisions, approved by the Army Council, most closely affect the Royal Artillery :—

- (a) The repair tradesmen in units will be absorbed into enlarged L.A.Ds. commanded by a R.E.M.E. officer. The allocation of such tradesmen to batteries will still, however, rest with the Commanding Officer of the parent unit.
- (b) The implementation of the scheme for the Royal Artillery should begin on 1st October 1951 and be completed within three months.
- (c) Certain tradesmen in Arms other than R.E.M.E., such as Artificers R.A., are by their qualifications and experience suitable for direct transfer to R.E.M.E., as Armament Artificers. A Board of Officers was therefore set up to consider such cases individually.

This article deals mainly with the work of the Board mentioned above and known as the "R.E.M.E. Phase II Transfer Board".

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On 16th August 1950 the Transfer Board first assembled at Lansdowne House. The President was the Director of Personnel Administration and its full-time permanent members were a Lieutenant-Colonel R.E.M.E., who was also Vice-President, a Major R.A. and a Major R.A.S.C. In addition a Major R.A.C. was co-opted, as allowed by the terms of reference, and in point of fact he was present at every meeting with an equal voice in the recommendations. The members of the Board met each day under the chairmanship of the Vice-President and from time to time reported progress to the President.

The terms of reference given to the Board included the following :—

- (a) To study the records of service and qualifications of tradesmen eligible for transfer and make recommendations as to who should be offered transfer as Armament Artificers, and their seniority after transfer.
- (b) To make recommendations on any other personnel problems connected with the implementation of R.E.M.E. Phase II.

At the first meeting it was agreed that the Corps representatives should act as members of a composite board and not merely as special advocates for their own Corps. This attitude was successfully maintained throughout the life of the Board—so much so that it was not unusual on occasions for the representative of one Corps to argue in favour of more generous conditions for members of another Corps.

Furthermore it was soon appreciated that, as the transfer of Regular

tradesmen was to be voluntary, for the scheme to have fair prospects of success, not only should justice be done, but it must be apparent it had been done. On the one hand the offer of transfer should be sufficiently attractive to obtain the largest possible number of volunteers; on the other hand, the prospects of the existing R.E.M.E. tradesmen should not thereby be lessened.

After a few days' deliberation in London the Board agreed upon a tentative programme of approach to the problems. It was first necessary to compare the standard of technical training received by tradesmen in the respective Corps, including of course R.E.M.E., and, conjointly with this, the experience and employment, both military and technical, of these tradesmen. Both comparisons could best be made by visiting various technical training establishments and, among other investigations, interviewing a cross-section of the tradesmen at each place. It was apparent even at this early stage that there were considerable differences between Corps in both the initial training and the subsequent employment of the tradesmen under review. It was therefore first necessary to decide upon a "yard-stick" by which the suitability of tradesmen for direct transfer as Armament Artificers could be measured. By this means the Board could then select those tradesmen who should be offered transfer on such terms.

The second talk of the Board would then arise—that of recommending the seniority on transfer both in relation to the other tradesmen transferring and the existing Armament Artificers in R.E.M.E. Here again, there was considerable disparity between the opportunities for promotion to the higher ranks in the various Corps. Early in its proceedings the Board became aware of this difficulty but it was not until much later that they realized fully the problem arising from such a fusion.

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The Board spent the next few weeks on tour, starting with the R.E.M.E. Training Centre at Arborfield Cross—a place which to the more senior Gunner officers has somewhat different associations.

There training programmes and trade standards were examined. A number of Armament Artificers and potential Armament Artificers were interviewed. Their views on R.E.M.E. Phase II were particularly interesting for in many cases they had started their trade careers in Corps other than R.E.M.E. and a goodly proportion of former Artificers R.A. were found among these. While visiting the Training Battalion at Blackdown the Board took the opportunity of interviewing two Artificers R.A. from the neighbouring R.H.A. Regiment.

The Board then moved to the 3rd Training Battalion, R.A.S.C., at Bordon, which was responsible for the training of Mechanists R.A.S.C. There many tradesmen of that Corps were interviewed and the standards to which they were trained were examined. Also at Bordon, the Armament and Electrical Trade School was visited. This establishment, although War Office controlled, was very much a Gunner enclave. The Commanding Officer and many of the instructors—Officers, Warrant Officers and N.C.Os.—were members of the Regiment. From these were obtained valuable "off the record" views on the various problems which might arise on the transfer of R.A. tradesmen to R.E.M.E.

Lastly the Board visited the R.A.C. Centre at Bovington where they studied the problems concerning the transfer of tradesmen from the R.A.C.

By a fortunate chance the R.A. member of the Board discovered the existence of a R.A. Wing there and was able to interview several of the instructors.

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After a brief call at the R.E.M.E. Record Office for a discussion of some points in connection with the existing terms of service and promotion prospects for Armament Artificers, the Board settled down once more in Lansdowne House to digest the information and impressions which it had gleaned from its tour.

Two important points had emerged. Firstly, among the tradesmen who were possible candidates for transfer there was a wide disparity between Corps, in both their initial technical training and their subsequent experience and employment. Secondly, the Armament Artificers, although trained technically on broader lines than most tradesmen in Other Arms, were not always as widely experienced in practical supervision and military knowledge.

As a matter of interest it was generally agreed that the average Artificer R.A. Class I with a certain length of service, although not possessing the full qualifications of an Armament Artificer, was by his training and experience up to the standard of an Armament Artificer without further qualification.

The problem therefore which faced the Board was to find a formula which would equate technical qualifications with regimental experience and length of service in the trade. Eventually a suitable "yard-stick" was agreed upon and the next stage of the proceedings began.

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Each Corps affected by the transfer had provided a seniority list of repair tradesmen and, armed with these, the Board visited in turn the Record Offices of the Household Cavalry, the R.A.C., the R.A., the Royal Corps of Signals and the R.A.S.C. The last-named, at Hastings, enabled the members to enjoy the doubtful attractions of an English seaside resort out of season.

During these weeks the Board examined in detail the documents of every man whose qualifications might in its opinion fall within the previously agreed "yard-stick". Generally speaking, the Confidential Reports rendered on these soldiers were of considerable help.

Another point which emerged from the examination of documents was that some soldiers had not applied for up-grading when apparently they were capable of passing the test.

As a result of this examination of documents the Board decided upon those tradesmen who should be offered direct transfer to R.E.M.E. as Armament Artificers. It is interesting to note that the numbers of such tradesmen selected by the Board was in almost exactly the same proportion to the total number of repair tradesmen in the Corps concerned as were the number of existing Armament Artificers to the total number of repair tradesmen in R.E.M.E.

In the case of the Royal Artillery a further interesting comparison could be made. For some years it has been felt that the prospects of our repair tradesmen, particularly Artificers, were not so good as those of other Arms. Therefore at the end of 1947 the then D.R.A. convened a Working Party to make recommendations for the improvement of conditions of service and promotion prospects for Artificers R.A. should R.E.M.E. Phase II not be implemented. This Working Party recommended an increased establishment of higher ranks

for those who had certain minimum trade qualifications. These qualifications could not be accepted on financial grounds but, by a coincidence, the total proposed establishment of Warrant Officers and Staff-Sergeants was exactly the same, although arrived at by entirely different means, as the number of R.A. tradesmen which the R.E.M.E. Phase II Transfer Board recommended should be offered transfer as Armament Artificer.

Encouraged by these coincidences to believe that thus far they had been working on the right lines, the Board then began to consider the question of seniority on transfer, and here they found that the most difficult part of their task lay.

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It was first necessary to integrate the names of the tradesmen who were to be offered transfer as Armament Artificers on to one seniority roll before any attempt could be made to insert them into the R.E.M.E. Armament Artificer Roll. This first Roll was named the "Other Arms Roll".

Even at this stage difficulties arose. It would seem at first sight that integration could be achieved through comparison of shadow rank—war substantive rank could not be used as a factor because in many cases it bore little relation to seniority as its grant was often dependent on being in the right place when a vacancy occurred. But the Royal Artillery for certain cogent reasons had not allocated shadow-ranks to its tradesmen and substantive promotion by time in a trade only went up to the rank of sergeant; to be strictly accurate there was still serving one Artificer R.A. who had been a substantive staff-sergeant before the war.

The Board therefore had to discard shadow-rank as a guide to integration and eventually produced an Other Arms Roll which was based on length of service in the trade and which also retained the existing order of seniority between members of the same Corps.

The next stage was to integrate this Other Arms Roll with the existing R.E.M.E. Armament Artificer Roll, but here difficulties arose due to the structure of the latter.

To become an Armament Artificer a tradesman must first have certain trade qualifications and then be recommended for the Course by a Board. If selected he attends a twelve to eighteen-months' course. On successful completion he is appointed Staff-Sergeant with the prospect of time promotion to Warrant Officer II after six years and further promotion to Warrant Officer I by selection. If he is within the age-limit he then stands a chance of obtaining a commission as an Electrical and Mechanical Assistant Engineer (E.M.A.E.). The seniority of an Armament Artificer dates from the day he completed the Course and bears no relation to the time he has spent in his basic trade. It is possible for a man to become an Armament Artificer with the rank of Staff-Sergeant as young as 23 and be promoted to Warrant Officer II at the age of 29. On the other hand the Other Arms Roll comprised the top strata of tradesmen from their respective Corps and were in general older than their counterparts in R.E.M.E.

Consequently the Board was faced with the problem of integrating two Rolls, one of which was a steady gradation by age and length of service in the trade while the other contained no age or length of service factors whatsoever. It was, however, psychologically desirable to have a fully integrated Armament

Artificer Roll on the completion of R.E.M.E. Phase II so that, as far as possible, there would be no obvious differentiation between the original R.E.M.E. Armament Artificers and those transferring from other Corps.

The Board accordingly embarked upon a series of “exercises”, integrating the two Rolls in various proportions and even with a varying bias at the top of the Roll. Graphs were drawn and slide-rules brought into action but, try as they might, the Board could find no method of integration which, while being fair to the existing R.E.M.E. men, gave the newcomers a chance of reaching commissioned rank.

The adoption of two Rolls with proportionate promotions from each was therefore accepted as the best method of providing a career.

Once this decision had been made, there was little more to do beyond devising certain safeguards to protect those men who might be attending or have applied to attend Armament Artificer Courses during the period of transition, and also those who, although not initially accepted by the Board, might attain the necessary standards by the date of transfer. In addition it was decided that promotion to Warrant Officer II for those transferring as Armament Artificers under the R.E.M.E. Phase II could only be by vacancy and not by time. With this the life of the R.E.M.E. Phase II Transfer Board came to an end after four months’ work.

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It is not intended that this brief account should be a full guide to the workings of the scheme. A number of A.C.Is. have been published on the subject and any officer who desires to know the executive details should consult these.

The Board found that, whereas on the whole the tradesmen themselves, particularly in the Royal Artillery, were in favour of transfer to R.E.M.E., the officers were against the scheme, usually through imperfect knowledge of its implications. They did not sufficiently realize how poor the existing prospects were for Repair Tradesmen in the Regiment. This applied in particular to Artificers R.A. who, after an initial trade course of four-and-a-half to five years at the Military College of Science, were still Bombardiers or Sergeants while their contemporaries who had previously transferred to R.E.M.E. were Staff-Sergeants and Warrant Officers.

Finally, it should be noted that the conditions of transfer were not the part-time product of some staff-officer who had many other problems on his plate. The scheme was the result, after the general principles had been framed, of deliberations by four officers who had no other task for a period of four months.

It is not claimed that the result is by any means perfect but it has been reached after exhaustive examination and is probably the fairest solution for both the existing R.E.M.E. tradesmen and those of the Other Arms affected by R.E.M.E. Phase II.

THE GREAT WALL OF CHINAGRAPH.

By "SHELDRAKE".

I WAS on an exercise not all that long ago when a distinguished officer, who I rather think had set the scheme, asked me the grand old question of D.F. I told him what had been planned. One on the track junction opposite the Rutland Rifles. Another on the spur which ran into the Plymouth Light Infantry. Various other points which battery and battalion commanders had thought fit I showed him neatly marked on my tale.

He shook his head. "What I always like to see", he answered, "is a continuous row of stonks right round the position".

I was more than delighted that any officer outside the Royal Regiment should use the word stonk in the correct sense. We have so many who think it means just a good hammering and who refer to a splinter as shrapnel. But let that pass. His remark really set me thinking about the whole Army's conception of D.F.

Now I realize that the Great Wall of Chinagraph is popular at the School of Infantry. It may be the current teaching at Larkhill as well. For all that I make so bold as to put my head in the lion's mouth and say I think it is thoroughly unsound.

The real trouble lies in the fact that the Infantryman and the Gunner do not get together over the issue. I am a Gunner of meagre qualifications but I propose to regard the whole problem from the two viewpoints—the man who wants it and the man who produces it. The Infantryman must call the tune but it is up to us pipers to say what music we have on the stand and which numbers we play best.

When first asked, the battalion or company commander might well plump for the unbroken ring of chinagraph which looks so safe and cosy on the map. He imagines an attack coming in at night. A quick appreciation of the direction the enemy are taking, a word to the Gunner and down comes an impenetrable wall of steel—525 yards long—to foil the marauders.

Is it really like this? No, of course it isn't.

Let us start with fundamentals and study the sorts of attack to be expected. I would hesitate to enumerate a comprehensive list but I am prepared to give some of the more probable types.

The light probing attack by a patrol will hardly call for D.F. either by day or night. It can be dealt with by small arms or observed artillery fire. Still it is difficult in jungle country or in the dark to know if it heralds bigger things. Here we meet a problem for the young subaltern commanding his platoon. He will seldom have much experience of war yet his initial appreciation may well be important.

Next we will consider a more serious affair—something amounting to a two-company attack precluded by some pretty hearty artillery preparation. If this comes in by day in good visibility the issue is clear. We must kill or drive off

the enemy. If we happen to have a D.F. target recorded near where we want the shells, well and good. If not, a map reference will do the trick almost as quickly.

Now what about the same thing at night or under cover of smoke or fog. There will be little warning of the actual assault though shelling and mortaring may well put us on our guard. Noise of movement, wire cutting, trip flares, mines or a word from a listening post can all give useful indications, but so tense is the atmosphere that false alarms are inevitable even with the best trained troops.

Probably the most likely attack we can expect is that on two or more places at the same time. Even if the enemy confines his effort to one spot he will almost certainly produce some sort of diversion so that in the initial stages it amounts to the same thing.

The last we must consider is the mass or "human sea" affair. The British Army has really never met this before the Korean war and the idea of advancing enemy climbing over their own dead is apt to be dismissed as highly-coloured journalism by those who have no experience of it. Suffice to say it is all too real, moreover it is a form of attack which is extremely difficult to counter. It may be hideously expensive in men but it will swamp minefields and wire as if they did not exist.

The Gunner with an answer to all these conditions is going a long way towards solving the Defensive Fire problem. Whether we like it or not we have got to be that Gunner. So far we have dealt with the customer's needs. Before we can reach the hand-out stage I suggest we must look at the producer angle.

To dispel any doubts let me clearly state that I am primarily against two things. One is the widespread use of stonks, the other is the tendency to have great numbers of D.F. targets. Let us review the stonk first.

The stonk in its place is a most useful weapon but, I contend, that place is not in the D.F. list. First, it is misleading. It is only human to feel that you are getting more for your money with a stonk than with a concentration. It is a bigger mark on the map. But just visualize a stonk at Rate 2. It will give you shells falling every 30 seconds and some 20 to 30 yards apart. Is this lethal? Ask a Chinaman.

Second, the stonk is slow. It is the G.P.O. who has to sing out the orders. He knows how much longer those individual corrections take. I have known close on 100 rounds a gun fired in an hour of D.F. This gives precious little time for, "Number 1, 4775. Number 2, 4750—etc.". And just try moving a stonk in a hurry. I wonder how many readers have actually done this at the blunt end.

Third, comes the problem of the journalist's two-pronged attack. It may be, and often is, possible to get another regiment to deal with the second assault. If not your stonk may look a bit silly. I defy any regiment to put down two successful stonks at the same time.

Fourth on my list is hilly country. Korea is a bit up and down in parts and perhaps I am biased, but the fact remains that stonks are awkward things to handle in mountains. They will arrive in the most astonishing shapes unless one gives guns individual angles of sight.

Now for a moment take a look at the regimental concentration. This is marked on the map as a neat cross but no one in their senses expects it to

result in a pinpoint affair. It is a pretty useful effort that fetches up inside 200 yards by 100 yards though when it does come down it is no place for an ambitious Chinaman. I often think we should mark them with a circle not a cross. It would give a far truer picture.

My second big hate is the enormous number of D.F. targets—be they stonks or concentrations—which one way or another creep on to the list. I have known as many as 150 targets on the D.F. list within range. And this after some heavy blue-pencil work on the sector which concerned us.

According to the book these must all be plotted on the Artillery board. This, don't forget, is the same board that we use for opportunity and all other forms of target as well. Data must be worked out for individual guns and correction of the moment altered against each every four hours.

Seriously is this on? The work involved is terrific. It requires a most efficient system to extract the correct data in a hurry and the chance of making a slip in the four-figure number must always be some cause for anxiety. In fact the more D.F. targets you have the more chance there is of error. There unquestionably comes a time when it is quicker to give a map reference and have the target plotted afresh than to use a recorded number.

I would like to take this a stage further. There is very little difference in time on the air or line in giving a map reference as opposed to a four-figure target number. There is certainly less chance of a slip as the map reference will make sense or not: the target number is seldom checked on the board as the records and data are all logged.

I have mentioned map references and, if my ears do not deceive me, I can now hear mutterings from the pundits. Survey, accuracy of map detail, meteor and calibration will all be flying at my head. Very well, let us face them in a realistic manner.

Within its own resources a regiment should be capable of keeping the guns calibrated to the extent required for normal fighting. The methods used may be rough and ready but the number of rounds fired in action gives one ample opportunity to check fall of shot. Survey too, I am convinced, presents no problem. For many months in Korea there was no Observation unit of any nationality and we fixed from a map spot taking a sun shot for line. It worked perfectly.

I am assuming, reasonably I think, that good maps of the one-inch or 1/50,000 variety will be available for any campaign we are likely to meet. It is true that some detail may be a bit old fashioned. In backward countries houses fall down regularly each year and villages have a disconcerting habit of wandering round the landscape. The same is true of some streams and tracks but in my experience contours are most faithfully reproduced.

It is still the policy, I gather, to issue a meteor telegram every four hours. Accepting this to be accurate and to arrive promptly in the unit, we should be able to put our first round well within a couple of hundred yards of the target. If the meteor, for any reason, is wildly out this will affect the registered target as much as the predicted. It would seem, therefore, to have little bearing on the argument.

Logically we have arrived at the question of close D.F. With all our accuracy, drills and techniques I submit it is a bold Gunner who puts his first round of D.F. down within 200 yards of his own troops. If shooting has taken

place recently in that area the risk is justified. If not, I am convinced it should be pushed out and then brought in by observation or sound.

One must always remember that with registered D.F.—or any other registered target for that matter—meteor can give you two errors. First, the chance of an inaccurate correction of the moment at the time of registering. Second, a similar inaccuracy when engaging the target. These might cancel out but they might be cumulative and make an appreciable difference.

After a little experience in a campaign one should be able to gauge the value of the meteor available. If one accepts this as accurate your registered target will work out well and, I maintain, the map reference target will be pretty close to the mark too. For anything other than close D.F., or some precise point like a river ford, the latter will probably be as good as the former. If the meteor tends to be a bit shaky you will not be able to count on much better than a magpie in either case. We arrive then, if my premises hold water, at this conclusion. Whatever the state of the meteor, predicted fire will probably suffice for the area targets we normally register.

We have one more tune we can play which is, perhaps, not so widely known or requested. The Target Grid method of adjusting fire has made the quick movement of a concentration simplicity itself. Surely this will fill many gaps left by my ruthless pruning. Now while the concentration will trip gaily round the countryside the stonk, as I have mentioned before, is nothing like so nimble. If you must have a stonk, leave it where it started.

Now, I think, we have kicked the subject round long enough to produce a few concrete suggestions. The Infantry demand that we break up any attack in the shortest possible time. On balance what is the best plan?

I consider that the maximum number of D.F. targets to a battalion front should be six. These are needed on the likely avenues of approach and the probable routes of infiltration. Close targets should be no less than 200 yards from our own troops but can be moved right in after we know how the shells are falling. Targets along wire or minefields are attractive as they catch the enemy at his slowest but we must remember the damage shell fire causes to such obstacles. This disadvantage does not, of course, apply to natural obstacles whose crossing places make excellent D.F. tasks. The rest of the front can well be covered by map reference targets chosen at the time or moving the existing D.F.

The stonk—here it comes again—should rarely if ever be used for D.F.

There are many other aspects of D.F. that we have no time to thrash out here. S.O.S., deep D.F., numbering of targets, grouping and code names are all worthy of careful consideration. D.F. on our own troops has saved the day (or night to be pedantic) on at least two occasions when the Chinese got in their hair. This too is food for thought. But I must not ramble on or we shall be here all night.

I have expressed my views. I do not expect to find many in close agreement but if I have started an argument I am happy enough. There is no shadow of doubt that D.F. is one of the most important jobs we have to do. Let us spare no pains to do it well.

BODY ARMOUR.

By BRIG.-GEN. A. F. U. GREEN.

“**N**YLON armoured jackets” already used in Korea are to be tested here.

The experience of battle conditions is likely to be more valuable than tests on inanimate targets, but it is to be hoped that such tests may be so comprehensive as to amplify the reports from Korea. The conflict between protection and penetration has gone on since the earliest weapons were used and this question of body armour is a hardy perennial. For the moment we are concerned only with reducing injury or wounds caused by bullets, shell splinters, local shock and perhaps the bayonet. It is sometimes thought that the aim is the prevention of *penetration* to the body but that is only part of the problem.

In 1905 I wrote in the *United Services Magazine* referring to the invention of gunpowder in the 13th Century—“A puff of the new explosive powder and armour was as a coat of cotton . . . body armour vanished into thin air and has not yet returned”.

How wrong I was! and how wrong are those who still hold the same view. There are three fallacies in this loose statement.

The theory that the penetration of a bullet was superior to that of an arrow or a bolt from a crossbow remained untrue for at least four centuries. The notion that prevention of penetration by a body-covering rendered one immune from injury is nonsense and, thirdly, what is wrong with cotton if it can be established that in certain circumstances cotton, linen or other textile or fabric may be better protection than steel?

Without suggesting a return to bows and arrows which some sarcastic people seem to regard as an obsession by reactionary British generals, particularly at the War Office, a study of the history of the bow illustrates what is meant by *penetration*.

The bow is one of the most ancient inventions and is believed to date back to ages which produced the invention of the use of speech, of fire and of primitive social combination. At any rate the use of the bow throughout the globe suggests that it was (like fire) common to all humanity. In prehistoric times and in the dawn of history it was improved in different regions according to conditions of life, growth of intelligence and the availability of materials and it became the most universal weapon supplementary to the earlier implements of concussion, hacking, cut and thrust and generally superior to sling, catapult or other means of propulsion. Ancient Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Greece and Rome all had their technique and organization of archery for sport and war.

The bow naturally developed in different ways, sometimes becoming what we might regard as extremely modern in design with technical improvements far in advance of other tools and weapons and implements for husbandry and other occupations. The two principal resulting types are the short (or Turkish) bow and the longbow perfected in England in the 13th century.

Some figures from what are considered authoritative sources may illuminate the question of penetration without being regarded as a plea for bows

and arrows. The longest shot on record is 870 yards—by a Turkish bow. The longest "flight" in 1950 was 429 yards with a longbow. The longbow (English 13th century) could penetrate an inch of oak at 200 yards.

Without borrowing from the legends of Robin Hood and so on it was reckoned that an archer should hit a target the size of a man's head and trunk at any range up to 100 yards almost without fail. A trained archer could loose his shafts at about the same rate as the Old Contemptible could fire his S.M.L.E. in 1914 using it as a single loader. To-day, there are in the United States, thousands of archers, members of innumerable clubs who use bows built on the modern methods of production for fishing rods, golf clubs, etc., and who exhibit almost legendary skill not only as archers but hunting game big and small. Such an archer will back himself to shoot a better score on the golf course than a scratch player. They reckon that the bow and arrow is the match of any service pistol for range, accuracy and penetration (but, I believe, not rapidity).

Modern bows are designed to have a pull of varied strength to suit the physique of the archer, but I read that a pointed arrow with 50-foot pounds of energy will perforate a thousand sheets of a telephone directory and a blunt arrow an inch of pinewood. These figures may not satisfy the statistician but if the longbow and the crossbow (12th to 17th centuries) developed the punch with which they are credited it is absurd to believe that the invention of the early fire arms, which took hundreds of years to acquire the same punch and more centuries to develop a like rapidity, was responsible for the sudden or even gradual elimination of the mailclad chivalry.

The superiority of the firearm over bow or crossbow was not clearly established till the *rifle* came into its own between 1650 and 1750 as the descendant of matchlock, wheellock, snaphance and flintlock and it may be said that armour had vanished from the battlefield about 1670 and only survived for parade and ceremonial. Now to consider the protection afforded by body armour.

The earliest weapon would be a club and the first missile a slung stone. Against these protection would be by agility, superior skill of the same kind or the chance intervention of clothing of skins or a head covering worn without the intention of warding off attack. This might make primitive man think and eventually wear something to keep him warm and also to protect him against blows.

The kinds of injury he might anticipate (except in unarmed combat) would be a blow by a blunt instrument, a poke in the eye or ribs by a sharp point, a cut by a sharp edge, a missile or something much greater like a boulder being rolled upon him. And these are the essential injuries to guard against to-day. A man may be killed just as dead with a knitting needle or a felling axe and, jumping centuries, we may consider what kind of body protection, worn by the individual soldier, is efficacious and practicable against the kinds of wounds to which he is liable to-day.

With a bullet the punch is measured by foot-pounds of energy and it is calculated that a bullet with sufficient remaining velocity to expend 50 to 60 foot-pounds on any part of a man where he is liable to fatal injury is likely to cause death—provided the *penetration* is enough for what has been called the "hydraulic bursting effect".

The amount of punch necessary without penetration is a different matter and it is the difficulty of appraising how much bodily protection is required to keep a man reasonably safe against shock and contusion that makes this question of body armour so debatable. It is not penetration that maims or kills—there are many cases of ghastly wounds in fleshy parts and of penetration of the heart and other vital organs which have resulted in survival. It is a question whether the bullet or the bayonet which has penetrated finishes the job by what might be called secondary effects.

“Armour” does not only mean the panoplies we see in museums which reached their zenith in the 17th century, though by then it had been discarded for wear in the field and now only survives in token form for ceremonial. Armour began with protective skins which developed into hide, leather, reinforced leather and leather backed with padding or reinforced by plates, outside or inside, of metal, horn, wood or other resistants. Quilted fabrics, cotton, linen and other textiles laminated and reinforced saved men from countless wounds. Bronze, brass, iron and steel clad the noble and wealthy—in fact the ranks of chivalry, while the other ranks derived such protection as they might by hide or leather or quilting.

Armour, particularly helmet and cuirass or breastplate grew ever heavier during the periods with which we associate armour, not due to the advent of firearms but to the demands of the nobility for complete body armour for man and horse and the same thing occurred with the simpler accoutrement of the rank and file until pikemen, foot soldiers, arquebusiers and the rest showed a tendency (so well understood by the P.B.I. in the 14/18 war) to discard and to throw into a ditch any burden they had to carry which seemed more of a curse than a blessing.

The death knell of armour was due to increasing weight, complexity and cost and not to the use of firearms. Primitive firearms could only kill or maim by concussion and it was not till about 1590 that penetration by bullet was considered sufficient to justify “proof” of armour by pistol.

To give an idea of the fantastic weights reached by knights in armour we may reckon the horse’s load roughly:—helm 25lb.; armour and weapons 80lb.; horse furniture 80lb.; man (say) 150lb.; sundries 15lb. Total over three-hundredweight! No wonder the knight in armour had to be hoisted into the saddle and if unhorsed was as helpless as a tortoise on its back.

In the meantime the bullet was catching up—but that was about the 17th century when common soldiers preferred leather which was good enough against cut and thrust but not so good against the odd chance of a bullet.

Courbouilli, or leather boiled in oil and moulded into shape, was enormously used as a substitute for the armourer’s master-pieces for man and horse and was not only a good imitation but a really efficient form of body armour. Its poor relation, rawhide, has been seen in our time and is illustrated by the round shields of the Sudanese in the Egyptian campaigns of the eighties, and even in the basket hilts of singlesticks so superior to wickerwork.

Portable shields have been made from the earliest times of wood, leather, rawhide, rope or metal—all proof against cut and thrust, not always against arrows and still more rarely against modern bullets.

Gunners may remember the screening of embrasures and gun posts by hanging “mantlets” of rope and rawhide—an excellent illustration of preven-

tion of penetration by loosely suspended yielding materials with solid backing.

The helmet (a vast subject in itself) culminated in the "tin hat" of 1915. It had gone through every conceivable shape and material primarily for protection and then for adornment and display and now, except for this tin hat and equivalents, survives only as a traditional ceremonial headdress which is sometimes picturesque, usually unbearably uncomfortable and always useless.

Incidentally, the cuirass of the Household Cavalry is not a true survival at all, having been introduced for the coronation of George IV at a time, when the only true survival of armour (in the British services) was the gorget patch which lasted till the reign of William IV.

This tin hat is an almost exact replica of the "Iron Hat" of the 17th century except that it is made of hardened manganese steel and against shrapnel and shell splinters is stated to have reduced fatal head wounds by 75%.

The cuirass (i.e. back and front) or the corslet (i.e. breastplate only) were adopted in the 14/18 war by various nations in different forms and the Germans actually produced a sort of steel turret or "sponson" for snipers, quite bullet proof but so heavy that it could not be considered as body armour. To sum all this up with special reference to these "Nylon armoured jackets" here is a true snippet from history.

In the eighteen-nineties, Hiram Maxim, who had produced his epoch-making machine gun in 1884, being annoyed by a campaign which was going on for the adoption of a much-advertised bullet-proof waistcoat or jacket of German or American origin,¹ offered to exhibit a better, cheaper and less cumbersome article of greater efficiency.

He put it on a dummy and after rifles and pistols had done their best he treated it to bursts of machine-gun fire which shot away the textile covering and disclosed a light, thin and undented plate of hardened steel. And that killed all further talk about the bullet-proof waistcoat.

There are apparently two American jackets now claiming to be bullet-proof, one of nylon backed by sponge rubber weighing 8lbs. The other of laminated plastic fibre glass, weighing 7 $\frac{3}{4}$ lbs. Fifty of the latter are said to have been tested in Korea and this experience, though ridiculously inadequate, must weigh heavily against more extensive tests against dummies on a proof range.

The questions about either of these jackets are these :—

What is the detailed report from Korea?

What kinds of wounds or injuries is it proof against?—Not on a dummy, but against human flesh.

Is it economical?—That does not mean "cheap". Can it be made by the hundred-thousand without diversion of manufacturing potential and material?

Will its production and issue unduly complicate questions of supply and logistics?

How does it affect the comfort of the heavily-weighted soldier in all conditions of climate, temperature and battle?

Does Thomas Atkins like it or will he sling it into the ditch?

If we can get answers to these questions we may be able to form an opinion when the official report on tests in this country becomes available, but certainly not before.

¹ I think the name of the inventor was Doewe, perhaps someone with a clearer memory may correct me.

THE ROYAL ARTILLERY AT ST. MALO AND CHERBOURG 1758.

By LT.-COL. M. E. S. LAWS, O.B.E., M.C., R.A. (Retd.).

NOTE:—The numbers in brackets after the names of R.A. officers refer to Kane's List.

ON 11 April 1758 a treaty was signed in London under the terms of which Britain undertook to subsidize Prussia to the extent of £660,000 to enable Frederick the Great to continue the war against France. Both Governments agreed not to make peace without the other's consent, and England also accepted responsibility for maintaining a Hanoverian-Hessian army in the field in Germany to act in co-operation with the Prussians. Lastly, the British Government undertook to raid the French coast as a diversion in order to induce the French to retain a large force for home defence.

On 15 April warning orders were therefore issued for the assembly of an expeditionary force based on Portsmouth and by the middle of May the following fifteen infantry battalions¹ had assembled in camp at Newport, Isle of Wight, and were brigaded as follows:—

Commander—Lt.-Gen. The Duke of Marlborough.

Second-in-Command—Lt.-Gen. Lord George Sackville.

Staff—Lt.-Gen. The Earl of Ancran.

Deputy Adjutant-General—Lt.-Col. Hotham.

Deputy Quarter-Master General—Lt.-Col. Watson.

Guards Brigade (Maj.-Gen. A. Drury)—1st Bns. of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Foot Guards.

1st Brigade (Maj.-Gen. J. Mostyn)—5th, 25th and 36th Regts.

2nd Brigade (Maj.-Gen. Hon. J. Waldegrave)—20th, 30th and 67th Regts.

3rd Brigade (Maj.-Gen. Hon. G. Boscawen)—23rd, 33rd and 68th Regts.

4th Brigade (Maj.-Gen. G. A. Eliot)—24th, 34th and 72nd² Regts.

Although the expedition was to be based on Portsmouth, the troops were encamped well away from the town—the infantry with the battalion guns in the Isle of Wight, the cavalry at Petersfield and the artillery at Woolwich. Probably one reason for this segregation can be found in the following letter written on 5 February 1758 to Lt.-Gen. Lord George Sackville (Lt.-Gen. of the Ordnance) by Brigadier James Wolfe:—

“The condition of the troops that compose this garrison (i.e. Portsmouth)—or rather vagabonds that stroll about in dirty red clothes from one gin shop to another—exceeds belief. There is not the least shadow of discipline, care or attention. Disorderly soldiers of different regiments are collected here; some

¹ There was another battalion in Newport Camp—74th (Talbot's)—but it was sent partly to West Africa and partly to Jamaica and did not take part in the operations against the French coast.

² The 72nd Regt. (Richmond's) was disbanded in 1762.

from the ships, others from the hospital, some waiting to embark—dirty, drunken, insolent rascals, improved by the hellish nature of the place, where every kind of corruption, immorality and looseness is carried to excess; it is a sink of the lowest and most abominable of vices. Your Lordship could not do better than to get the Company¹ of Artillery moved out of this infernal den, where troops ought never to be quartered".²

The state of discipline of the troops as disclosed by this letter was probably little better at many other stations and explains much of the disgraceful plunderings of the civilian inhabitants which occurred during the coastal operations in 1758 and which contributed in no small degree to the difficulties of the British commanders. With disciplined troops, the Isle of Wight may have been selected as an assembly area in order to prevent desertion.

Encamped at Newport with the infantry was a detachment of the Royal Artillery manning the battalion guns, which were attached in pairs to each Regiment of Foot. This detachment was composed of details from the Companies R.A. in England under:—

UNIT			<i>Capt.-Lieut.</i>	<i>2/Lieuts.</i>	<i>Fire Workers</i>	<i>Sgts.</i>	<i>Corpls.</i>	<i>Bdvs.</i>	<i>Gunners</i>	<i>Mattresses</i>	<i>Total</i>	OFFICERS' NAMES
Capt. J. Gregory's Coy. 1 Bn. (Disbanded 1771) ...	...	...	—	—	1	1	1	—	3	5	11	J. Davidson (316)
Capt. L. Pattison's Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 3 Coast 1/4/ 1947) ...	...	...	—	—	1	1	—	3	4	12	21	R. Harrington (281)
Capt. J. Pattison's ⁽³⁾ Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 12 (Minden) Field Battery 1/10/1948) ...	...	...	—	1	—	1	—	1	3	5	11	V. Lloyd (241)
Capt. W. Phillips' Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 32 (Minden) Coast Battery 1/4/1947) ...	...	...	—	—	1	—	1	1	3	5	11	J. Brietzche (311)
Capt. C. Brome's Coy. 2 Bn. (Became 17 (Corunna) Field Battery 1/4/1947) ...	...	...	—	—	1	—	1	1	3	5	11	T. D. Pearse (303)
Capt. J. Innes' Coy. 1 Bn. (Disbanded 1817) ...	...	...	—	—	1	1	—	1	3	5	11	H. Evans (298)
Capt. T. Smith's Coy. 2 Bn. (Became 15 Observation Battery 1/4/1947) ...	...	...	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	D. Drummond (162)
Capt. P. Innes' Coy. 2 Bn. (Disbanded 1771) ...	...	...	—	—	1	1	—	1	4	5	12	E. Downman (299)
Capt. W. Hussey's Coy. 2 Bn. (Became 4 (Sphinx) Coast Battery 1/5/48) ...	...	...	—	1	—	—	1	1	—	8	11	E. Walker (222)
Total ...	...	...	1	2	6	5	4	9	23	50	100	

By 15 May also had been collected at Petersfield nine Light Troops of Dragoons from 1st and 3rd Dragoon Guards and from 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th,

¹ Capt. T. James' Company, 1 Bn. R.A., arrived at Portsmouth on 8 Jan. 1758 from Dartford and remained there till mid-May when it embarked to join The Duke of Marlborough's force. It was, however, replaced at Portsmouth at the end of May by Capt. T. Smith's Coy., 2 Bn. R.A., from Dartford.

² Life and Correspondence of Maj.-Gen. James Wolfe, by R. Wright. 1864.

³ Capt. J. Pattison (55) was employed on the Staff as A.D.C. to the Duke of Marlborough.

10th and 11th Dragoons. The Engineer arm was represented by Lt.-Col. W. Cunningham, one Captain and one Ensign.

The main body of the artillery component of the expeditionary force consisted of three complete Companies which embarked¹ at Portsmouth in mid-May. The field guns (other than the battalion guns), ammunition and equipment together with the siege train came round to Spithead by sea in Ordnance store ships and there joined the transports detailed to embark the infantry and cavalry. The artillery of the force was composed as under, additional to the detachment manning the battalion guns :—

Commander Royal Artillery—Lt.-Col. T. Desaguliers (51).

Comptroller of Artillery—T. Jones

Commissary of Artillery—R. Veale

Assistant Commissary and Paymaster—J. Barnes

Civil Department
of the
Board of Ordnance

UNIT	Cpts.	Capt.-Lts.	Lieut.	2/Lieuts.	F/Ws.	Sgts.	Corpls.	Bdrs.	Gwrs.	Matts.	Rfers	Dmrs.	Total
Capt. T. James' Coy, 1 Bn. (Disbanded 1770) ...	1	1	—	1	3	2	3	7	18	61	1	2	100
Capt. J. Brome's ⁽²⁾ Coy, 2 Bn. (Disbanded 1819) ...	—	1	—	1	3	2	3	8	18	61	1	2	100
Capt. A. Tovey's Coy, 1 Bn. (Disbanded 1819) ...	1	1	1	1	2	2	3	7	17	62	1	2	100
Total ...	2	3	1	3	8	6	9	22	53	184	3	6	300

The officers serving with these Companies were as follows :—

T. James' Coy.—Capt. T. James (73), Capt.-Lieut. D. Day (177), 2/Lieut. T. Jones (225), Lieut.-Fireworkers D. Scott (279), T. Younge (304) and A. Maclelan (309).

J. Brome's Coy.—Capt.-Lieut. B. Stehelin (161), 2/Lieut. J. Eyre (169), Lieut.-Fireworkers R. Patrickson (254), J. Smith (317) and C. Mason (322).

A. Tovey's Coy.—Capt. A. Tovey (92), Capt.-Lieut. J. Yorke (154), Lieut. J. Jeffreys (197), 2/Lieut. N. Connor (235) and Lieut.-Fireworkers N. Kindersley (328) and J. McLean (320).

Admiral Lord Anson (with Admiral Sir Edward Hawke) had orders to cover the projected operation with the Channel Fleet and to prevent any interference by the French squadron at Brest. The military force was to be escorted by a separate squadron under Commodore Hon. Richard Howe consisting of one ship of the line (H.M.S. Essex (64)), four 50-gun ships (H.M.S. Deptford, Portland, Jason, Rochester), nine frigates (H.M.S. Active (36), Brilliant (36), Pallas (36), Richmond (32), Flamborough (28), Tartar (28), Maidstone (28),

¹ It is known that Capt. T. James' Company marched from Dartford to Portsmouth, arriving on 8 January. It is probable that the other two Companies marched from Woolwich early in May.

² Capt. J. Brome (87) was employed on the Staff as A.D.C. to Lt.-Gen. Lord George Sackville.

Rose (24), and Success (24)), five sloops (H.M.S. Swallow (16), Diligence (16), Saltash (14), Speedwell (10) and Swan), two fireships (H.M.S. Pluto and Salamander), ten cutters and three¹ bomb vessels (H.M.S. Infernal, Grenado and Furnace). The bomb vessels carried R.A. detachments as under for the service of their heavy mortars; Captain J. Gregory (86) was in charge of the whole party.

					H.M.S. Infernal					H.M.S. Grenado				H.M.S. Furnace					
UNIT					F/W	Corpl.	Bdrs.	Gnrs.	Matts.	F/W	Bdrs.	Gnrs.	Matts.	F/W	Corpl.	Bdrs.	Gnrs.	Matts.	
Capt. J. Gregory's Coy. 1 Bn. (Disbanded 1771) ...					—	—	—	—	—	—	3	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—
Capt. J. Pattison's Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 12 (Minden) Field Battery 1/10/1948) ...					—	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—
Capt. W. Phillip's Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 32 (Minden) Coast Battery 1/4/1947) ...					—	—	1	1	—	—	—	1	1	—	1	1	—	1	1
Capt. C. Brome's Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 17 (Corunna) Field Battery 1/4/1947) ...					1	—	1	—	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—
Capt. T. Smith's Coy. 1 Bn. (Became 15 Observation Battery 1/4/1947) ...					—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1
Total ...					1	1	3	2	2	1	4	2	2	1	1	2	2	2	2

The subalterns on board the bombs were D. Price (321) on H.M.S. Infernal, J. Garton (329) on H.M.S. Grenado and S. Tovey (318) on H.M.S. Furnace. The tenders to the bombs were respectively Endeavour, Nancy and Neptune.

Full details of the artillery equipment embarked for the expedition are lacking,² but besides the 6-pounder battalion guns, there were some 60 cannon in all, including fifteen 24-pounders. It should be noted that in addition 50 mortars were loaded, an unusually high proportion.

It will be seen therefore that the total strength of the Royal Artillery embarked for the expedition was as follows:—

	Lt.-Col.	Capt.	Capt.-Lts.	Lieuts.	2/Lieuts.	F/Ws.	Sgts.	Corpls.	Bdrs.	Gnrs.	Matts.	Pifers	Dmrs.	Total
Staff ...	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3
Det. with the Bn. Guns ...	—	—	1	—	2	6	5	4	9	23	50	—	—	100
Three Companies R.A. ...	—	2	3	1	3	8	6	9	22	53	184	3	6	300
Det. on board the Bombs ...	—	1	—	—	—	3	—	2	9	6	6	—	—	27
Total ...	1	5	4	1	5	17	11	15	40	82	240	3	6	430

¹ Most published accounts, including Clowes' History of the Royal Navy, assert that there were only two bomb vessels in the squadron and include H.M.S. Infernal as a fireship. The ship's log and muster book make it quite clear that she was equipped as a bomb.

² No details of the number of artillery horses embarked are known, but a contractor was paid £574/10/- in August 1758 "for hire of Train (of artillery) horses" for the expedition to the coast of France.

The infantry of the expeditionary force embarked at Cowes on 25 May (Guards and 1st Brigade), 26 May (2nd and 3rd Brigades) and 27 May (4th Brigade and R.A.) and, being joined at Spithead by the cavalry transports from Portsmouth and by the Ordnance store ships from Woolwich, the whole fleet of over 150 vessels set sail on 1 June.


It is of interest to note that when the force sailed from St. Helens it left about 500 men sick at Newport Camp. About 400 of these embarked on four transports on 30 August and, under escort of H.M.S. Fowey, joined the expedition off the Brittany coast on 4 September. Another 200 men were left sick at Weymouth when the force sailed again on 31 August, and these were collected at Dorchester and were later sent to Portsmouth where they rejoined their respective units. The high proportion of sick in a force of under 14,000 men gives some idea of the state of health of the Army at that time.

The strategic purpose of the operation being to assist Frederick the Great's campaign in Germany by compelling the enemy to retain troops in western France, it was the intention of the British Government to launch something far more ambitious than a mere nuisance raid. The Duke of Marlborough was therefore instructed to seize St. Malo, which, being situated on a peninsula easily defended against landward attack, could be held by a small garrison supplied and maintained by sea. It was assumed that a British force securely established at St. Malo would compel the French to contain it by means of a far larger army or alternatively would be the means of goading the enemy fleet to put to sea in an effort to cut the communications across the Channel and thus provide Lord Anson with the opportunity he sought of destroying the Brest squadron. This indeed is the explanation of the inclusion of such a strong artillery contingent in the expeditionary force, for of the thirteen Companies R.A. in the whole United Kingdom, the equivalent of $4\frac{1}{2}$ Companies sailed with the Duke of Marlborough. St. Malo was to be stormed by escalade following a short but very violent bombardment, and was thereafter to be held; both phases of this plan required a powerful artillery. The fifty mortars—besides those of the bomb vessels—were to provide the short but violent bombardment in preparation for the assault, while the heavy guns would later be required for defence.

Commodore Howe with his huge fleet of transports made but slow progress. One transport carrying four companies of 1st Guards was driven ashore and wrecked, while the Ordnance store ship *Anne* lost a mast and had to be taken in tow. But at 2 p.m. on 5 June the fleet stood into Cancale Bay and, after a quick reconnaissance inshore, the Duke of Marlborough and the Commodore decided to land the troops at La Houle, just south-east of Cancale. Hoisting his broad pendant on H.M.S. *Success*, Commodore Howe led in the *Rose*, *Flamborough* and *Diligence* and anchored off the three-gun fort at La Houle Point. Half-an-hour's firing sufficed to overcome resistance, and at 7.30 p.m. the Guards Brigade, the 5th Regiment and two battalions of Grenadiers¹ were put ashore together with ten 6-pounder battalion guns. The leading troops quickly seized the high ground overlooking the beach and drove off a few

¹ The Grenadier Companies (100 rank and file each) of all battalions (except the Guards, 5th and 72nd Regiments) were formed into two battalions (each of 5 companies) and field officers were specially detailed to each.

Attack on St. Malo June 1758



French militiamen without much difficulty. Next day the remaining troops, including the dragoons and field guns, were landed, and arrangements were made to construct an entrenched camp to cover the landing place.

Soon after dawn on 7 June the army set out from Cancale in two columns, leaving Boscawen's 3rd Brigade to hold the beach-head and "to bring up the heavy cannon". On the right Lord George Sackville led the Guards and 1st Brigade with the second battalion of Grenadiers and the Light Dragoons directly towards St. Malo, while the Earl of Ancram with the 2nd and 4th Brigades and the first battalion of Grenadiers moved by a more southerly route. After a very tiring march over abominable tracks, the two columns took up position that evening on the high ground at Paramé, and the Duke of Marlborough carried out a reconnaissance of St. Malo. Seeing a large collection of shipping in St. Servan harbour, which was not covered by the guns of St. Malo, the Duke decided to despatch a raiding party under cover of darkness to do what damage it could. Accordingly a detachment of Light Dragoons, each man carrying an infantryman *en croupe*, swooped down on St. Servan that night and set fire to over 100 ships, including many privateers and some small warships. In addition, the extensive naval storehouses were totally destroyed, and the raiding force withdrew without meeting any opposition beyond some distant and ineffective gun fire. The damage done in this raid was estimated at £750,000, and for many months the privateering enterprises of St. Malo were ruined, to the great advantage of British sea-borne trade.

According to the original plan, every effort should have been made to send up mortars from Cancale so as to be ready to open a very heavy bombardment of St. Malo as soon as possible. But the direct road between Cancale and Paramé had been found to be so unexpectedly bad that the British commander decided to send his artillery transports round by sea in the hope of being able to land the mortars nearer his objective. Meanwhile he sent a party of cavalry to seize the fort of Roteneuf—which had been abandoned by the enemy—and to examine the coast for a sheltered landing place. The French on their part unhesitatingly declined the British summons to capitulate and blew up the narrow causeway which formed the only approach to the city by land. British reconnaissance of the walls of St. Malo revealed the depressing fact that the scaling ladders provided for the assault were far too short.

The Duke of Marlborough was also seriously concerned at the problem of feeding his troops, who had landed with only two days rations. There was no properly organized transport and in any case the poor tracks westwards from Cancale made the despatch of food and ammunition to the camp at Paramé a difficult operation. A good main road ran from Cancale *via* Dol to St. Malo, but it was exposed to attack over a long distance and would be very difficult to protect. On 8 June therefore foraging parties were sent out to obtain what food could be found in the neighbouring villages, but the bad discipline of the troops, who looted and pillaged disgracefully, destroyed all hope of friendly co-operation with the inhabitants, who fled with their cattle and moveable possessions.

On the evening of 8 June two further reports reached British Headquarters at Paramé. A Frenchman trying to make his way into St. Malo was caught by a vigilant piquet and was found to be carrying a message exhorting

the garrison to stand fast for two or three days as by that time a force of 20,000 regular troops would relieve the city. At about the same time the Duke of Marlborough received a report from Colonel Caesar who had marched to Dol with the 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards and a few Light Dragoons. This force, which had paid fairly for all it requisitioned, had been well received by the citizens and had stayed the night in good billets without seeing any enemy troops. Two prisoners had, however, stated that a force of French regular troops was concentrating not far from Dol. During the night 8/9 June there was a very violent storm with thunder and lightning and torrential rain, which must have turned the country roads into bogs.

The effect of these two unconfirmed and vague reports on the Duke of Marlborough appears to have been decisive. Already worried and perplexed by administrative problems, and above all by the difficulty of getting his heavy artillery into action, he seems to have seized on the danger of being brought to battle by superior enemy forces as a sufficient reason for abandoning the expedition so far as St. Malo was concerned. A more energetic commander would at least have delayed his re-embarkation for as long as possible, for every day that the British remained ashore in Brittany meant attracting more and more French troops to the area. But Marlborough, though he had shown competence in Flanders as a Brigadier, was no James Wolfe, and he decided late on 8 June to withdraw to Cancale and there to re-embark his force.

Careful and successful arrangements were made on 9 June to mislead the enemy as to British intentions. Large working parties were employed in repairing the road forward towards St. Malo, and orders were given for detachments to collect six days rations from ships in a bay near Roteneuf. Even the British troops themselves believed that active operations against St. Malo were about to begin, but in fact a message had already been sent to Commodore Howe to return with his ships from St. Malo to Cancale, and a detachment of artillery with four mortars which was actually on its way to Paramé camp was ordered to retrace its steps to the landing place without delay.

On the morning of 10 June the British force was under arms expecting to advance towards St. Malo when it was suddenly ordered to retire to Cancale. The movement was completed without opposition and the British encamped within the fortified lines constructed by the 3rd Brigade. The artillery was embarked that night and the Light Dragoons with the four Brigades of the Line next day, leaving the Guards Brigade and the two battalions of Grenadiers to spend a most uncomfortable night ashore. After sixteen hours of continuous heavy rain, the rearguard embarked on the morning of 12 June, still quite unmolested by the enemy.

For over a week the fleet remained weather-bound in Cancale Bay, during which time reconnaissance was made of Granville, though probably only to confuse the enemy and not in preparation for a landing, since the little town was hardly worthy of attention. The fleet then moved round to Havre, perhaps in the hope of making a dash for Caen, but bad weather caused this plan to be dropped, and on 28 June the fleet and transports stood out to sea. Two days later the whole force suddenly appeared off Cherbourg and all arrangements were made for an immediate landing. At the last moment, however, the wind rose to gale force and all question of landing troops on a lee shore had to be

abandoned. As the men were sickly from long confinement in overcrowded¹ transports and as both water and forage were almost exhausted, it was decided to return to England. By the evening of 1 July the fleet was at St. Helens, and four days later the infantry and artillery were landed at Cowes and the Light Dragoons at Portsmouth.

The attack on St. Malo had undoubtedly failed in its major strategic object and it is interesting to note that the immediate cause of that failure was due to the impossibility of employing the artillery. There can have been few instances in history where a sea-borne operation of over four weeks duration had been completed without the artillery firing a single round, and it was precisely because the guns could not be got into action that the expedition failed in attaining its object. Yet the damage inflicted on French shipping and the alarm caused in the invaded district had to some extent diverted French troops from the main theatre of war in Germany, and these factors no doubt influenced the British Government in deciding to re-employ the troops concerned in a further series of raids on the enemy coast, which, it was believed, was keeping 30,000 French troops on the western seaboard.

When the Duke of Marlborough reached England he found that the Government had already decided to send five regiments of cavalry and three battalions of infantry to serve in Germany under Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick. Mr. Pitt intended, however, to continue the diversionary operations against the French coast, though on a reduced scale. There was to be no question of seizing and holding a strong point which would invite attack by land or sea, but purely a series of nuisance raids designed to divert attention from Germany and to tie down troops in western France. As a result of the new plan, the Duke of Marlborough,² Lord George Sackville,³ the Earl of Ancram and Major-General Hon. J. Waldegrave left the force in the Isle of Wight and the command was given to Lt.-General Edward Bligh,⁴ a 73-year-old veteran. Three battalions of infantry—20th, 23rd and 25th Regiments—were also withdrawn for service in Germany and the remaining force in the Isle of Wight was reorganized into four brigades, including one of the Guards. A newcomer to the expeditionary force was H.R.H. Prince Edward,⁵ who embarked on board H.M.S. Essex, flying the broad pendant of Commodore Howe.

The withdrawal of three infantry battalions for service in Germany led to a corresponding alteration in the Battalion Gun detachment of the Royal Artillery. Colonel Desaguliers received orders to send with these three battalions a party of officers and men to which would be added 12 mattresses from other battalion gun detachments then encamped at Chatham. The party withdrawn from the force at Newport, Isle of Wight, was composed as under :—

¹ Transports had been provided on a basis of one ton per man—the normal allowance for a short sea voyage.

² Capt. J. Pattison (55) accompanied the Duke of Marlborough to Germany as A.D.C.

³ Capt. J. Brome (87) accompanied Lord George Sackville to Germany as A.D.C.

⁴ Walpole somewhat unkindly described him as "an old General routed out of some horse armoury in Ireland". He had seen a good deal of active service and was considered a competent officer.

⁵ H.R.H. Prince Edward Augustus, second son of the Prince of Wales, was born in 1739.

Unit.	2/Lt.	F/Ws.	Sgt.	Cpls.	Bdrs.	Gnrs.	Matts.	Total.
Capt. J. Gregory's Coy., 1 Bn. ...	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1
Capt. L. Pattison's Coy., 1 Bn. ...	—	1	—	—	1	1	5	8
Capt. J. Pattison's Coy., 1 Bn. ...	1	—	—	—	—	1	3	5
Capt. W. Phillips' Coy., 1 Bn. ...	—	—	—	1	—	1	—	2
Capt. C. Brome's Coy., 2 Bn. ...	—	—	—	1	1	2	3	7
Capt. J. Innes' Coy., 1 Bn. ...	—	1	—	—	—	1	2	4
Capt. P. Innes' Coy., 2 Bn. ...	—	—	1	—	1	1	—	3
Capt. W. Hussey's Coy., 2 Bn. ...	—	—	—	—	1	—	4	5
Total	1 ¹	2 ¹	1	2	4	7	18	35

A detachment of 1 Corporal, 1 Bombardier, 2 Gunners and 12 Mattresses of Capt. T. Smith's Company, 2 Battalion, R.A. (which was at that time stationed at Portsmouth) was hastily added to the expeditionary force at Newport, making the battalion Gun detachment up to a total strength of Captain-Lieutenant D. Drummond, 1 Second-Lieutenant, 4 Fireworkers, 4 Serjeants, 3 Corporals, 6 Bombardiers, 18 Gunners and 44 Mattresses (total 81 all ranks). This reconstitution of the force apparently involved some changes in the accommodation of troops on Ordnance transports, and with General Bligh's force re-embarked, two detachments (each of 1 Sgt., 1 Bdr., 2 Gnrs. and 2 Matts.) were berthed on board H.M.S. Essex and Jason instead of on board transports.

The Light Dragoon component of General Bligh's force was also reduced by five Light Troops—those of 1st and 3rd Dragoon Guards and of 2nd, 6th and 10th Dragoons—which were ordered² off to rejoin their own regiments then preparing to accompany the Duke of Marlborough to Germany.


It should be noted that, despite the change in the objective of General Bligh's force and the withdrawal of an infantry brigade, no significant change was made in the artillery component, which remained exceptionally strong in relation to the twelve infantry battalions still left. The explanation may be that the Ordnance store ships were fully loaded and in process of watering and re-victualling, and to have withdrawn say one Company, R.A., and an appropriate proportion of guns, ammunition and stores would have delayed the whole expedition.

On 1 August Commodore Howe³ put to sea with the fleet of transports in company, and four days later anchored off Cherbourg, then garrisoned by three French regular regiments, three militia regiments and some 250 dragoons. The General with his Staff, the Commodore and Prince Edward boarded H.M.S. Tartar and made a careful reconnaissance of the coast in order to select a landing place in Marais Bay, west of the town.

¹ The three officers sent off to Germany were 2/Lieut. V. Lloyd and Fireworkers R. Harrington and H. Evans.

² There is some doubt as to whether these orders were actually carried out, and consequently whether four or nine Light Troops took part in the second expedition. It is known that "three additional Troops of Light Horse" joined the expedition at Portland from Spithead under escort of H.M.S. Richmond and Scorpion on 27 August, and that some Light Dragoons had embarked at Portsmouth on 25 July—probably four Troops.

³ Commodore Howe's squadron remained unchanged except that H.M.S. Montague (60) joined in place of H.M.S. Deptford. The frigate Renown (32) joined on 18 August and the frigate Fowey on 4 September.



Very early on 7 August H.M.S. Maidstone and Rose stood in to a position just off Cherbourg together with the bombs Furnace and Grenado, which latter ships at 1 a.m. began a slow bombardment of the town with their heavy mortars, throwing carcasses¹ (incendiary projectiles) and shells. Unfortunately, after firing only six rounds, the 13-inch mortar of H.M.S. Furnace was found to have a cracked chamber, and by dawn the Grenado's 13-inch mortar was also condemned² as unfit to fire. The enemy returned the fire of the bomb vessels but without effect.

While Cherbourg was thus kept under fire all preparations were being made for landing the Guards Brigade and the Grenadier battalions in the flat-bottomed boats³ specially designed for the purpose. At 3 a.m. the Commodore shifted his broad pendant to H.M.S. Pallas and worked closer inshore six miles west of Cherbourg followed by the Richmond, Active, Flamborough and Rose. The bombs and their covering ships also joined the division inshore and about noon a heavy fire was opened by the ships on a body of French troops drawn up near the beach while the flats pulled towards the landing place. H.M.S. Furnace does not appear to have taken part in this bombardment, but the Grenado and Infernal certainly did. The latter ship's mortars made exceptionally good shooting with 20 shells and 20 canisters (each containing 200 one pound balls). These projectiles⁴ were chiefly responsible for driving the enemy from the beach and allowing the British infantry to land practically without loss. Once formed, the Guards and Grenadiers advanced with great dash and soon drove the defenders back with the loss of three brass field guns and a colour. The beach-head was thus secured, and by nightfall the remaining three infantry brigades had been safely landed. Early next day the artillery and the Light Troops of Dragoons were put ashore and the whole force advanced on Cherbourg without meeting any opposition. The French abandoned the town and made no attempt to hold the forts which were intended to protect it.

The British had no intention of holding Cherbourg and they therefore devoted themselves entirely to destroying its fortifications, military stores, shipping and port facilities. Most of the 27 ships found in the harbour were either burnt or filled with stones and sunk in the fairway. Two vessels⁵ only were brought off as prizes, one of which was loaded with 22 brass cannon and two brass mortars. All the iron guns and mortars—175 in all—were destroyed, all the forts were blown up, the pier heads demolished, the basin blocked and

¹ Described in a contemporary work as "a mischievous invention in the nature of a bomb, and thrown like it out of a mortar-piece".

² At this time each Bomb vessel normally carried two mortars, a 13-inch and a 10-inch. It was unfortunately by no means unusual for the 13-inch sea service mortar to crack, usually at the muzzle. The defect was still common fifty years later.

³ These boats—an early pattern of the modern Landing Craft, Infantry—were 12-oared craft drawing only two feet of water and each carrying 63 fully equipped soldiers. They had been built specially for the expedition in May and were first used in Cancale Bay in June.

⁴ These projectiles are described in the ship's log as "boxes of 1-lb. shot", each box holding 200 balls. It is not clear whether they were loaded and fired loose or whether they were contained in some sort of canister and burst in the air by time fuze as were the mortar shells. In any case, they seem to have been an early form of shrapnel and were very effective against troops in the open. H.M.S. Infernal fired the whole of her supply of 20 boxes on this occasion.

⁵ One was the privateer Tartar of Bristol which had been captured by the French, and the other a Danish ship originally taken by the British and later recaptured by the enemy. It was the latter which was used to bring away the brass cannon.

its retaining walls mined. The town itself was not harmed, but the unfortunate inhabitants suffered greatly from the disgraceful behaviour of some of the troops¹ who plundered and pillaged unmercifully. A week's strenuous labour sufficed to complete the total destruction of the harbour works which had taken thirty years to construct and had cost about £1,000,000. On 16 August the whole force re-embarked without the slightest interference by the French. The fleet then sailed for Portland, having sent H.M.S. Richmond—which ship had got ashore and was damaged—into Spithead and H.M.S. Success and the two prizes to Portsmouth.



The raid on Cherbourg had been skilfully executed and had undoubtedly caused great consternation in France, quite apart from the material damage done to the port. The Maréchal de Luxembourg, Military Governor of Normandy, had hastily called in troops from all over the province and had assembled outside Cherbourg some 10 battalions of regulars and six of militia with three regiments of cavalry, but had not been in time to intercept the raiders. The British Government, which at one time had been tempted to change its plan and to attempt to hold Cherbourg, finally decided that Bligh's force should be again despatched to harry the French coast so as to increase the uneasiness felt by the enemy after the Cherbourg raid.

On 31 August the fleet sailed from Portland and on the morning of 4 September landed the troops at St. Lunaire, four miles west of St. Malo. There was no opposition. The plan was to run the bomb vessels up the River Rance past St. Malo, and, under cover of their fire, to bring the flat-bottomed landing craft to St. Servan, there to embark the troops for ferrying across to St. Malo by night. Reconnaissance, however, soon revealed unexpected difficulties of navigation and the great strength of the seaward defence forts, and the plan was therefore abandoned. An alternative proposal to cross the Rance at Dinan—13 miles south of St. Lunaire—and to attack St. Malo on the east of the river was also rejected for the obvious reason that the army would have no secure means of communication with the fleet on which it depended for food and ammunition. A reconnaissance of St. Briac by five companies of Grenadiers found only some 15 fishing boats in the bay and these were duly destroyed.

Meanwhile the weather had deteriorated, and by 7 September Commodore Howe was compelled to move his ships under the lee of Cape Fréhel. The army was thus left in a very difficult position since it had landed with but three days rations and had no transport and only a few battalion guns. All question of attacking St. Malo was abandoned, and it was decided to move westwards parallel to the coast and to embark in the bay of St. Cast which gave some shelter and a fair anchorage.

On 8 September the army set out from St. Lunaire following the coast. There were constant harassing attacks by the militia and peasantry, who were enraged by the undisciplined behaviour of the invaders, and by the evening the advanced guard was held up near the mouth of the River Arguenon at St.

¹ The Guards Brigade was specifically excepted in contemporary reports. There was only one case of ill discipline among the Royal Artillery—a Gunner of Captain Tovey's Company, who was found guilty by Court Martial of plundering, and he was pardoned by the Commander. The merchant seamen from the transports were responsible for much of the looting.



Guildo. General Bligh decided to wait until low tide next day before crossing. When the time came the Guards, covered by two well-handled field guns, forded the river on the right without difficulty, while the Grenadier battalions followed by the rest of the army crossed at St. Guildo. The army camped that night just beyond the river and next day continued its leisurely march to Matignon. The 1st Battalion Coldstream Guards was sent on to St. Cast to bring up supplies from the fleet next day if required.

That night General Bligh was informed by a deserter¹ that the enemy were in considerable strength at Lamballe—some 12½ miles south-east of Matignon. In fact the Duc d'Aguillon, Military Governor of Brittany, had acted with great vigour. He had been at Brest when the news of the landing had reached him on the evening of 5 September and had at once directed all available troops to concentrate on Lamballe which had been occupied by midday on 7 September. By the evening of the 10th he had 14 regular battalions, 6 squadrons of cavalry, 10 guns and 6 mortars only five miles from Matignon.

Making no attempt to slip away quietly during the night, the British set out from Matignon about 3 a.m. on 11 September and took six hours to march the 2½ miles to the bay of St. Cast. At 9 a.m. embarkation commenced and the French soon after appeared on the high ground overlooking the beach. The frigates and sloops of the fleet had already taken station as close inshore as the depth of water would permit, and the three bomb vessels *Furnace*, *Grenado* and *Infernal* anchored rather to the north of the beach and began to engage the enemy troops with their mortars. The effect of the heavy shells on formed infantry was devastating, and the ship's log of H.M.S. *Infernal* records that the French "fell down prodigious fast", the one-pound shot² from that ship being particularly effective. It was apparently the heavy mortar shells which held the French off until the whole force except the rearguard (4 companies of the 1st Guards and the Grenadiers under Major-General Drury) had been safely embarked. Then soon after 11 o'clock the enemy brought their artillery into action and their infantry advanced towards the beach in three columns. Those of the left and centre were held off chiefly by the fire of the warships, but the northernmost column found a covered approach and broke into the British position on the beach. The rearguard fought most gallantly, but was at length overwhelmed by numbers when its ammunition began to fail.³ Some were saved by the warships' boats, many were drowned or shot down in the water, while the rest were taken prisoner. Commodore Howe then ordered his light craft to withdraw since it was clear that nothing more could be done.

Of about 1,500 officers and men of the rearguard, the British lost about 600 killed and wounded and the French claimed the same number of prisoners of war. The enemy also admitted a loss of over 500 men (including 64 officers)

¹ No fewer than 40 deserters joined the British between 8 and 11 September and were duly brought to England.

² See also Note 4, page 229. It seems probable that only H.M.S. *Infernal* used the shot as this ship's log alone mentions this type of projectile being received on board and fired. The other bomb vessels' logs record that they fired shells and carcasses both at Cherbourg and at St. Cast.

³ Each infantryman had originally had 36 musket cartridges, but it will be remembered that the Guards Brigade and Grenadier Bns. had for the previous three days been constantly employed as advance and rearguards and must have expended much of their ammunition. Unfortunately their pouches had not been replenished.

during the action, and a high proportion of their casualties must have been inflicted by the heavy mortar shells¹ of the bomb vessels, for the ships' guns of the frigates and sloops could not have been effective against the French on the heights of St. Cast and could only have protected the rearguard when the enemy advanced on to the beach. It was the clever use of the covered approach which allowed the French to close with the British (who were holding a sort of embankment on the beach) and once the fighting came to close quarters the ships' guns could not intervene.

The fleet remained in St. Cast bay until 14 September when it sailed, and, after calling at Plymouth, arrived at Spithead on 18 September. Three days later the troops were disembarked to reoccupy their former quarters in the Isle of Wight and at Petersfield. But this was only a temporary arrangement so far as the artillery was concerned, for by the middle of October Captain T. James' Company was moved to Portsmouth where it remained in garrison, while the Companies of Captains J. Brome and A. Tovey were sent to Woolwich. The Battalion Guns detachment was broken up and the personnel rejoined their own units.

In assessing the value of the series of raids on the French coast in 1758, there is a danger that the tactical failures—especially that at St. Cast—should be given too great an importance when compared with the, at least partial, strategical success. It has been estimated that between 80 and 100 regular French battalions were retained in Flanders and the western provinces owing to these raids by some 13,000 British troops, and in addition a considerable militia force was kept embodied to the detriment of the national economy. Thus the raids exercised a considerable indirect influence on the main campaign in Germany, and to that extent were eminently successful. Had the tactical handling of the force been more efficient, the strategical value of the diversion might have been very much greater.

The campaign was a most unsatisfactory business from the artillery point of view, since only the small detachments employed on board the bomb vessels had any opportunity for distinction. On the two occasions when they were given a chance, however—at Cherbourg and at St. Cast—they undoubtedly handled their mortars with great credit. The Battalion Gun detachments had little enough to do except weary marching, while the siege train equipment was never landed at all.

After the expedition had returned to England, the C.R.A. (Lt.-Col. T. Desaguliers) applied to the Board of Ordnance to claim his right to dispose of the six church bells, captured at Cherbourg, for his own benefit. He reported that five of these bells were in good condition and would fetch 1/4d. a pound, and the other, which was damaged, could be sold as scrap "brass gun metal" for -/9d. a pound. The Board of Ordnance admitted the C.R.A.'s. right to the bells in accordance with long standing custom and assembled a Board of Officers to survey them in the Tower of London. The Board reported that four of the six were unserviceable and that the total weight was 60 cwts., 1 quarter, 10 lbs. The exact amount realized has not been traced, but it must have exceeded £250, which represented quite a handsome war gratuity.

¹ H.M.S. *Infernal* fired 32 shells, 8 carcasses and 15 boxes of 1-pound balls.

There remained the 24 brass cannon captured at Cherbourg and sent to England under convoy of H.M.S. Success. Orders were issued on 23 August for waggons to be sent from the Tower of London to Portsmouth to bring back the guns, and at 2 p.m. on Friday, 8 September, they were duly marched in ceremonial state from the Tower *via* London Bridge and Westminster Bridge, through St. James's Park to Hyde Park where they were "encamped", attended by a detachment of the Royal Artillery from Woolwich of 5 officers, 12 N.C.Os., 102 gunners and mattsos, 4 drummers and 4 fifers. Drivers and horses were brought from Chatham for the occasion and in all 55 drivers and 235 horses were employed. After being on view to the populace in Hyde Park, the guns were marched past His Majesty the King on 16 September and returned through the city to the Tower. The procession must have made quite an imposing display which was probably intended to counter a certain feeling of frustration at the previous lack of tactical success in the raiding operations on the French coast.

The campaign on the Channel coast in 1758 was an unsatisfactory episode from the Gunner point of view, and perhaps for that reason has been almost completely ignored by regimental historians. Duncan¹ indeed mentions that "400 Artillerymen" took part in the first raid on St. Malo and the capture of Cherbourg, but he makes no mention of the second attack on St. Malo or the disaster at St. Cast, nor does he make any attempt to identify the R.A. units concerned. No other published account has given any further details. Yet on the two occasions when the R.A. was able to intervene, outstandingly successful results were achieved, and the Regiment has no reason to be ashamed of the part it played in this curious campaign.

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NORTH AFRICAN TWELFTH.

By MAJOR P. HALFORD-THOMPSON, M.C., T.D., R.A.

IT all depended on the weather. A sharp thunderstorm just before the opening day and the Wadi Caam would attract few birds. The Caam was our local standby for sandgrouse and throughout the dry season held about a mile and a half of standing water which finished in a sandbar at the mouth. The sandgrouse flocked in here every morning at first light to drink and coffee house, this being the only available standing water for miles around. Once it rained little spruits and pools sprang up all over the district and the birds scattered accordingly.

British Administration Tripolitania had somewhat nostalgically set the opening of the sandgrouse season for August the twelfth. Given no rain the little birds came into the Caam come wind come wrack and the real problem was to leave no stretch of water on either bank untenanted by a gun. Some stands were very good, others were dull and there was some heartburning in the Mess the night before as we drew out the numbers and names to correspond with the stands on our Wadi Caam shooting map. At least ten guns were

needed to cover the banks and the next day we were going to place twelve; only one minor V.I.P. had to be accounted for and he was arbitrarily allotted a good place.

Just on first light we arrived at the meet in jeeps and sent off the right bankers in charge of a gun who knew their stands. At the same time we beat off the more notoriously useless Arab "boys" who gathered like flies round us and portioned the others out into the backs of jeeps to act as pickers-up. I shepherded the left bankers to a point half-way down stream and managed to get them all walking in the right direction before escorting the V.I.P. to his stand. Just as I approached the small nullah where I proposed to drop him and his boy, to my horror I saw the features of the local District Officer rising up out of the sand; he had given us no indication that he was coming and had brought two other guns with him.

However there were many other places and I managed to get the V.I.P. into a reasonable pitch before taking cover myself as their unmistakable whistle heralded the arrival of the first birds at our end. At the same time sporadic musketry broke out a mile up stream. This flushed the half-dozen resident teal who zigzagged madly down nearly the full length of the water, getting both barrels from nearly everybody.

By the time they reached us they had decided that height was all important and they erupted out into the Mediterranean with only one casualty, which fell, I was pleased to notice, to the V.I.P. By this time the sandgrouse were making determined efforts to reach the water in coveys of ten to thirty and, except for the guns right up at the head of the water, shooting was general. Those at the top end however had a lot of rock pigeon and dove to contend with, deceptively fast and seemingly armour plated. I had a very small scratch in the ground about twenty feet above the water and whereas I could conceal myself I could not induce my boy to take any camouflage precautions. Finally I picked him up and deposited him in the wadi where he was kept cool and out of harm and sight.

A sandgrouse's call is very easy to imitate and I found that I could lure quite large coveys within gunshot and I soon had a very welcome pile of little birds at my feet, those that fell in the wadi being collected by the already wet boy.

A morning like this ran through a good fifty cartridges and I had refilled my belt for the third time when the pace began to slacken as fewer and fewer birds came in and the survivors of those who had arrived made off into the desert again. We finally trudged back to the jeeps, where a drinks tent had been erected, and counted our bag. This was remarkably good, indeed a record for the water, and consisted of 194 sandgrouse (a few imperial, some pintail and the majority spotted), 1 teal, 150 doves, 9 rock pigeon, 1 chickhoor, 1 hare.

We were very fortunate this season and the rain held off long enough for us to get in five more big days. We tried once or twice to do it with three or four guns but we got very little shooting as the birds merely edged off to other parts of the wadi and less than ten guns had little sport. When the weather finally broke hardly a bird came into the Caam but we had by that time accounted for just under 500 brace of sandgrouse.

ROYAL ARTILLERY 40 INFANTRY DIVISION.

By BRIGADIER J. M. HAILEY, D.S.O.

Commander Royal Artillery, 40 Infantry Division.

BY midsummer 1952 nearly all units and individuals who formed part of the original Divisional Artillery of 40 Infantry Division and who arrived in Hong Kong in the summer of 1949 expecting to fight in the defence of the Colony, will have left.

It therefore seems a suitable occasion to write a few words about the gunner units and the men who have formed the framework of the defence of the Colony for nearly 3 years and who are either leaving or have already left, and who have gained such a deservedly high reputation for themselves among the Hong Kong Garrison.

The original Divisional Artillery in 1949 consisted of 14 Field Regiment, 23 Field Regiment and 25 Field Regiment (the last named forming part of the permanent Garrison of the Colony before the emergency). A few months later 58 Medium Regiment and 27 (Strange's) Battery arrived. Initially 58 Medium Regiment came under command of the C.C.R.A., whilst Strange's Battery, then an Anti-Tank Battery, came straight to the Divisional Artillery.

Various reorganizations took place, the first of which removed 25 Field Regiment to Kowloon to fill the gap caused by the departure of the Commando Brigade who had an Internal Security role there. This fine regiment was therefore lost to the Divisional Artillery early in 1950, and from then onwards took up a mainly police-infantry role with all the efficiency of their predecessors.

The backbone of the Divisional Artillery for more than 2 years was therefore 14 Field Regiment and 23 Field Regiment. This lasted until October 1951 when 14 Field Regiment left. They were replaced by 45 Field Regiment who had already made a great name for themselves.

14 Field Regiment was fortunate in one respect in that the regiment moved to Sek Kong, away out in the New Territories, soon after disembarking where they remained throughout their tour in the Colony. This was an advantage not fully appreciated at the time as Sek Kong Camp then consisted of bare paddy fields humming with mosquitoes. As an example of early conditions there, during the first Administrative Inspection of the regiment at Sek Kong, a very heavy downpour flooded the entire camp and converted the whole area into a lake in which such irrigation drains as existed were completely obscured. The Catering Adviser who was taking an active part in the inspection inadvertently stepped into one such drain and was last seen clutching his report above his head and doing his best to save himself from drowning. Due to the hard work put in by Sappers, 14 and 45 Field Regiments, Sek Kong is now a flourishing hutted camp quite unrecognizable to those who first knew it.

23 Field Regiment was the first major gunner unit to arrive in the Colony in July 1949 and they have been there longer than anyone else in the Divisional Artillery. After one or two initial moves, during one of which they had to undertake an Internal Security role for about 3 months on Hong Kong Island, where their liaison with the police and knowledge of low life in Hong Kong was reported to be unequalled, they settled down in Quarry Camp where they have been ever since.

23 Field Regiment have had a wonderful record of success both in work and play. They have either won or been in the finals of practically every major sporting event in the Colony. As an example of their enterprise they ran a small Saddle Club, without outside help, which proved an admirable method of providing exercise and amusement both to themselves and their many friends in the Royal Navy.

The regiment claim the distinction of having entertained in their Mess at various times distinguished visitors ranging from the Queen's representative, in the person of the Governor Sir Alexander Grantham, G.C.M.G., who honoured them with a farewell visit a few weeks ago, to eminent soldiers ranging from the C.I.G.S. down to all ranks of General Officers.

58 Medium Regiment have now reached home on the "Empress of Australia". It is not generally known that the first British casualties of the Korean war were from this regiment. They came from a small party of Other Ranks who were carrying out liaison training with the Royal Navy. When the ship was shelled off Korea the gunners took their place in helping to serve naval guns. Three were killed and one wounded, together with some of their comrades of the Royal Navy. They also have a splendid sporting record whilst in the Colony.

27 (Strange's) Light Battery who, although not leaving for England as a complete unit, will have lost all their original members by midsummer, provided the first gunner unit to serve in Korea. A troop of the battery, then equipped with anti-tank guns, sailed for Korea to support 27 Infantry Brigade and took part in all their early battles. For this they received a citation from the President of the South Korean Republic. This has been a particularly happy little unit with a wonderful record in work and sport.

Among others who have left or are leaving the Divisional Artillery are 1903 Air O.P. Flight. This excellent little team left in July 1951 and have been doing outstanding work.

The Movement Light Troop and 22 Counter-Bombardment Troop come into the same category as 27 Light Battery. Although they are not leaving as units, all their original members will have left by mid-summer. They too have contributed much.

Finally H.Q., R.A., 40 Infantry Division itself. The least that can be said about the members of this H.Q. is that there is hardly a hill or a camp or a bar in the Colony on which they have not left their mark. Enough said!

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The Pack.

R.A. DRAGHOUNDS SEASON 1951-1952.

By "So WESTRY".

"AND now for the honour of Shropshire" So said mad Jack Mytton who lived not more than a mile from Park Hall, Oswestry, and no doubt many mad gunners and civilians feel the same as they swallow their tonsils going into some of the same fences over which Mytton used to hunt.

In our second season we have managed to record quite a lot of progress. We have 13 couple of hounds and $4\frac{1}{2}$ couple of our own puppies for next season's entry. We now have ten lines or rather areas, each allotted to an officer. No line has to be run through the same fields more than once a season as the whole country is huntable provided the wire is taken down.

"Who's that under his horse in the brook?" writes Nimrod of the Quorn Hunt from Ashby Pastures of 1832. Well, certain officers who shall be nameless have taken a ducking this season and one certainly meets every sort of obstacle with a choice between timber and brush at most fences. We also have a fox-hunting day every other Saturday, mostly in the Welsh foothills where there is anything from a stone wall to a bullfinch on top of a bank, usually scrambling up or down hill into the bargain.

We aim at taking the wire down to provide a good stretch of natural fence in and out of every field but on parts of one or two lines, notably Colonel Wells' and Captain Coopers' there are places where one can jump a field to the right or left of hounds. This also applies to the Chirk Castle line which has virtually no wire at all.

"The pace was too good to enquire"—Also from Nimrod.

From a meet we held well down into the North Shropshire Country, their Master a great sportsman, Mr. H. J. Davies, and his son and daughter were out. He will forgive me, I know, if I say he is no chicken and also forgive me if there is no truth in this story though I heard it from a relation of his. . . . His anxious wife, fearful for his safety, had been waiting about but missed him when he came in, but eventually found him by the fire in his slippers and asked him how he had got on, to which he replied: "Great fun, and if it had been a point-to-point I do believe I'd have won". And I think he would, as he was beautifully mounted and gave us a fine exhibition of taking on the country.

Pause a moment oh my brothers
Who at home so glibly prate
How you hope to see Foxhunting
Soon abolished by the state.
We have fought for you and gladly
Would you now requite us thus
Kill the sport we love so madly
Think what hunting means to us.

For the sake of those who're absent
 For the sake of those who're gone
 All those gallant cheery comrades
 Who once rallied to the horn.
 For the youngster true to breeding
 Longing soon the game to learn
 Hear us Soldier Exiles pleading
 Keep it up till we return.

The two last verses of "The Exiled Foxhunter", by Maud Wynter, published in *Horse and Hounds* during the first World War and quoted by that champion of foxhunting both sides of the Atlantic, Mr. A. H. Higginson, in "The Tale of Two Brushes" in 1943.

Surely these lines express the thoughts of many in war or in prison camps, and do they not prove that hunting is the soldiers' sport. I'm not referring to the Road Brigade or one or two hunt-ball pink-coated gentry who have never left the ground except behind somebody else. Theirs is a different sport. Neither has the good man across country necessarily got to be an expert equitator. It is the chap who gets up covered in mud and blood on the landing side of his fences and goes on, not the immaculate one who remains on the take-off side, who we want to follow in the footsteps of Jock Campbell, Bill Blacker and Bill Gunn, who are probably even now taking their own line in the land where there's never a blank day and no wire.

It must be our object then to try and find their successors. There are very few countries where one can do it in now within the average subaltern's pocket and a drag in what was a good country plus a real wire effort from the line organizers seems to provide the answer. Then the cavalry charge can be let loose to meet all the old-time hazards of un-wired natural fences and they are still legion. For instance do you remember Joe, in battledress, jumping on the horse of one who had had enough and losing his teeth in a bullfinch.

Nigel colliding with a cart mare galloping along the landing side, at Woodhouse.

Peter doing an Absalom at Llanforda.

Fred extricating himself from a snow drift at the last fence at Hengoed.

Dick coming home with the rim off his bowler, looking like a miner.

David, Derek and Marigold, all on the deck together at the same thorn fence at Hardwick.

Catching our fox in the open the day that Jerry ran for us, and discarded his specks, miles off the line regardless of wire.

What fun it all is, and, oh horsey ones, it would all have happened to us just the same if we had never heard of the indirect rein of opposition or the comparative advantages of standing or running martingales or whether we were or weren't wearing a hat guard or our horses a noseband. Those that get "that wicked glint" in their eye would have seen the end of the hunt however long they had been at the game, whatever they were riding, and whoever refused just in front of them, or any of the old excuses.

CORRESPONDENCE COLUMN.

Authors are alone responsible for facts and opinions expressed in their letters, etc.

ADDITIONAL NOTES FOR THE F.O.O.'s. SUCCESSOR.

From "F.D.D."

"25's" Notes for his successor are excellent, I think there should be more of these articles from officers who possess the knowledge and experience which is not available in official publications. This is particularly important because there are many of our present troop commanders, and those to follow, who will have no experience of battle conditions.

May I, without wishing to detract from the merits of the article, mention what might cause some misunderstanding and some heresies which "25" has perpetrated and offer two additions to his "Notes" from the non-armoured aspect.

Firstly, in case it may be taken too literally and encourage false ideas, the F.O.O. should not wish for "the opportunity of getting to grips with the enemy". His job in battle is to provide immediate fire support during the assault and reorganization and to maintain intimate liaison with the unit he is supporting. To avoid becoming embroiled in the infantry or armoured battle he is provided with a wireless set on the net of the supported arm. He is not to consider himself a killer of the enemy. With apologies to an old proverb—"He who sees and lives to-day; sees much more another day". However, there are occasions when the F.O.O. and his party have to resort to the use of their small arms; but more of this later.

The first heresy concerns the use of the equipment available to the F.O.O. For example, the Remote Control E is outdated and not in current use. The abbreviation A.C.L. stands for Apparatus Cable laying, not Assault Cable layer. The standard battery for a W.S. 19 fitted into an armoured O.P. carrier is the 6v. 85ah. connected in series, it is impracticable to stow, lift about, or charge a 12v. 170ah. battery. However, these are minor points because the equipment in use and the way it is handled does vary.

Writers of such articles may be advised to avoid reference to scales and types of equipment as they are apt to change.

Now for the offer of two additional "Notes".

I certainly agree with "25's" advice with regard to the selection and training of the O.P. team. The team represents the "eyes" of the battery or regiment, without the "eyes" the guns are to all intents and purposes blind. I therefore suggest these notes:—

- (a) Training of reserves for the O.P. teams.
- (b) Handling of small arms.

By all means concentrate on the O.P. team and let the G.P.O. handle the gun end but don't sit back when you think your teams are trained, you must then train your spares and reliefs. It is a sobering thought but, in 1944 for "Operation Overlord", although many Field Branch units had trained for years for the day, I have heard it said that the observation of fire by many R.A. troop commanders was not up to the required standard. This was of course before the introduction of Target Grid (Shades of the New Lamp).

My last suggestion for the "Notes" concerns the handling of small arms. It is a "MUST" that the F.O.O. and O.P.A. can do each others' jobs, operate all wireless sets, drive the O.P. vehicle, cook, etc. It is also a "MUST" that they and the remainder of the O.P. team are trained in the handling of all small arms it is axiomatic that this is coupled with a sound knowledge of field-craft and infantry platoon tactics. When the O.P. party are dug-in in the battalion area they must be prepared to fight to the last round and last man. This is not a cheap effort at heroics, when you are facing advancing hordes, the infantry expect the gunners to busy themselves with their job and if needs be help to stop the attack by using their small arms, whilst still laying on a D.F. (S.O.S.) on the company position. It is in such circumstances that the F.O.O.'s party does come in very close contact with the enemy.

May I conclude by saying that it should be the AIM for all Gunner and Infantry officers to know enough about each others' jobs so that in an emergency the Gunner can command a company and the Company Commander shoot the guns of the artillery (shades of that very new lamp!). However, the F.O.O. must never forget that his main job is to support those very gallant men—the P.B.I.

* * * * *

From "C.R."

In your April volume "25" mentions in "F.O.Os. will be provided as follows" that stretchers are the best means of carrying awkward loads.

Towards the end of the war, while serving as a B.C. in the mediums, I put forward officially the need for Gunner O.P. parties to have some kind of handcart. The best design could only be found by practical trials but a cart to be suitable should be:—

1. Capable of holding 1 large wireless set and batteries and a few rations, etc.
2. Light enough for 2 men to carry it loaded for short distances and over obstacles, or pulled by hand.
3. Collapsible for fitting to the outside of a jeep.
4. Adaptable to form a stretcher for a wounded man either in itself or by being joined to another similar cart.

Doubtless there are many other considerations but I am sure that many an O.P. party has yearned for a small cart at times.

IN DEFENCE OF NEW LAMPS.

From MAJOR D. E. RALEY, R.A.

Major Mead mentions four main drawbacks to Target Grid:—

- (a) Difficulties at the O.P.
- (b) Difficulties at the guns.
- (c) Signal security.
- (d) Loss of speed.

Difficulties at the O.P. and loss of Speed.

- (a) The "Lane O.T." is not quite such a nebulous term as the writer implied. Area targets in many cases give a real O.T. lane and it will be agreed that the genuine pin-point target is not very common.
- (b) In the case of a destructive shoot from a flank surely the old method suffered from the same shortcomings as target grid. Until one had an O.T. round it was impossible to make final adjustments to line, and similarly until one's line was correct the final adjustment to elevation was not practicable.
- (c) I cannot agree that target grid shoots conducted from a flank take more time and ammunition. An extensive trial on this subject in which over two thousand rounds were fired, was carried out by the School of Artillery, India. The O.P. officers represented all degrees of experience from a C.O. of the Old School to the latest-joined second lieutenant. The country was on the whole fairly difficult and close, and apex angles varied from 0° to 180° . Shoots were carried out by both the old and new methods. Target grid (although this term was not yet born) achieved a saving of 25% in rounds and 20% in time over the old method. No doubt similar trials have been carried out in this country.
- (d) Target grid unquestionably takes a little longer than the old method to produce any given round. This is because of the calculations involved at the gun end. We must remember however that it is the time from the opening round to the shoot becoming effective that counts. In this respect the overall saving in time on ranging, due to a simpler procedure, more than offsets the slight delay on each round. The final answer is in fact generally obtained quicker by target grid than by the old method.
- (e) I do not agree that in war the O.P. officer will be less harassed and the need for speed will be greater. Rather the reverse is the case. However cool one's temperament, enemy fire is apt to be disturbing and the simpler the procedure the better. Similarly although speed is unquestionably of great importance at times, the tempo of war is often slower than that of training.
- (f) Let us not forget the advantages to be gained by substituting simple sub-tension rules for such archaic devices as O.T./B.T. factors and Apex Angle Tables to mention only two of the complicated impedimenta of the O.P. officer before the days of target grid.

Difficulties at the Guns.

Before target grid the G.P.O. had to contend with normal fire orders applied direct to the guns, link shooting procedure, and cardinal point procedure. Surely to him Target Grid must be a great blessing as he now has one procedure for all types of shoot. It simplifies the training of technical assistants and reduces the number of proformas required.

Signal Security.

I think the arguments put forward are over pessimistic. Unless the map references of targets are given absolutely accurately the triangles of error are likely to be immense. The best that the enemy is likely to get then is a suspected O.P. area. This he would most probably have anyway from a shrewd look at the ground.

There is no need for "yet another" code to embarrass the O.P. officer. If a code is necessary, Unicode is quite adequate for encoding O.T. bearings providing they are always given as three figures, e.g. O.T. 005, O.T. 310. We are dependent on Unicode anyway for encoding the map reference of the O.P.

Uniformity.

With the advent of NATO and the projected European Army we must be prepared to make sacrifices in the cause of uniformity. No one would suggest imposing Coca-Cola on the Dutch, but let us be sufficiently flexible in thought to accept as common that which is best, whatever the nation of origin may be.

The test of war.

If we are to accept nothing new without the test of war then we are likely to be a somewhat antediluvian army at the time of the next conflict.

We are however "fortunate" in having a war available in Korea on which to test our new ideas. I recently had the good fortune to listen to a lecture by Lt.-Col. Maris T. Young, D.S.O., R.A., who commanded 45 Field Regiment in Korea. Target Grid was acclaimed as a great success out there.

Conclusion.

Let those of us who mastered the art of "visualizing the line of fire", knowing the workings of the "O.T./B.T. factor" and the "Apex Angle" and who always "got our line right first" rest content that in our day we were giants on the range. We were, however, a very small and select band indeed. That was a bad thing for the Regiment.

The days when "Old — will never make a good shot, he just can't visualize the line of fire" are now over. In the long run I don't think we shall forego either speed or accuracy, and we shall certainly have more officers capable of doing a shoot. The fact that the skilled observer is no longer a sort of witch doctor can at the worst only be a blow to our ego.

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