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

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

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

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

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

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Born 25th June, 1861. **Died 28th January, 1953.**

At the present moment when the future of the Sudan offers so perplexing a problem, no attempt could be made to describe Sir Reginald Wingate's life's work without making some allusion to the Sudan and to all that it implies.

As it stands the Sudan may be regarded as perhaps the finest result that has ever been attained by the now half-forgotten Empire builders of Britain. Among that brilliant company which during and over eighty years laboured to erect the edifice until recently styled "the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan", there stand out three great figures. First, Charles Gordon, from whose imagination and personality there sprang the human ideals and the spiritual force which have animated all his successors. Next came Kitchener, to forge the tools and deal the massive blows that brought Gordon's dreams into the realm of possibility. Lastly, there came Wingate who, after many years of practical work gave concrete shape to the administration and daily economy of the Sudan such as we know it to-day.

It was indeed fortunate for those men that this immense, more primitive, far more sparsely populated and backward area should never have presented the formidable, perhaps insuperable, obstacles which beset the early efforts of the Honourable East India Company and its successors in India. So the humanism and selflessness of Gordon, the thrift and practical intuition of Kitchener, the patience and industry of Wingate could mould the system and inspire all those who worked with them, and still more, after them; it is indeed a glorious record.

Now let us consider Wingate himself; for it is only by our appreciation of his entire active life that we will comprehend the greatness of the task that he achieved in that region and it is, moreover, a story that every Gunner officer should know.

Reginald Wingate, although never possessing any of the advantages normally conducive to advancement in the Army, deservedly attained to distinction of the highest order. From being a penniless Gunner subaltern, without ever having held any regimental command, without passing through the Staff College, without ever having played any part in the South African war or in some other important campaign, Wingate has achieved a renown that places him on a level with the most successful of modern British commanders. His remarkable rise, moreover, never gave occasion to envy, criticism or recrimination. Wingate's life in fact is a striking example of a "self-made" soldier, who, by patience and application, by good judgement and timely use of his great opportunities in Egypt, made his way with an assurance born of conscientious industry. He may have been fortunate in his surroundings and in his chiefs; but merit and personality, such as his, were in any case certain of deserved success.

It is a curious fact that Wingate and Kitchener should both have received a somewhat similar training: Wingate, educated in all but penury, at a tiny school in the Channel Islands, never absorbed the traditional outlook of the normal public school pupil. Kitchener, brought up in austere surroundings, educated at Montreux in Switzerland, started life with none of the usual antecedents of a British officer. The only conventional training these two men ever received was at the Royal Military Academy. Both from their earliest days in the Service were faced with the necessity of making their way forward by their own efforts. Both succeeded in so doing, utterly untrammelled by conventional views of life and unhindered by any doctrine instilled into them by "higher authority". Industry resting on an intuitive sense of all that was morally desirable and practically expedient replaced all hard and fast rules. Very rare gifts that found free play in the wonderful frame in which they found their full expression. And how both men took advantage of their good fortunes.

Francis Reginald Wingate, born on 25th June, 1861, was the seventh son of Andrew Wingate of Broadfield, Renfrewshire. His mother was Irish, having been a Miss Turner of Dublin. At the time of Francis' birth his father was a prosperous merchant trading with the Southern States of America. The War of Seccession, however, ruined him, and on his death he left a widow with barely sufficient means to bring up her family. So she moved to Jersey for the sake of obtaining a cheaper education for her boys. From St. James' School, where he was educated at a cost of £15 per annum, Francis passed into the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, whence he was gazetted to the Royal Artillery on 27th July, 1880. With something less than £100 as his entire inheritance, but gifted with great courage, industry and a power of unflagging application, he arrived in India before he was twenty-one. There he immediately took up the study of those Eastern tongues which were destined to bring him so far in his career. By passing the higher standard in Arabic, Hindustani and other languages he not only secured the monetary rewards which were of immediate service to him, but he also attracted the notice of his superiors. After a time he was sent from India to Aden. Whilst there, in January, 1883, the G.O.C., Aden, appreciating his slender means and his real qualities, wrote to Sir Evelyn Wood, then Sirdar in Cairo, recommending him for service in Egypt. Accordingly, Wingate was seconded for service with the Egyptian Army in June, 1883. On meeting him, Sir Evelyn conceived a great liking for the young gunner and selected him to act as aide-de-camp. The Sirdar and his staff officer became inseparable. During this period, Wingate once acted as commandant of a cholera hospital and gained the 4th class of the Osmanieh. Then during the Nile Expedition of 1884-85 and in the operations in the Bayuda desert, he accompanied Sir Evelyn Wood, who was acting as G.O.C. Lines of Communication. He was rewarded with the 4th class of the Medjidie, and a brevet majority to await his reaching the regimental rank of Captain.

On Sir Evelyn Wood's appointment to the command of the Eastern District at home in April, 1886, Wingate followed him to England and continued in the post of A.D.C. But finding it impossible to live on his pay in England, even when treated as a member of the General's family, at the end of one

month he asked to return to the Egyptian Army; and there he remained to the end of his service. On arrival in Cairo he was immediately appointed Assistant Military Secretary to Major-General Grenfell, then Sirdar. There on 1st January, 1887, he was transferred to the Intelligence Department, in which he served for twelve consecutive years. There he was first appointed Assistant Adjutant-General; then on 1st January, 1894, Director of Military Intelligence. Whilst thus employed promotion was rapid; captain and brevet-major on successive days in January, 1889, brevet lieutenant-colonel in November, 1896, and brevet colonel in December, 1897, when he also became A.D.C. to the Queen.

His entire service in the Egyptian Intelligence was an unbroken period of patient industry. On the results of his labours were largely based all the details of the expeditions undertaken for the recovery of the Sudan. Before the total reconquest of that immense region was possible, however, some protracted fighting took place along the existing Sudanese frontier which in one form or another lasted many years. These several little expeditions are indeed a monument to the patience of Kitchener, backed by the industry of Wingate; they were often undertaken with barely adequate means, but timed with the utmost skill and judgment. In 1889 there was fought the Battle of Toski, after which Wingate received a D.S.O. The operations dragged on until the Egyptian troops recovered Afafit and Tokar in February, 1891. As a result Wingate was advanced to the 3rd class of the Medjidie,

The next five years were a period of preparation for greater things. The general ignorance regarding the Sudan and its peoples, which had militated so largely against the success of previous expeditions, was gradually dispelled by the tireless efforts of the Intelligence Department, which ultimately attained to a remarkable efficiency under Wingate's direction. Spies, disguised as traders or desert warriors or even women, penetrated into the strongholds of Mahdism. They were able to reveal the secrets of its deliberations; they disclosed the enemy's resources hidden at Omdurman; they reported the feelings of the people in the mosque and in the market place; they brought back details of the strength of every garrison. The ground was thus well prepared for the successive movements of the contemplated reconquest; indeed the accuracy of the information that had been collected was fully borne out by subsequent events.

In spite of all this work, Wingate found time, in 1891, to publish his monumental work "Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan". He also took a leading share in facilitating the escape of European captives from the Mahdi's stronghold, notably that of Father Chrwalder, whose narrative he published in 1892 under the title of "Ten Years' Captivity in the Mahdi's Camp". Finally, in 1895, he gave an English version of Slatin Pasha's "Fire and Sword in the Sudan". These services were recognized by a civil C.B. and the 2nd class of the Iron Crown of Austria.

During 1894, for a few months, he also acted as Governor and Commander of the troops at Suakin. Meanwhile the conduct of the impending campaign of reconquest had been initiated by Colonel (later Field-Marshal and Earl) Kitchener. It was a formidable task, for it involved, in the first instance, many miles of railway construction, since the problem of transport dominated the

entire strategy of the forthcoming advance; and here Kitchener's training as a Royal Engineer proved of great value. Wingate's role, as Director of Military Intelligence, was truly a responsible matter, for Kitchener had resolved to take every advantage of river transport up the Nile and to supplement river and railroad by camel transport wherever the former means should prove unavailable. The consequent problems depended largely on the possession of accurate information. The advance upon the Dervish stronghold at Firket began in June, 1896, and throughout the subsequent operations Wingate's services were in constant request, until, in September, the Dervishes, after being defeated at Firket and Hafir, were eventually driven beyond Dongola. Pending the resumption of active operations, Wingate accompanied Sir Rennell Rodd's mission to Menelik, when Rodd was able to negotiate an important treaty with Abyssinia, signed at Addis Abbaba on 14th May, 1897.

Meanwhile Kitchener, relying on Wingate's information, had matured his plans for the second stage of his campaign. He was rejoined by his assistant in time to take part in the capture of Abu Hamed and in the occupation of Berber. But the last and principal advance was yet to come. In 1898 Kitchener, having received the support of an Expeditionary Force of British troops, marched on Khartum. This movement brought about the battle of the Atbara and culminated in the total rout of the Dervishes at Omdurman in September 1898. Mr. Winston Churchill in his book "The River War" mentions a meeting with Wingate during the reconnaissance on Kerreri, an incident that seemed to afford the writer some pleasure. Mr. Churchill in anticipation of the coming battle visited the Intelligence Mess where he was invited to luncheon. At the same table were seated Wingate, Colonel Rhodes, Slatin Pasha and a number of foreign attachés. "Standing at a table spread in the wilderness", he writes, "we ate a substantial meal. It was like a race lunch before the big event". Wingate was created a K.C.M.G. and received the thanks of both Houses of Parliament. But even after Omdurman the operations were not concluded. Wingate accompanied his chief to Fashoda where a French expedition under Major Marchand, from West Africa, had anticipated the Sirdar's arrival. The solution of that situation is familiar history. On his return to Egypt, Wingate left his Intelligence work in order to become Adjutant-General of the Egyptian Army.

Still, Kitchener was not yet satisfied with his great success. Fearing lest the Khalifa, now a fugitive, might still be a menace to the peace of the Sudan, he organized two expeditions for his capture. In the first of these Wingate, now a temporary major-general, commanded a division of infantry; the campaign failed. In the second attempt the whole force was placed under his command; it proved entirely successful. Actions were fought at Abu Aadel and Om Dubreikat in which the Khalifa fell together with his last faithful Emirs. Sir Reginald's reward was a K.C.B.

In the autumn of 1899 the South African War broke out and in December Lord Kitchener was called away from Egypt. Wingate, to his intense chagrin, was left behind to be appointed Sirdar of the Egyptian Army and Governor of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan; and this position he held until 1916. All these years were spent by him in organizing the Government of the reclaimed regions. The results of those painstaking efforts were crowned with success

in the form of the peaceful development of the entire region, in the expansion of its trade and the growth of the railways. Khartum, the capital, grew apace and prospered greatly. In June, 1908, Wingate reached lieutenant-general's rank; in the following year he conducted a Special Mission into Somaliland. In 1913 he became a full general. With the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 Sir Reginald remained in the Sudan on the watch for any action which might be fomented by the enemies of Britain, but no movement of any real importance took place. Wingate had established the Government of the Sudan on a truly secure basis. Nevertheless from 1916 onwards a few minor operations claimed his attention; a rising in the Darfur Province necessitated military operations of an appreciable scale in order to re-affirm the powers of the Government. Finally, in the same year, Sir Reginald carried through lesser but equally successful operations in the Hedjaz in Arabia, where the Arabs had risen against the Turkish rule; this was but the climax of many years of unrest. So in 1919 the entire Red Sea littoral and Arabian hinterland were definitely liberated from Turkish suzerainty and pacified. The Hedjaz became independent.

In the year 1917, when the operations in Palestine had effectually dispelled the fear of any invasion of the Sudan, Sir Reginald became High Commissioner of Egypt in Cairo and continued in that position till 1919, when he handed over this office to Viscount Allenby. In 1920 he was created a baronet with the style "of Dunbar and of Port Sudan". He finally retired from the Army in 1922.

It should be emphasized that no appreciation of Wingate's remarkable career could be complete if it overlooked the fact that his work, like Kitchener's, covered far more than that of the normal soldier. His many years in the Sudan prove him to have been an administrator gifted with ability and judgment. The very qualities, in fact, which he showed in his later years were but those by which he had already made his way to the fore in the years previous to 1898. His experience of purely military matters was never extensive: he had not held any active command from the days when he was a young subaltern until he led his troops in pursuit of the Khalifa in 1898. He never really served outside Egypt. But his insight into men, and tenacity of purpose, backed by a marvellous power of sustained office work, were to prove an effective substitute for more conventional and showy military qualities. So his Intelligence work covered more than purely military topics; it dealt equally with geographical, physical, ethnographic and linguistic matters; it was a compendium of all information that an extemporized administration of recovered territory might acquire. It was the product of profound study, tireless industry and astounding accuracy. It is significant that, when his son was born in 1889, the Arab clerks in the Cairo War Office nicknamed the child "Ibn el Hebr" (The Son of Ink).

Sir Reginald Wingate received a D.S.O. in 1889, a C.B. (civil) in 1895; he was created K.C.M.G. in 1898, K.C.B. in 1900, G.C.V.O. in 1912, G.C.B. in 1914 and, lastly, G.B.E. in 1918. He was created a baronet in 1920.

He held the Grand Crosses of the Order of the Nile, the Osmanieh and the Medjidie, the Order of El Nahda of Hedjaz, the Grand Cordon of the Order of Mohammed Ali, he was a Knight of Grace of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.

He was a Pasha of Egypt and held the 2nd Class of the Star of Ethiopia. He was appointed a Colonel Commandant of the Royal Artillery in 1917. He was Honorary Colonel of 57th Lowland Bde., R.G.A. (T.A.) and of 7th Bn. The Manchester Regt. (T.A.). He was also an Honorary D.C.L. of Oxford, Honorary LL.D. of Edinburgh. He was a freeman of the Borough of Dunbar, an Honorary Member of the Zoological Society. He was a District Grand-master of Freemasonry in Egypt, the Sudan and N. Africa, 1900-19.

He married in 1888 Catherine Leslie, daughter of Captain J. S. Rundle, R.N.; she was a sister of General Sir Leslie Rundle, who also had a distinguished career in the Egyptian Army. Lady Wingate, who was created D.B.E. in 1918, was holder of the Grand Cordon of the Order of El Kemal of Egypt and Lady of Grace of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, died in 1946.

Sir Reginald leaves two children, a son and a daughter. The former, Ronald Evelyn Leslie, born in 1889, succeeds to the baronetcy. He entered the I.C.S. in 1913; he served in Mesopotamia 1917-19. He married Mary Harpoth, daughter of Sir Paul Vinogradoff of Oxford.

H.G.deW.

EDITORIAL.

(1) The appeal made in the issue of October 1952 for articles of a technical nature has to date produced no response. The primary object of the Royal Artillery Institution is to further the professional education of the Artillery Officer; for this reason it receives financial support from W.D. funds.

The lack of technical articles in the Journal has already been commented on by the Treasury officials responsible for the annual renewal of our grant.

If we are to retain official support, it is essential that we fulfil our charter and that at least one third of the articles published are technical.

The Editor again asks members to submit such articles for the consideration of the Committee.

(2) In the article "The Selarang Barrack Incident", by Lt.-Col. I. R. McIntosh, O.B.E., R.A., published in the issue of January, 1953, on page 53, line 6, the size of the area into which the prisoners were moved was given as 300×500 yards—this is wrong, the area was in fact 300×500 feet.

SOUTH AFRICA.

A Lecture delivered at the Royal United Service Institution, on Thursday, 19th February, 1953.

By Dr. A. L. Geyer
(High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa).

Lieut.-General Sir F. G. Wrisberg, k.b.e., c.b., in the Chair.

The Chairman: We are very fortunate this afternoon to have Dr. Geyer, the High Commissioner for South Africa in London, to talk to us about South African problems. A good deal has been written and said about them in past years, probably without too much information, and we are looking forward to hearing Dr. Geyer's authoritative views on the subject. He has been in London for the last two or three years. I am sure that after the lecture he will be glad to submit himself to any questions which occur to you. He has already told me that he hopes you will put these questions before him quite plainly and that he will do his best to give an unequivocal answer. I have much pleasure in introducing Dr. Geyer.

Dr. Geyer: I thank you for your welcome. May I say that I regard it as a great privilege to be here and to talk to you about this great subject.

Africa, South of the Sahara, may well be described as a great, black question mark with a white dot. It would be fascinating to speculate about the answer to that question mark—in other words, about the future place of Africa in the world order—but I must resist that temptation and I must concentrate on the white dot.

The problem of the relations of Black and White within the same State is an exceptionally difficult one, and nowhere so difficult as in South Africa. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that this problem incites so many people to think with their emotions instead of with that sadly neglected part of their anatomy which Providence gave them for that purpose.

It is true that Brazil claims to have solved the problem. There, a policy of miscegenation and equality has been followed from early times, but as 14 per cent of her population are still Blacks, as against 64 per cent Whites, and as these negroes are the very lowest social class and still almost wholly illiterate, I am not so sure that Brazil has solved the problem!

The other country with a considerable black minority is the U.S.A. and there the problem has most decidedly not been solved. In fact, when one studies Gunnar Myrdal's monumental report on the American Negro problem, one is amazed that any fair-minded American should ever dare to criticize South African because of discrimination against the Blacks.

This is the more so when one considers how very insignificant is the American negro problem when compared with ours. Their negroes are only 10 per cent of the total population. They are no longer Africans, but are

Americans. For almost two centuries they have been living among Whites. They are civilized. They follow the American way of life. And yet there is still the American negro problem!

Compare the population figures of Brazil and the U.S.A. with those of South Africa. Here we have—White 2·6 million; Black, 8·5 million; Cape Coloured, one million; Indian, 0·36 million. In other words, in Brazil two out of every three of the population are white; in the U.S.A. nine out of ten are white; in South Africa one out of every five is white.

Before dealing with the problem, I must refer briefly to the so-called Passive Resistance Movement in South Africa, which began last year, and which has led to several savage riots. Hostile Press propaganda has created the impression that this is something totally new, the result of intense discontent caused by the policy of the present Government. The fact is that, according to figures quoted in Parliament recently by the Minister of Native Affairs, there were more riots during the last two years of the previous Government than there have been during the four-and-a-half years of the present Government.

This passive resistance is, in fact, a development of a movement which dates back at least to 1946. In that year the Native Representative Council, a body elected to advise the Government on Bantu affairs, passed a resolution condemning "the reactionary nature of the Union's Native policy", deploring the "policy of Fascism" pursued by the Government and demanding the immediate repeal of all discriminatory legislation. The Council refused to meet again until its demands had been met.

The man who moved that resolution is the man under whose leadership the present Passive Resistance Movement was started. The Government against whom the resolution was directed, was the Government of Field-Marshal Smuts. Then, as now, the demand was for absolutely equal rights. Then, as now, it led to riots. Then, as now, the great bulk of the Bantu would have nothing to do with it.

What is new is that this time the defiance campaign has been supported in public by the Prime Minister of India, and, what is perhaps more serious, an ex-Secretary of State for the Colonies in this country recently was one of the speakers at a public meeting held in London in support of that defiance campaign in another Commonwealth country.

A passive resistance campaign, Indian inspired and on the Indian model, when the participants are semi-civilized Bantu, must almost inevitably lead to outbreaks of savage violence, as has been the case recently. And yet, under our laws, as long as there was no violence the courts could do no more than impose the comparative light sentences, appropriate to the offence, on those who deliberately acted in defiance of certain laws. It is difficult to get at the instigators.

In the circumstances, the Government have introduced two very drastic Bills. One makes provision for declaring a state of emergency in any part of the country if the Governor-General is convinced that public order could not be maintained by the ordinary means. The other makes provision for heavy penalties both for persons who deliberately break a law by way of protest against existing laws and for those persons who incite others to commit such an offence by way of protest. Both Bills have the support of the Opposition.

You may have seen the statement, in certain British papers, that criticism of any law in South Africa is now made a punishable offence. This statement is fantastically false.

Now let us turn to the South African problem. More fully to understand this problem, it is necessary to look at its background. Here the first point to emphasize is that South Africa is not a black man's country, taken from him by Europeans. When the Dutch settled at the Cape 300 years ago, there were no blacks within a thousand miles. The country was very sparsely inhabited by Hottentots, a brown race even more primitive than the Bantu, and by Bushmen, in their turn much more primitive than the Hottentots. The Hottentots, I should explain, intermarried with our large imported slave population, and in this way, along with an infiltration of white blood, there came into being our so-called Cape Coloured People. These Cape Coloured are a mixed race but not a mixed race of European and Bantu origin.

From Central Africa, however, a wave of Bantu migration had been moving gradually Southwards, and had reached the North-Eastern part of what is now the Union not long before the coming of the white colonists. When the two streams of colonization met, more than a century later, the Bantu were to be found roughly in the Northern half, the Europeans in the Southern half, of the country.

At the beginning of the 19th Century, an unparalleled series of inter-tribal wars literally—I say literally—depopulated the great plains of the interior and almost the whole of Natal. European pioneers moved into these uninhabited areas.

In the course of the second half of the 19th Century the Bantu tribes were brought under European rule, and a considerable part of the country then occupied by them is still theirs—the so-called Native Reserves, in which no white man can acquire land. You see, then, that in a sense South Africa is as much a colonial power as is, say, Britain or Portugal, with this tremendous difference; our colonies are within our borders.

The second point I wish to emphasize emerges from the first. I have shown that South Africa, even from the point of view of original occupation, is fully as much the homeland of the white South Africans as it is of the black South Africans. These white South Africans are to-day no more European colonists than our Bantu are Central African colonists. These Whites cannot withdraw from South Africa and return to a homeland across the seas, as did the British from India or the Dutch from Indonesia. For the great majority, South Africa is their only homeland. There they have built a new white nation. They have developed a modern, already highly industrialized State, with the greatest and most complicated gold mining industry in the world.

They cannot leave, and they are determined not to be submerged in a black sea, not to be absorbed by the vast coloured majority of the population. They find themselves in the midst of this vastly greater black population. I am confining myself to the Bantu, partly to keep my talk within limits, partly because the Black-White relationship is the crucial one. This Black population has been able to increase in such numbers solely because, if I may use the expression, the White man upset the balance of nature. In all Eastern and Central and Southern Black Africa, before the coming of the white man,

periodic inter-tribal wars, disease, and starvation were nature's effective means of restricting the human population to the small numbers that could, under such primitive conditions, be fed. The white man changed all that.

These Bantu are a primitive people. They are not, as so many starry-eyed individuals seem to think, Europeans whose skins happen to be black. In fact, they are as different from Europeans as a race can possibly be, with a totally different background, totally different beliefs and traditions, a totally different outlook on life.

They never succeeded in evolving a civilization of their own, worth mentioning. This is all the more remarkable, because the Bantu race has been, in earlier times, in contact with civilized peoples for long periods. There were contacts with the ancient Egyptians. Later the Indians traded with the East Coast of Africa. Still later the Arabs established trading posts all along that coast. In spite of all this, the Bantu remained as primitive as ever. How primitive, how different from the Europeans they still are, can be seen in Kenya to-day and may also be illustrated by two facts from South Africa.

First, after 70 years of British rule and of intensive missionary activity, ritual murders are still to-day a common occurrence in the small British colony of Basutoland. Secondly, last year serious riots, arising out of the passive resistance campaign, broke out in three centres in South Africa. In the Native township in East London, a nun was brutally murdered during the riot, a nun who had been selflessly working among and for the people who murdered her. Some of the rioters cut flesh from the corpses and ate it! Such were the black people whom we met moving Southwards, and whom we have been trying to civilize.

Please remember that this work of civilizing our Bantu people is not very old. It was only after the middle of the previous century that the first tribes were brought under direct white rule. Remember, too, that our white population was extremely small, and our country desperately poor before the discovery of diamonds and gold in the 70's and 80's.

Remember, in addition, that 13 years after the discovery of the Witwatersrand, the Anglo-Boer War broke out, with all that that meant for South Africa; that the Union is only 51 years old, and that in its short history it has been involved in the greatest world depression in history and in two world wars.

With all these facts in mind, the truly remarkable thing is that so much has been achieved in the uplift of these primitive peoples. This small white nation is doing more than is being done for black people in any other part of Africa, infinitely more, too, than is being done for their peasants or labouring classes or Untouchables by most of those countries that attack South Africa in the United Nations.

I have not the time to describe this work, so let me take education as an example. There are about 860,000 Bantu children attending school, roughly double the number of 12 years ago. There is a Bantu university college, affiliated to one of our universities. Another university has two parallel sections, in adjoining towns, one for white, the other for coloured students. Two other universities admit coloured students. There is a medical school for coloured students, also affiliated to the University. There are two Agricultural Colleges for Bantu. All told, over 2,000 Bantu have graduated from South African universities, among them medical doctors, solicitors, teachers, etc.

In another respect an almost revolutionary change has come over the country within the last 25 years. In the oldest settled part of South Africa, unskilled work was done by imported slaves and by Hottentots. In that part of the country such work is still mainly done by their descendants, although a good deal of skilled work is also done by them.

Later, in the interior, unskilled work came to be done by Bantu. There was, however, practically no industry, so that they were occupied mainly on the farms and in work like railway and road construction, and, after the discovery of minerals, in the mines. The great mass of the Bantu, however, continued to live their tribal life in the Reserves, largely untouched by European civilization.

Then began a period of remarkably rapid industrialization, especially since 1939. The result has been an enormous influx from the Reserves into the industrial towns, so that now something like two million Bantu are living in urban areas, large and small.

Try to visualize the revolution in the life of a simple tribal Black, suddenly transplanted from his primitive way of life into a modern industrial city; the more so as he and his kind came crowding into the cities at such a rapid rate that extremely bad slums arose.

In his tribal village his life had been ordered, from the cradle to the grave, by fixed, traditional conventions, by tribal discipline, and by a tribal social and moral system. Suddenly he was released from all that, without being able, so suddenly, to adopt the totally different traditions and moral discipline of the white man. The results were and are devastating and tragic, and these morally and socially uprooted, detribalized Bantu labourers are our greatest headache.

By now, I trust, you see our problem: a small white nation, in a minority of one to four in their homeland, determined to remain and to develop as a white nation, but realizing that they have a great responsibility towards the black people in their midst, who, too, are entitled to the opportunity to develop to their fullest capacity. Here you have two sets of rights, conflicting in many respects, and no solution which violates the one or the other, can be regarded as just or satisfactory.

How then, to find that essential synthesis of the rights of the Whites and the rights of the Blacks? That is the problem facing South Africa.

I have stated the problem. Is there a satisfactory solution? A great deal is heard nowadays about "partnership", and I should have liked to examine whether this could be a solution in South Africa. Unfortunately I cannot make out what is meant by this fine-sounding word "partnership".

Is it to be a partnership of the races as races within a country? That would presuppose the continued existence of these separate racial groups. Each race would retain its identity; in other words, there would be two or more racial blocks which are to co-operate as partners. But how? Are these racial blocks to be kept apart politically, economically, socially? That would be the policy of Apartheid!

Or is it to be a partnership of individuals, irrespective of race, in the sense that the English, the Scotch and the Welsh are partners in this country? In other words, is this Partnership-community to be one in which no distinction whatsoever is made on grounds of race or colour?

If that is what is meant by "Partnership", why use that word at all? In the case of Brazil that policy is described as miscegenation. It could perhaps better be described as integration or amalgamation of the different racial groups into one nation and one people.

No, I confess that I do not know what is meant by Partnership. What is obvious is that it means different things to different people. One thing it does seem to mean, and that is equal political rights for all individuals, irrespective of race, who possess certain specified qualifications.

Why don't we at least adopt this in South Africa? Or rather, why, when we did have that policy in one of our four provinces, did the Government of Gen. Hertzog and Gen. Smuts abolish it in 1936? In its place came a system under which the Bantu elect three Whites to represent them in the Lower House, and four in the Upper House.

Before answering my own question, allow me a few remarks about parliamentary democracy. The Parliamentary system has served you well, so well that you are inclined to lose sight of some significant facts. The first of these is that, although seven centuries old, your system has been a truly democratic system for less than one century, while adult suffrage is a comparative novelty. In other words, the system had been part and parcel of your way of life for many centuries before the masses were given any political rights.

The second fact is that the British system is not an easily exportable article. Look at the map of the world, and note how few the countries are, outside of the English-speaking world, where the system has stood the test of time, and how many the countries where it has failed outright.

In spite of these facts, the assumption in many quarters seems to be that this system can be worked with success by Blacks just emerging from a state of barbarism as great as, or greater than, that of our ancestors of 2,000 years ago.

Now to return to the question: why not equal political rights for all individuals, irrespective of race, who possess certain specified qualifications? Such a policy would certainly ease the situation—temporarily. For that very reason, it has an attraction for what I would call the "muddle through" temperament and for the person who does not worry about the future. Does it, however, solve the problem?

Under such a policy at first the number of Bantu with the necessary qualifications would be small. The more we applied ourselves to the task of civilizing the Bantu, however, the more rapidly the Bantu voters would increase in numbers. At first they would probably not realize their political power, just as your labouring classes, when first enfranchised, did not do so. But in time they would. If, meanwhile, the races have remained socially separated, it surely is inevitable that the time would come when Bantu leaders would organize their people into a separate political party. Think of the analogy of your own labouring classes, not forgetting that, in our case, the class division is also a racial division.

Now, if that were to happen, can you visualize the bitterness of the political struggle, which would then, at the same time, be a racial struggle? Inevitably, with the ratio between black and white as four to one, the whites

would eventually be a small, politically powerless minority in their homeland. Would the British people, if placed in our position, adopt such a course?

We thus find ourselves facing this dilemma. The white South African nation is determined to maintain its identity as a white nation. That is obviously impossible if there are to be equal rights, politically and otherwise, for Black and White within the same community. On the other hand the Bantu have as much right to get the opportunity to develop to their fullest capacity in what is also their homeland.

To us there seems to be only one way out of this dilemma, and that is the policy of Apartheid. This is simply the Afrikaans word for separateness, separate development.

Let us say at once that the idea of Apartheid is almost as old as the white settlement of South Africa. With hardly an exception, every white person in South Africa rejects absolutely the idea of integration, of a mixing of the races. The abolition of equal political rights for the Bantu, and the putting of Bantu voters on a separate communal roll in 1936, was based on this principle of separateness. Much earlier, in 1917, Gen. Smuts, in a speech in London, explained the principle in these words :—

"Instead of mixing Black and White in the old haphazard way, which instead of uplifting the Black, degraded the White, we are now trying to lay down a policy of keeping them apart as much as possible in our institutions. In land ownership, settlement, and forms of government we are trying to keep them apart, and in that way laying down in outline a general policy which it may take a hundred years to work out, but which in the end may be the solution of the Native problem".

It must be said, however, that although this was the generally accepted principle, in practice there was far too much of a policy of Laissez-faire. The matter was allowed to drift, and the present Government deserves credit for facing up to the full enormity of the problem, and attempting to find a long-range solution.

The basic assumptions of their policy may be summed up as follows. First, the Whites are determined to remain a white nation and, as such, to develop their homeland. In this sense it is a question of self-preservation.

Secondly, it is obvious that this is not possible, in the long run, in a single, multi-racial South African community, all of whose members have equal rights.

Thirdly, they believe that, for the foreseeable future, political power will have to remain in their hands, in their own interests, but most decidedly also in the interests of the country as a whole.

Fourthly, they realize that there can, in the long run, be no self-preservation by attempting to keep the Blacks under. A policy of oppression would obviously eventually blow the whole structure sky high. Perhaps I may read you a statement by the Dutch Reform Church in 1950—and they have a membership of about half the white population. They are in favour of Apartheid, and, in a statement on this policy, they used these words: "No people in the world worth their salt would be content indefinitely with no say or only indirect say in the affairs of the State or in the social, economic organization of the country in which decisions are taken about their interests and future". The time must come when these Bantu have a full and adequate say in the control of their own affairs.

But Apartheid is not solely a policy of self-preservation, and so, fifthly, the Whites regard themselves as being responsible for the advancement of the Bantu and therefore under the moral necessity of creating conditions under which the Bantu can develop to their fullest capacity.

Sixthly, in all these circumstances they believe that the only solution lies in the separate development of the races. The Bantu, to use a popular simile, are to be regarded as the wards of the white trustees, wards who are to receive more and more autonomy, until eventually they will be masters in their own areas, as the Whites are in theirs.

This means a very energetic policy of development of the Bantu areas, both agriculturally and industrially. At the moment, a strong and able commission of inquiry is investigating the whole question of the economic development of the reserves. This policy also means a gradual extension of local self-government. A Bill passed last session has made an important new beginning in this connection.

It further means taking steps to ensure that, within the reserves, and in Bantu townships outside the reserves, preference is given, where possible, to Bantu in filling positions in the civil service, in the professions and in trade and industry. Some steps in this direction have already been taken.

This policy, if successfully applied over very many years, must obviously eventually lead to the formation of separate white and black States. There are those in South Africa who maintain that it would be wise for all Governments in Southern Africa to seek a common policy based on that assumption.

There are others who bluntly state that the policy is doomed to fail and that in any case it is now too late. These critics would be more helpful if they were to propose an alternative solution, which they do not, so that their attitude amounts to one of abject defeatism. The difficulties in the way are certainly enormous, but as against that I should emphasize that the Government have only begun to carry out this policy; that a great deal of rubble has first to be removed, the result of many years of drift; that they are in many respects still feeling their way; and that it will obviously have to be a gradual process, stretching over very many years. There can, therefore, obviously be no blue print made for a long period ahead. Rather will changing circumstances demand repeated adaptation.

Let me briefly mention the main obstacles in the way of its success. First, even with intensive development, the reserves, about the size of England and mostly in the best-watered, fertile parts of South Africa, are too small to support all the Bantu. To this the Minister of Native Affairs replies that, with proper development, the reserves will provide a national home and a full national life at least to the greater part of the Bantu. I would add, as my personal opinion, that, if and as the policy is successfully applied, an extension of the Bantu area eventually seems inevitable.

Secondly, as part of South Africa's rapid industrialization, ever larger numbers of Bantu are being drawn into secondary industry in the white areas. They provide cheap labour, which is, by the way, also most inefficient labour, and this increasing economic integration seems to me to be the crucial point of the problem. I cannot say that we have found the solution yet, but let me again emphasize that the policy of Apartheid was adopted only four years ago,

when this process had already gone very far. There is no quick solution for such problems.

Thirdly, the policy, to be successfully applied, must demand very considerable sacrifices from the Whites, and democracies invariably find it very difficult to make heavy sacrifices for the benefit of future generations.

Fourthly, it is essential to get the co-operation of at least a large section of the Bantu themselves. Some progress is being made in this direction. There are Bantus supporting this policy. More progress is to be expected, as the positive advantages for them become increasingly apparent. At the moment, however, the great majority of articulate Bantu are strongly opposed to the policy. While comparatively few in number, their hostility is none the less an important factor.

This fourth difficulty is made greater by the present world climate on the question of colour and of colonial peoples. Extravagant criticism from abroad, sometimes well meaning, sometimes malicious, and mostly utterly irresponsible, has the double effect of inciting the Blacks to extremes and of creating bitter resentment among the Whites, thus making the atmosphere all the more unfavourable for dealing with the problem.

Enormous as these difficulties are, we have no choice but to face them. We see no other way, in the long run, of doing justice to both Whites and Blacks. *(Applause.)*

After a number of questions had been asked the Chairman thanked the Speaker for giving the Institution so much of his time and for his absorbingly interesting lecture. *(Loud and prolonged applause.)*

COUNTER-BOMBARDMENT IN KOREA.

By Major E. V. Thomas, R.A.

IN the early stages of the war in Korea the North Korean army had very little artillery support and the same applied to the Chinese when they first entered the fray. The United Nations Forces were engaged with an enemy who relied for fire support on the infantry mortars and a very limited number of tanks. There was, therefore, little need for a counter-bombardment organization, and an American observation battalion was actually issued with 105 millimetre howitzers and used in a field artillery role.

During the spring of 1951, however, enemy artillery of the lighter natures began to make its appearance, and by the time the armistice negotiations started it was already a considerable nuisance. During the operations which took place in October and November of that year it was made amply clear that the enemy was now able to bring down concentrations of an intensity that bore comparison with those encountered in European warfare, although he was still unable to control and correct his fire with any degree of flexibility.

The 1st Commonwealth Division, which was formed in July 1951, possessed no Locating Battery, or C.B. Staff Troop, and so, to cope with this new situation, an improvised C.B. Office had to be formed at H.Q.R.A., consisting of one captain and four surveyors borrowed from the field regiments. With so small a staff, and no means of communication other than the existing channels, the C.B.O. was much handicapped. His principal sources of information were the Divisional Air O.P. Flight, air photographs (of which the supply at that time was quite inadequate), shelreps, and, from November onwards, a long sound-ranging base from the 1 (U.S.) Field Observation Battalion. In spite of these handicaps sufficient information had been obtained by 9th December 1951, to publish a hostile battery list which included 148 different positions, of which 55 were believed to be in current use. The Chinese had already demonstrated that characteristic of mobility which has since been one of the main causes of vexation to those endeavouring to combat their efforts.

As the American Counter-Battery Intelligence Section at Corps Artillery Headquarters was also in its infancy, the C.B.O. at H.Q.R.A. confined himself to the role of gun location, being unable to deal adequately with both guns and mortars with the resources at his disposal. A counter-battery officer was added to the tactical headquarters of the field regiment in direct support of the brigade which was most affected by hostile mortars. To assist him he had one American radar set of the tracking type, mortreps and very little else.

On 21st December 1951 a C.B. Staff Troop and a Divisional Locating Battery (less its Radar Troop, and one of the sections of its Sound-Ranging Troop) landed at Inchon. These units had been hastily organized in Hong Kong at the end of November, and were with the Division within a month of the arrival of a War Office signal ordering their formation. By the middle of January the Locating Battery had deployed its two short bases, and the C.B.

Staff Troop had settled in as part of H.Q.R.A., with its Brigade Sections deployed with the tactical headquarters of field regiments. The section allotted to the reserve field regiment had joined R.H.Q., and the A.C.B.O. was busily engaged in training his section and getting to know the infantry.

It was a fortunate period in which to take over. The Chinese counter-attacks which continued throughout November, in an effort to regain some of the ground lost during the allied advance in October, had finally ceased, and even shelling and mortaring were at a low ebb. No doubt the enemy was feeling the need to accumulate fresh stocks of ammunition, in the face of the air interdiction programme, after his recent heavy expenditure. Daily harassing fire averaged about 50 shells and the same number of mortar bombs, with occasional hates of as many as 200 rounds, fired over a period of four or five hours. It was therefore an ideal training period for an inexperienced C.B. set-up.

Existing methods were adopted as far as possible, and adjusted to include the additional resources available, the most important of which were the sound ranging short bases and an adequate system of wireless communications. Responsibility for locating hostile mortars, and carrying out retaliation against them, was delegated to A.C.B.Os. at brigades, one of whom took over from the existing counter-mortar officer. The D.C.B.O. was to exercise general supervision over all C.B., but make his main concern the location and neutralization or destruction of enemy guns. Although enemy guns are, strictly speaking, the concern of Corps in the U.S. Army, as in our own, the staff provided at that level is quite inadequate to deal with the problem, being considerably less than that provided in a British division. The U.S. Army differs from ours also in that C.B. is entirely an intelligence function. Targets produced by C.B. Intelligence are offered to the Operations Section, where the duty officer decides which are worth engaging. There is no one officer, with the standing of our C.C.B.O., responsible for both locating and destroying hostile batteries, with artillery under his orders for the purpose. It was decided therefore that the British D.C.B.O. should duplicate the functions of C.B. Intelligence, and request fire by Corps guns on targets which he considered worth engaging. In addition he had the 25-pounder regiments at his disposal, as long as they were not required for "tactical" targets or defensive fire.

This division of functions has been maintained throughout the past ten months, and has worked smoothly, thanks to plenty of goodwill on all sides, and a little give and take here and there. Although C.B. in Korea has so far been tested only in static defence, there is no reason to believe that the same way of working would not stand up to the strains of mobile warfare.

The C.B. office at H.Q.R.A. was organized in accordance with the principles taught at the School of Artillery, but as time went on the approved methods of office procedure were modified considerably to suit conditions existing in this theatre. The lay-out of the H.Q.R.A. command post is as shown in figure 1. consists basically of a bunker containing the C.B. office on one side, divided by a partition of map boards and hessian from the I.O.R.A's. office and the space for L.O's. and the air support controller on the other.



FIGURE 1

The command vehicle containing the control set on the H.Q.R.A. command net, and also a set working to Corps Artillery Headquarters, is backed on to one end of the bunker. Thus all parts of H.Q.R.A. are easily accessible to each other, and yet so separated that each interfere with the other as little as possible.

At the top end of the C.B. office are the telephones, with a map in front of them, and a shelrep and locrep form under the talc by its side, for use on the rare occasions when information arrives by this means. Two telephones are on direct lines to Corps, one to Operations and the other to Counter-Battery Intelligence. A third is on the H.Q.R.A. exchange, and a fourth works to the signaller in the C.B. command vehicle, placed about 20 yards away so as to avoid interference with the H.Q.R.A. command net. Close beside the telephones is the head-set of the remote control from the control set on the C.B. net. This is manned by a T.A.R.A. who takes down shelreps and locreps. The shelrep form used is of foolscap size and contains spaces for ten shelreps, which are numbered serially throughout the day. The locrep will hold five locreps. Both types of forms are filed on clips as soon as they are dealt with.

The C.B. chart consists of a 1/25,000 map covered with a sheet of thin talc, on which hostile batteries are marked in Indian ink. There are two shelling plots, pinned to either side of the board, and used alternately. As soon as the second plot starts to become crowded the first is cleaned off and is ready for use again. Shelreps are plotted in pencil, numbered at the edge of the board with their serial numbers, and marked with the time of the shelling and the area shelled. By a comparison of times it is possible to detect true intersections, composed of rays referring to the same gun, and to discard false intersections, formed by rays referring to two different batteries which fired at different times. Flash bearings are plotted in chinagraph, and marked with the

position indicated by the time of flash-to-bang. Locreps are plotted in china-graph and numbered, together with air O.P. sightings and opinions expressed by ground observers.

The full operational team on duty consists of:—

(a) D.C.B.O., who selects targets, arranges retaliation, and keeps the air O.P. briefed as to the areas in which to expect active guns.

(b) A.C.B.O., who maintains a running record of events, showing how much is coming in and where, under the headings:—

Time	*Area shelled*	*Number and* TYPE OF GUNS.	*Number of Rounds*	*Battery Probably Responsible*

This record takes the place of the Day Diary (which is not kept) and needs a careful scrutiny of shelreps. The A.C.B.O is also available for answering telephones.

(c) Serjeant T.A.R.A. and two T.A.R.A., who are interchangeable. One attends to the wireless, the second plots, and the third passes on shelreps, locreps, and any other information to C.B. Intelligence at Corps, and also to flanking divisions where applicable. In spare moments he is also available for answering telephones and brewing up!

This team deals readily with up to 80 or 90 shelreps and locreps an hour, which is the maximum intensity so far encountered, and in quieter times it can be reduced to one officer and two T.A.R.A. At night one T.A.R.A. and a signaller are quite sufficient, and the A.C.B.O. is available to take his turn as H.Q.R.A. duty officer, who is also responsible for supervision of C.B. during the hours of darkness. Sources of information at present available are:—

(a) *Air O.P.*

The Divisional flight carries out four sorties a day, each of over two hours duration. Smoke puffs (commonly known as "smuffs") from active guns are frequently seen, and reported over the H.Q.R.A. command net. Flashes are seldom seen, except on the dusk sortie, probably due to the bright sunshine and the use of flashless ammunition. Each evening an air O.P. pilot reports to H.Q.R.A. armed with a report on the day's activities, and air photographs on which pilots have marked the places where active guns have been sighted.

(b) *Sound Ranging.*

An American long base and the two short bases of the Locating Battery together produced a total of 2,973 locations during the first nine months of 1952. Although short bases are mainly intended to locate mortars, guns are located with Baker or Charlie accuracy up to a distance of about five thousand yards from the F.D.Ls., and useful indications have been given at double the distance. Locreps (and shelreps from A.Ps.) are sent over the C.B. net.

(c) *Air Photographs.*

The supply of air photographs has been steadily improving in response to the ever increasing demand. They are interpreted by the A.P.I.S. detachment at Divisional Headquarters, with whom the closest liaison is

essential. The D.C.B.O. is supplied with a copy of each cover, a personal study of which is of great value in order to ensure the selection of suitable methods of retaliation. One A.C.B.O. has recently been trained as a photo interpreter, an innovation which is paying dividends. As will be seen from the note on Chinese Gun Positions at Appendix A, air photographs can seldom, by themselves, locate the smaller natures of artillery with any certainty, though they are quite invaluable for pin-pointing guns in areas brought under suspicion by other means.

(d) *Shelreps.*

During periods of harassing fire almost as many shelreps are received as shells, and sometimes more. Even sound bearings often turn out to be surprisingly accurate, and occasionally produce three or four-ray intersections. At the worst they indicate the general area from which shells are coming, and enable Air O.Ps. to be briefed to look in the right direction. Almost all shelreps come over the C.B. net, either from sound-ranging A.Ps., or from All Arms through A.C.B.Os. at brigades. The C.B. net has no difficulty in passing as many as three shelreps a minute, and has rarely been over-crowded.

(e) *Prisoners of War.*

These have seldom been able to give accurate locations of hostile guns, but have been useful for Order of Battle information. Captured documents are seldom obtained.

(f) *Radar.*

The American radar set with the Division has seldom produced useful results, due to limitations which it shares with those of our own Army. It has however proved its ability to track shells as well as mortar bombs, under suitable conditions, when all is going well. There is no doubt that field artillery radar will be of very great use when present technical difficulties, including the size of the equipment, have been overcome.

Information arriving in the C.B. office is recorded on shelrep and locrep forms, the C.B. log (on which is entered only such information as would otherwise tend to be written on the backs of envelopes) and the A.C.B.O's. record of shelling. At 1700 hours daily the A.C.B.O. on duty hands over to his partner and sits down to write a summary of the day's events, based on these sources. This summary (known as a C.B. Intrep) is issued on a wide distribution, and also forms the basis for the collation system, which is maintained by the serjeant T.A.R.A. In addition to the usual hostile battery history sheets, a card index is maintained for sundry bits of information which do not in themselves justify the marking of a suspect battery. A card is kept for each map square, on which are entered such things as stray sound locations, "possible" guns seen on air photographs and other scraps of information of this type, which in course of time often tie together to form a well-documented battery.

In these conditions a shelling connection and activity trace has been found superfluous. A mental picture of each battery's habits is formed from study of the shelling plot, and information regarding any particular battery can be obtained, if desired, from its history sheet.

An invaluable part of the collation system is a second C.B. chart, or "crystal ball", on which every battery ever located is marked up, thus enabling those on the real C.B. chart to be limited to batteries appearing on the current H.B. list.

Retaliation is of the following types :—

(a) Destructive shoots carried out by Air O.Ps. against definitely located guns, accurately marked on air photographs, which pilots take up in the air with them. Shoots of this type are undertaken by aircraft from the Corps Artillery Air Section as well as the Divisional Air O.P. Flight. 8-inch howitzers are normally used.

(b) Neutralization shoots carried out by Air O.P. pilots on batteries which they see active. Occasionally the C.B. staff will direct a pilot who is already airborne to shoot a battery which appears from the shelling plot to be active, but this can only be done in the case of batteries that are fairly obvious, and well known to pilots. In this type of shoot the normal weapon is the 155 millimetre howitzer, owing to its greater speed, but 8-inch howitzers are also used.

(c) Neutralization shoots carried out by sound rangers, who plot fall of shot, and give target grid corrections until fall of shot coincides with the location of the gun. This kind of shoot has been carried out successfully by short sound ranging bases (as well as the American long base) using 4·2-inch mortars, 25-pounders, and 155 millimetre howitzers. An Air O.P. observes fire for effect, whenever possible, in an attempt to identify the target.

(d) Regimental targets fired by 25-pounders, usually with a proportion of airbursts. These are useful when the location of the hostile battery is not accurately known, and at any rate give the infantry the impression that their troubles are not being ignored. A cluster of well placed regimental targets often secures a pause in the briskest harassing fire programme.

(e) Predicted bombards by medium and heavy artillery. These are only used as a last resort, as they are expensive in ammunition and require the employment of a large number of guns to stand a chance of being effective.

(f) Air strikes by aircraft carrying bombs, rockets or napalm, which form the only way of destroying some of the more deeply dug positions.

The counter-mortar set-up is rather simpler. At each brigade the A.C.B.O. forms part of the field regimental commander's tactical headquarters, and works alongside his I.O. His communications consist of telephones on the brigade exchange, and on the tactical headquarters exchange, a wireless set on the C.B. net, and a wireless set on the light regiment net (for ordering bombards with 4·2-inch mortars). He has the use of the C.O's. set on the field regiment net, and can hear what passes on the H.Q.R.A. command net when the C.O's. set is open.

His sources of information are the same as the D.C.B.O's., and his collation system similar but simpler. Immediate retaliation is undertaken against any mortars which appear to be active, using 4·2-inch mortars or 25-pounders, or both. The choice depends on whether the enemy mortar is believed to be in dead ground to 25-pounders or not, and whether it is within 4·2-inch mortar

range. Counter-mortar fire plans are made for raids or fighting patrols, and fired by the A.C.B.O. when the enemy mortar defensive fire comes down.

A by-product of C.B. is flak-suppression during close support air strikes. Information about enemy L.A.A. and even A.A.M.Gs. is collated at H.Q.R.A., and plotted on a map. From this, up to twelve targets are selected in consultation with the air controller, in areas likely to concern the aircraft, and these are engaged throughout the strike. Two rounds a minute of 25-pounder or 155 millimetre howitzer ammunition are fired on each target. This system is fairly costly in ammunition but pilots speak very highly of its effectiveness. Just how effective it is is very difficult to assess and no doubt a proportion of their satisfaction with it is attributable to psychological reasons.

Since the beginning of the year the Chinese artillery has become increasingly powerful and increasingly active. Japanese 105 millimetre howitzers and Soviet 122 millimetre howitzers have arrived on the scale of about 40 in support of each Chinese division, in addition to the divisional artillery of about 36-75 or 76·2 millimetre mountain guns or howitzers. The ammunition supply is now such that the enemy is willing to spend 80,000 rounds on the Army front, in ten days, in support of a series of minor attacks, few of them carried out by more than one battalion of infantry. Daily harassing fire has increased to an average of two or three hundred rounds a day in the Divisional area. Mortaring has increased on a similar scale, the chief weapons in use being of 81 and 82 millimetre calibre.

The result of our C.B. efforts has been to cause the Chinaman to dig to an extent that is probably unique in warfare. As far as we can tell, no guns are deployed without solid, resisting head-cover. Now, more and more are being sited in the mouths of tunnels, dug right through spurs, and through the tops of hills. This type of position takes two or three months to dig, but once complete it is practically impregnable. The area of fire from such a position is limited to about 50 degrees, which means that the heavier guns tend to be sited five to six thousand yards back, and even further, in order to cover a reasonably wide front. Range, of course, is lost as a result.

Due to this capacity to dig deeply, and to erect shelters which will stand hits from 155 millimetre and even 8-inch howitzers, Chinese losses in men and equipment have probably been small. By the persistent efforts of Air O.Ps., however, they have been driven out of position after position, and forced to build new ones. The gunners have had to endure steady and accurate shelling by day, and spend their nights in digging—a state of affairs which is probably having an effect on the morale of even so industrious a race as the Chinese.

Destruction of enemy mortars is even more difficult than the destruction of guns, as it is possible to fire mortars from the entrance of tunnels on the reverse slopes of hills, and to have them back under cover long before even retaliation takes place, let alone a destructive shoot. At the best, retaliation can only make life difficult for the enemy, and thereby discourage them from firing off their pieces wantonly and inadvisedly. It will not stop them firing covering or defensive fire in support of their infantry, although it may reduce the volume of such fire considerably.

This article has been devoted to C.B. in the special conditions of protracted static defence, against an enemy inferior in artillery techniques, and having no protection against attack from the air, except that which can be afforded by

his anti-aircraft guns. It is therefore not possible to state any C.B. lessons which can claim to be of general application.

From our enemy, however, we can learn two things. The first is the value of field and medium howitzers which will shoot in upper register without difficulty. Hundreds of rounds of C.B. fire have burst on the crests of hills, in an attempt to destroy enemy guns which are situated on steep reverse slopes, many of which are only visible to Air O.Ps. if they fly at a height of several thousand feet. The enemy have only been able to occupy such positions because they can elevate without difficulty to 65 degrees. The sooner we are able to do likewise the better.

The second lesson is the value of solid overhead cover for guns, to resist not only airbursts, but also direct hits from medium and heavy artillery, using delay fuzes. Such cover can only be obtained as the result of great labour, and at the cost of some loss of flexibility. In conditions of inferiority in the air, however, its existence might well mean that our artillery would escape neutralization and partial destruction which would otherwise be its lot, and that defensive fire would still be produced when required.

Appendix A.

CHINESE GUN POSITIONS.

The C.C.F. Artillery, although in its infancy, has given a remarkable demonstration of what can be achieved by gunners in static defence, in spite of complete inferiority in the air, and in the face of a superior artillery equipped with all types of locating device. It has shown an ability to fire accurately on to pin-point targets with up to about three guns (ranged separately, from different gun positions); to bring down fire on to a map reference, in accordance with a pre-arranged plan, with reasonable accuracy, using up to 20 or 30 guns; and to make good use of observed fire to cause the maximum annoyance to infantry localities with the minimum expenditure of ammunition. This potential has been built up by the construction of well-dug permanent positions, and by the use of plentiful single-gun roving positions, occupied either for a single day to fire a particular programme, or for as long as they escape attention. Good digging is the main reason for the continued existence of the C.C.F. Artillery.

The aim of this article is to describe the principal types of position that have been detected so far. It is based chiefly on a study of air photographs, but also on the observation of air O.P. pilots, who are often the only people who can confirm that diggings which appear on photographs do in fact contain guns—and this they can do only by seeing smoke or flashes appear from them. As no ground check of positions constructed in the last nine months has yet been possible, this article may well contain errors in points of detail, but in general it is believed to be correct.

There appear to be ten types of artillery positions, which we will explore in turn.

The first type is the normal position for a battery of 122 mm. howitzers, consisting of three or four guns. It is entered by a conspicuous track, clearly visible on photographs, but no wider than is necessary for taking lorries.

(Occasionally a zealous battery commander has had his guns carefully manhandled in from an adjacent road, so that after a few days only a footpath catches the eye.) The track leads to the gun shelters, not more than about three hundred yards from the road, in line, and almost always at the foot of a steep reverse slope. For choice, each gun shelter is in a separate gully of its own, to make engagement yet more difficult. Since these guns can fire in upper register without difficulty, crest clearance is no problem, and crests are frequently accepted of such a steepness that they afford almost complete protection, except against "high angle" artillery fire by American guns, and air strikes. Each gun-pit is constructed by digging down perhaps three feet, and roofing over with logs to form a chamber about six feet high and just large enough to take the gun, with its split trail. The erection is open at the front to a sufficient extent to allow the piece to be moved to the limits of its top traverse of 50 degrees, and to make full use of its ability to elevate to about 65 degrees. From each side may run covered shelters or trenches which are probably used for the storage of ammunition. The roof of the shelter is usually sufficiently strong to withstand at least one direct hit from an 8-inch shell, being earthed over to a height of several feet. This makes the shelter fairly obvious, unless blended carefully with its surroundings and allowed to become overgrown with natural vegetation before use. Attempts at artificial camouflage usually serve merely to call attention to the position.

The battery command post is built on much the same lines, to a flank, in line with the guns.

An alternative type of position for 122 mm. howitzers, which is also used for other types of weapon, consists of a row of caves dug into the foot of the forward slope of a hill. The entrance after occupation is probably built up until it is only large enough to allow the weapon to traverse and elevate, and is concealed by camouflage that is usually rather obvious.

A vehicle track can be seen to pass the entrance to the pits. The extent of the caves is a matter of conjecture, but they are undoubtedly large enough to afford complete protection for detachment and ammunition against anything less than a direct hit on the opening. For choice they are built at the foot of a narrow valley with a steep slope in front, to make engagement more difficult.

A type of position which has been gaining favour recently is quite a tribute to the power of the 8-inch shell to deal with shelters and caves of the kind described above. This is the tunnel type. A spur or small hill is selected and up to four tunnels are bored straight through it from back to front, a distance of perhaps 50 yards. The end of the tunnel nearest us is either kept to the smallest size out of which firing can take place, or it is cut away on either side to form a conspicuous V, with the gun in the entrance of the tunnel at the apex and the sides of the V marking the limits of its arc of fire. This kind of position is undoubtedly very laborious to construct, usually taking two to three months from start of work to completion, but when finished it is practically impregnable.

105 mm. howitzers sometimes seem to occupy battery positions similar to those of the 122 mm. howitzers, but they have lately been seen firing singly from a small clump of trees or bushes at the ends of a short track off the main road. It is not yet known what digging goes on in places like these, as neither gun nor spoil can be seen on photograph until after engagement by an air

O.P. From what is left after demolition it looks as if the gun may have been shooting from an open revetment, with slit trenches for detachments near by. With positions like this the puzzle is to know when they are occupied, owing to the natural camouflage, and the only way of finding out seems to be to clear away all camouflage with shell fire—an expensive business. When active, neutralization with airbursts would appear to be the answer.

Mountain guns and heavy mortars too sometimes fire from battery positions containing three or four guns. In this case the position is usually on the reverse slope of a steep hill, just below the crest, and preferably in a re-entrant. Such positions are usually very difficult to hit with artillery owing to the crest, and being on a steep slope are not a good target for an airstrike. The gunpits seem to be of the type shown in figure 2, and they are usually sited in an arc rather than a straight line. The detachment live in tunnels in the hillside. When in action they have considerable protection from the portion of the gunpit which is roofed over. Most of the gun is probably inside it too, though it probably has to be well forward in order to make use of its upper register to clear the crest.



FIGURE 2.—MOUNTAIN GUN AND SHELTER.

More often a mountain gun is sited by itself in a gully on the reverse slope of a steep hill feature. In this case its shelter is probably similar to that shown above, but being one isolated object, and well covered with camouflage, it is extremely difficult to identify as a gun on an air photograph. There is no general pattern of a gun position to help, and it is usually approached only by a very inconspicuous footpath.

The tops of most tactical features are honeycombed inside, and entered by one or more very conspicuous tunnels on the reverse slope. At the entrance to these tunnels there is usually a mound of spoil, with sometimes a shelter close by. Guns have been seen firing from the entrance to such tunnels, probably being sited on the spoil. If retaliation takes place, the order is presumably "Run up", and detachment and gun disappear inside the hill. The battle positions of such guns are probably in embrasures in the forward slope

of the same hill, and approached from a chamber under the hill top. Positions like this are likely to be occupied by the mountain guns belonging to the infantry regiment.

Occasionally up to four guns have been sited in line on the crest of a steep hill, firing out of a trench system, and with only light head-cover. This practice, however, seems to be falling out of favour, as safer positions become available. It may be revived in mobile operations.

Finally, guns are found firing from solitary bunkers almost anywhere, and occasionally from places in full view from our O.Ps. This is very difficult to combat, except through the efforts of O.P. officers, as it is not possible to embark on the systematic destruction of every bunker within gun range. A clue is given in some cases by the cutting of a V in front of the bunker to improve the field of fire, but this may equally well indicate that the bunker is designed for occupation by an anti-tank gun or a heavy machine gun.

Such then is the extent of the problem of dealing with the enemy guns which have been located. It has its depressing aspects, but encouragement may be drawn from the fact that many positions have been abandoned after concentrated attention by heavy artillery directed by air O.Ps., with the addition of an airstrike now and then for good measure.

And what a lot of time the Chinese gunner must spend digging!

TRAINING PROBLEMS IN THE TERRITORIAL ARMY.

By Captain P. B. Parsons, R.A.

THIS article is inspired by several factors which are new to the Territorial Army. The writer has a long experience of training problems in a mobile H.A.A. Territorial unit which has been very much a going concern since 1947, having had a high volunteer strength, and now having on strength some 420 National Servicemen doing their part-time service. It is the concern of the article to explore some of the frustrations now facing the Territorial officer in the training of his men, and to suggest ways and means of overcoming the difficulties. Although perforce written from the point of view of one particular unit it is certain that other units are afflicted by the same problems, and the suggestions made will have a general application at least to Territorial A.A. units, and possibly to a much wider field.

First to deal with the troops themselves. It is clear that the old concept of the T.A. volunteer is dying. The days of 1938 when units were up to establishment with pure volunteer soldiers, and kept waiting lists, are gone. There is still a residue of such men left in the T.A. units of to-day. They are W.Os. and N.C.Os. in the main of an age between 35 and 45 years. Some have years of good service still ahead of them, others will fade away in the next year or two leaving a gap which will be a serious burden to units.

Where are the others of this group? The Z reserve call-outs gives a part answer. A surprisingly high percentage of the reservists wore the Efficiency Medal ribbon and were fine material, having good war experience allied to an understanding of the nature and problems of the units to which they were called.

The source of recruitment of this pre-war volunteer class has disappeared with the advent of the National Service Acts; men in "reserved occupations" are now forbidden enlistment into the T.A. in general. There remain the two classes of National Service troops—volunteers and non-volunteers.

What then is the position in the majority of Territorial units to-day? There is a small and dwindling hard-core of volunteer officers and O.Rs., some being long-serving Territorials and most having war experience. Some of these are in "reserved occupations" and tabbed as non-available on mobilization. Then follows a greater or lesser leavening of N.S. men which is increasing. In the writer's unit the ratio is nearly four N.S. men to one T.A. volunteer. Some of these N.S. men will be volunteers. All of them are available to the unit on mobilization.

The N.S. non-volunteer has a training commitment of twenty hours yearly for three years, plus annual camp in each of those years, which for the moment we will presume is insufficient to make for progressive section or troop training out of camp, and it is now ancient history that one of the primary objects of T.A. units at present and in the future is to persuade N.S. intakes to

become volunteers. With the comparative failure of attempts to persuade the Z reservist to volunteer for the T.A. it is all too clear that there is no other source of recruitment.

The N.S. volunteer, in the writer's experience, has proved to be in many cases an excellent man and a potential senior N.C.O., and in a few cases no more than a scrounger who has found out that, as a volunteer, he can get away with an eight-day camp. There is some temptation in the circumstances in which units find themselves to-day to throw caution to the winds and enlist as a volunteer any N.S. man who suddenly appears with such a request. This the writer's unit has, rightly or wrongly, discouraged from the outset. But with so many men concerned, mistakes have been made.

Another factor to be considered is the question of whether the N.S. volunteer is going to re-enlist after his initial engagement. We are so accustomed to the automatic re-enlistment of the old type of volunteer that there is a tendency to overlook the possibility that a great deal of good N.C.O. material will be lost by wastage after a three or four year initial engagement.

The foregoing, although bearing at first glance no really close connection with training, is the background which itself produces the training problems which must be considered. What has been said applies equally to officers as to other ranks, although on a much smaller scale.

* * * * *

The first training problem to be faced is one of instructors. At present, most units can find enough instructors to meet their own normal needs, with occasional recourse to Brigade gunnery staffs for week-end camps, etc., others are obliged to call on outside assistance for practically all training.

The assistance available from outside sources is slim. For example, the brigade T.I.G. can only be in one place at once, yet may find that on one particular day or week-end eight or ten batteries in his brigade are training. The unit resources are composed of the Adjutant, the P.S.Is. and the Territorial officers and N.C.Os. As we have said, in most units this is enough, in others insufficient at present but likely to become worse with the run-down of the volunteer Territorial officer and O.R. strength. Also it is by no means certain that the full establishment of P.S.Is. will be held. In the writer's unit at present only two of the four P.S.Is. allowed on establishment are held on strength. There is a shortage of the right material to enlist on type "T" engagements, and a dearth of regular W.Os. and sergeants available for posting in.

Finally, the Territorial officer is by no means fully available for training alone, even in those lucky units which are not grossly under-officered. He is burdened with matters of administration, notably the keeping of Regimental funds accounts and the accounting for and maintenance of his M.T. equipment and stores. The office work connected with the command of his battery, troop or section cannot be ignored even with the fullest possible assistance from the permanent staff.

Nevertheless, the solution of the problem of finding instructors must be added to his worries. In the last five years, increments to the scales of permanent staff have given little hope that any solution in the future will

come from that direction, and the future instructor must therefore be found from amongst the N.S. officers and men, who must first be enlisted as volunteers.

We must now ask ourselves in what conditions will the N.S. potential instructor volunteer. The answer is plain. If he sees that it is very much a going concern he is coming into, that there is a place for him in it, that he is badly needed and that the need of him will be recognized by giving him the chance to gain promotion on merit right up to Warrant Officer, then half the battle is over. The other half of the battle is to keep his interest after he has volunteered by keeping him hard at his trade and giving him responsibility for results as a junior N.C.O. as soon as he is ready for it.

The pre-requisite is therefore a high degree of leadership from the officers in circumstances which are far from ideal. This must transcend the attraction of a respite from getting into uniform and standing on parade again after two years of doing little else. It must outweigh the attraction of the cinema and the television set, and last but not least, the feelings of wives and girl friends who are probably pretty fed up with two years of separation. That the task is possible is proved by the number of N.S. volunteers units are attracting—some of them already junior instructors. But there is a need for many more such volunteers not only at present but in five and ten years time, both in the good recruiting areas and in the bad.

The officer problem is the same. Volunteers must be attracted, for where else are the troop and battery commanders of the next decade to come?

* * * * *

The next problem to be faced is that of the best methods of training. It will be best to examine this against the background of a unit which has the greatest difficulties to overcome. The following might well be a typical case in an industrial centre of Britain :—

> X (Semi-mobile) H.A.A. Regt., R.A. (T.A.) exists in three centres, out-stations being at a distance of 15 miles and 7 miles respectively from R.H.Q. and housing one battery each. The senior battery shares a centre with R.H.Q.
>
> The unit is six hundred strong, of which total 150 are T.A. volunteers and 70 N.S. volunteers. It has 14 officers including the R.H.Q. staff of commanding officer, second-in-command and medical officer who are T.A. and adjutant and quartermaster who are regular. One of the remaining officers is the only N.S. officer and he is a non-volunteer. By an accident of geography the outstation batteries have only one and two officers respectively.
>
> The unit has its being in a highly industrial area where the three-shift system of working is prevalent.
>
> Each battery holds a full section of radar and command-post equipment and one gun.

The out-of-camp training problem facing a battery commander in this unit is a complex one. Let us take the case of a battery having sixty volunteers on strength and 150 N.S. non-volunteers. The former may be expected to attend regularly when their work permits. But of the sixty, forty are three-shift

workers. They can only attend in the evenings one week in three. Therefore the battery commander may expect an evening volunteer parade of some twenty men of various trades and employments within the unit. He can never therefore get a particular gun detachment or a particular predictor detachment together on an evening parade. To run morning parades, which his P.S.I. does to cater for the shift-workers, has the same results.

Of the non-volunteers, a similar proportion will be shift-workers and it is clear that to call them out for evening parades except in special circumstances will be wasteful of training time, as detachments will not be present as a whole. Instructors also will be missing.

Now we must consider week-end training. Here the problem is easier. A small proportion of the men will still be working, even on a Sunday, but the majority will be available. But the N.S. non-volunteers commitment of twenty hours yearly is soon swallowed up by week-end training (or evening training for that matter). For example, if a predictor number is called upon to attend the autumn air defence exercise—two week-ends of two days—he has completed sixteen hours of his twenty. In the remaining four hours, or one day, he will be called upon to fire the annual range course, and then we have seen the last of him until annual camp comes around.

The picture therefore is this. Out-of-camp training for this battery will consist of frequent small parades of familiar volunteer faces who will hold key positions in the battery, and perhaps six times a year, of a full section. The N.S. non-volunteer O.F.C. will not have enough training out of camp to keep his hand in. The volunteer gun number one will see his full gun detachment perhaps four times in the year.

No mention has been made so far of other diversions of effort which will certainly be on the programme. Mobile training, the annual administrative inspection, brigade and group exercises, all make their calls on the meagre training time available.

One more form of training must receive a mention, and that is the one or two-week course at the various group or command schools. This is the most concentrated form of training available and is recognized as the best possible tonic to the volunteer.

One further point about evening or week-end training should be made. That is the fact that alternative dates should be given for any non-volunteer call-out. The effect of course is to disperse still further the chances of getting the men required at the time they are needed. Dare it be said that battery commanders are suspected of forgetting this regulation from time to time in the interests of getting a real training section together?

It is now clear that when non-volunteers make up the majority of the battery, and that is the case with all three batteries in the writer's unit, the battery will arrive at annual camp without having had sufficient section drill to produce a really integrated team. Individual training of key volunteers should have reached a satisfactory standard, but there will be deficiencies in teamwork, particularly if past experience is to be believed, in the acquisition, tracking and passing-on of targets by the radars.

The question now to be answered is whether there is any way in which the position can be improved. There is no simple expedient which, as by a wave of the magic wand, will solve the problem. Whilst the law relating to the training of non-volunteers remains as it is at present, the battery commander is chained like Prometheus to the rock of frustration.

Left to himself, he would probably like to close down on all non-volunteer training except in the month preceding annual camp thus concentrating all section drill in that vital period. Alas, he is not left to himself. He will have to call on probably all his Os.F.C. and most of his command-post and predictor detachments, volunteer and non-volunteer, for the autumn air defence exercise. He recognizes the great importance of small-arms training, but deprecates the precious day spent on the range by his non-volunteers. And so on.

But if the law is retained in its present form, the best must be made of it. The best will probably be based on the following main principles :—

1. Evening training periods to be restricted to specialist and individual training of volunteers, and to equipment maintenance periods.
2. All non-volunteer training to be restricted to week-end or Sunday training.
3. As far as practicable, to reserve as much non-volunteer training time as possible to the two months before annual camp.
4. To resist any temptation to call out N.S. non-volunteers for "non-essential" purposes—e.g. local recruiting parades—which count against the obligatory training commitment. Even the annual administrative inspection might be included as non-essential, although the writer takes no responsibility for Brigade Commander's feelings on this point.
5. To encourage non-volunteers to use the T.A. centre social facilities all the year round, so that they get every opportunity to know their units and their fellows, once again without swallowing up precious training time.
6. To encourage non-volunteers to take full part in the regimental sporting activities, as a valuable means of encouraging fuller participation in the technical activities of the unit. This is by no means a forlorn hope, as the writer's unit can testify.

The foregoing suggestions can be adopted by units, it is suggested, without incurring any great disfavour from higher authority. In fact, certain of the points will probably find favour.

Now what can higher authority do to help, short of a change of law? The following two suggestions are put forward on behalf of harassed battery commanders with only one ambition—to improve the efficiency of their command in its primary role (and in 20 hours a year training time, surely nothing but the primary role should be considered) :—

1. Abolish the present system of commencing each separate non-volunteer's training year from the date of posting to the unit, thus producing anything up to a hundred separate "training years" to keep track of, with the constant administrative difficulties such a system brings. Instead, institute the date 31st October as the one end of the training year for

both volunteers and non-volunteers. Units could then be freed of much paper work in assessing every time they want to call non-volunteers for training, whether each man has completed his commitment for his own particular year, whilst still leaving the battery commander the chance to plan each man's training to the best advantage. The month of joining could decide the number of hours training to be performed before 31st October of the first year as follows :—

Joined in	*Training commitment before 31 October.*
November	20 hours
December	18 ,,
January	16 ,,
February	14 ,,
March	12 ,,
April	10 ,,
May	8 ,,
June	6 ,,
July	4 ,,
August	2 ,,
September	Nil
October	Nil

This system would allow of an initial "close season" of two months for each intake. In the second and third years, the full 20 hours would be demanded, and the balance completed after 31st October of the third year.

2. We are directed at present that all non-volunteers should fire the full annual range course each year. It has been said before that where the numbers concerned are in the region of 400 this is a task which demands a large slice of the available twenty-hours training. Due to the nature of the ranges in most areas it is seldom possible to combine a day on the range with some form of A.A. training. Many units are also faced with journeys of up to 30 miles to get to their ranges. The combination of these circumstances, which are not uncommon, means usually that a full day of each man's commitment is taken up. The dearth of open ranges at the permanent A.A. camps, and the heavy calls on those that are available, also precludes the firing-off of N.S. non-volunteers whilst at annual camp.

The necessity of encouraging the raising of the standards of small arms shooting is appreciated, but it is for conjecture whether, in units existing for an initial role in A.A. Command, it is so important as to be allotted one-fifth of the non-volunteer's yearly training commitment. This has more point when it is recalled that the course will be fired in one day, with no further practice until another single day a year later. Thus the training loses much of its efficacy by reason of lack of continuity.

The suggestion is therefore either to scrap the requirement altogether for non-volunteer N.S. men in A.A. command T.A. units, thereby increasing by 20% the training time available for more vital matters

(i.e. the accuracy of the unit's A.A. fire), or to produce a modified course which can be fired on T.A. centre miniature ranges. This modified course could include all practice but snap shooting (for which all miniature ranges are not equipped) and could be fired, by careful planning, in one hour per man instead of one day.

* * * * *

The foregoing suggestions are put forward as necessarily limited means of improving a difficult situation, and not as the cure for the basic malaise which is becoming increasingly apparent in T.A. out-of-camp training. The writer hesitates to propose measures involving changes of legislation, but if we are to succeed in maintaining the standards of training which were common in what, for want of a better phrase, we may call the "good old days", something must be done. The aim would be to give the Territorial A.A. unit commander a chance to organize a progressive training programme with full sections, or something approximating to full sections, throughout at least the three months preceding annual camp.

Let us say right away that this could only be done by increasing the yearly training commitment of the N.S. non-volunteer. If this were done, it would automatically mean increasing the commitment of the Territorial volunteer, as it is obvious that no N.S. man would remain a non-volunteer with a commitment of, say, 40 hours yearly training when as a volunteer he would only have to do 30 hours, and would qualify for a bounty into the bargain.

To take the question of the non-volunteer's commitment first. At present he performs 20 hours training in each of three years—a total of 60 hours out of camp. Increase this to 80 hours, to be performed in *two* years, 40 hours a year, leaving the third year "spare" except for annual camp, and offer a two-year volunteer engagement to potential N.C.Os. and any other keen men, and we immediately see a partial solution to our training difficulties. Admittedly, the third and blank year may seem a retrograde step at first sight, but it is submitted that the Territorial officer who is responsible for training will not so consider it. His administrative work will be decreased, and his training problems will be eased.

The benefits would show in the increased *progressive* training which could be attempted, not only in the extra week-end training periods which could be arranged, but also in the evening periods which could be sandwiched in between the week-ends, with some hope of having a reasonably complete section to train. We would, in one step, double the time available to prepare Os.F.C. for annual camp, thereby going some way to obviate the biggest single difficulty in making the fullest use of the fifteen-day camp period, at least for H.A.A. units. Other specialist employments would similarly benefit. But the greatest gain would possibly be in the morale of the Territorial officers concerned with training, whose present frustration would surely be mitigated.

The second question to be decided would be that of the Territorial volunteer's increased commitment. If the non-volunteer had to do 40 hours training a year out of camp, then the Territorial volunteer's commitment must be 50 hours at least. It is certain that this would be no burden to the volunteer worth having, whose aggregate at present often attains to 200 hours a year, and who

has long treated the 30-hour minimum with contempt. It is certain that a Territorial volunteer who at present puts in only 30 periods a year is not considered to be pulling his weight in the unit.

The suggestion for the Territorial trained volunteer's yearly obligation is therefore :—

To qualify for basic and "camp" bounty of £9 :

(i) 50 drills out of camp.
(ii) Fire the annual range course.
(iii) 15 days camp (or 8 days camp and 78 drills).

Supplementary:

(i) An extra 40/- for 40 extra drills.
(ii) 30/- yearly if certified efficient.

This represents a total of £12 10s. 0d. against £12 previously, and therefore will fall foul of our financial masters, but it is submitted that the increase in efficiency which would be produced by a combination of the increased commitments of both T.A. and N.S. would be worth much more.

It may be argued that the increased commitment might also frighten away potential T.A. recruits, but the Territorial officer's answer to that would be that he would not want a man who is not prepared to put in an average of one hour a week throughout the year, and consequently that he would welcome the change. In any case, the source of volunteers, as we have said, is largely limited to the N.S. man, whose commitment is already to be 40 hours.

* * * * *

Having talked blithely about new legislation, it is salutary to remind ourselves that new legislation is not easy to come by these days. But it seems that some form of new legislation will shortly be necessary to ensure that the N.S. man does not drift away into the limbo of complete civilian life after his $3\frac{1}{2}$ years part-time service. It is hard to believe that this will be permitted to happen, when the Z reserve is dwindling every day through age run-down. So the time to talk about new laws is ripe, whatever hope we might have of success.

If a change of law is not possible, it is still for consideration whether many Territorial officers would not still vote for sandwiching the N.S. non-volunteer's 60-hours' out-of-camp commitment into two years instead of three. A combination of this step and reversal of the policy of requiring the non-volunteer to fire a full range course would still increase (for two years at any rate) the technical training time available by nearly 90%.

Cannot something along these lines be done to give the Territorial Army a much needed morale boost, and to preserve for as long as possible the old concept of the T.A.?

How depressing it can be to see an evening parade of twenty men out of a paper strength of two hundred, and to be able to do little about it, some readers will know. The Territorial Army must surely not be allowed to drift into a state of affairs resembling another Army Emergency Reserve.

IF NOT AN AIR O.P. WHY NOT LOCATING?

By "Indices Tormentorum Hostium".

(Illustrations by Gnr. L. Lynch, R.A.)

SOME months ago an excellent article entitled "Why not an Air O.P.?" appeared in this Journal.

The object of this article is not to publicize "Air O.P." but to draw attention to less glamourous, but equally important, Gunner tasks—"Locating and Counter-Bombardment", which are very closely allied.

The Task.

Counter-Bombardment is the responsibility of the Royal Regiment.

The lives of the infantry depend in great measure on the regiment fully undertaking its responsibilities in this task.

It is the concern of our Gunner Commanders at all levels to achieve successful Counter-Bombardment; and all Gunner officers should fully understand the problem and their own particular part in it.

-AND ALL GUNNER OFFICERS SHOULD FULLY UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM AND THEIR OWN PARTICULAR PART OF IT.

Counter-Bombardment has two main aims: firstly, to provide Commanders with information about the enemy, with particular reference to the disposition and probable intentions of his weapons: secondly, to neutralize or destroy enemy weapons in accordance with an overall policy laid down by the Commander.

History of Counter-Bombardment.

There is little new about this task; the name has been changed from Counter-Battery because the scope of the work was widened to include weapons other than enemy guns.

In early days C.B. consisted of raiding parties sent out to spike the enemy guns; and it is interesting to note that the Chinese in Korea use infantry to infiltrate and destroy gun positions.

SPIKING THE GUNS

Our own efforts have improved since early days and have become more scientific, though not so technical that it becomes wearisome to a good regimental officer.

In the 1914-18 war enemy guns were located by means of flash-spotting and sound-ranging and though the equipment has improved these methods are still employed to locate enemy weapons.

During the last war C.B. at first concerned itself with the location of guns; but as the mortars became a major menace the C.B. organization expanded to deal with it.

The first big C.B. programme was fired at El Alamein and the organization grew from then on as demand increased.

For the invasion of North-West Europe a long pre-H-Hr. C.B. programme was fired using guns of the Royal Navy and Air strikes from the R.A.F. The task of co-ordinating this fire and arranging the programme was a gunner responsibility.

Throughout this campaign, and also in Italy and Burma, the skilful use of the means of locations, and the detailed interpretation of all the information about the enemy artillery, enabled heavy concentrations of guns and air to be used with effect on hostile batteries. In such major engagements as the Reichwald Battle and the Rhine crossing, there can be no question that the lives of many men in the assaulting divisions were saved as a result of this invaluable support.

At the end of the war the Royal Regiment was functioning well and smoothly in all its departments, and there are very few critics of the methods used in its employment.

The C.B. side had taken a long time to achieve proper form and when next it is needed there may not be time to labour through the various steps.

It is not only desirable but essential to keep the technique and knowledge of how C.B. functions alive.

Present Organization.

The C.B. organization includes units in the Regular and Territorial armies.

These units are the Corps Locating Regiments and the Divisional Locating Batteries. Both can be said to be direct descendants of the well-known Survey Regiment, R.A.

There are also Regular and Territorial C.B. Staff Troops, R.A., at Corps and Divisional level.

The Corps Locating Regiment.

The Corps Locating Regiment has two batteries, the Survey and Radar Battery and the Locating Battery.

The survey troops undertake the provision of survey data for gun regiments, and also for the locating devices.

These troops are usually placed in support or under command of a division and are highly mobile self-contained sub-units. They are quick into action, moving as a rule with the gun recce. parties. Their job is interesting and the constant demand for survey ensures great variety in the forward battle zone.

Survey troops may often find themselves working to supply data for allied units as well as our own artillery. The interpretation of the niceties and accuracies of survey into another tongue may then call for exceptional measures as one unit found, when, during an argument as to the correctness of a bearing, the interpreter remarked, "Why make trouble for a few degrees, lets split the difference!".

"WHY WORRY! LETS SPLIT THE DIFFERENCE."

The radar troop in the Corps Locating Regiment provides a new and extremely valuable source of information. Its primary task is the detection of vehicle movement deep into enemy lines by day or night. Another task is the observation and correction of our own artillery fire on to selected targets.

The radar sets now available are not satisfactory but development is taking place in this country, Canada and the United States.

As a result better and more reliable sets are on the way in the not too distant future.

There is no doubt that field radar is a good line for those interested in modern ways and means since much remains to be done and the scope is great.

The Locating Battery locates enemy guns by flash-spotting or sound-ranging. The flash-spotting troop employs visual methods of location and its O.Ps. are deployed well forward.

Any gunner would revel in this type of troop which not only makes use of natural O.Ps. but carries its own prefabricated mobile towers that can be erected at will.

The introduction of flashless propellant tends to put the flash-spotters out of fashion. It is however very difficult to eliminate all flash completely, and the reduction of flash in any degree causes an increase in smoke, on which good observations can be made. By using the smoke trail, flash-spotting is also a reliable method of locating rockets. Flash-spotters also undertake general intelligence work, calibration observations and datum point ranging.

If given guns at call the flash-spotters have been known to locate and destroy enemy gun positions in a very few minutes.

Sound-ranging troops locate enemy guns by picking up and recording the sound waves and converting them, by mechanical means, into the equivalent of bearings which are plotted on a special board. The work is slightly more technical than flash-spotting but well within the scope of the regimental officer.

Sound-ranging bases are normally deployed some three thousand yards behind the forward infantry with advanced posts in forward battalion localities.

Sound-rangers, if caught young enough, often stay in the trade to a ripe old age, refusing the temptations of other forms of sport.



– OFTEN STAY IN THE TRADE TO A RIPE OLD AGE.

The Corps Locating Regiment is well equipped with vehicles and communications and offers an exciting war or an interesting training period.

Tactically, the regiment gets a better picture of the battle than any other gunner unit as it is deployed across the whole corps front in the forward area. Good reconnaissance and laision with gun regiments and other arms, two very important gunner tasks, are essential in the Locating Regiment if it is to function correctly and survive in the modern battle. Good officers are, therefore, essential.

The Divisional Locating Battery.

The Divisional Locating Battery is an independant battery under command of the C.R.A.

Its primary task is the location of short-range enemy weapons and it is particularly concerned with the mortar.

The battery has two troops to carry out this task.

The radar troop locates mortars by detecting the bomb in flight and recording range and bearing to it. At present the troops are equipped with unsuitable sets and are unable to give as good an account of themselves as the technique deserves. This troop also deploys listening posts that provide accurate reports of mortar activity for the divisional C.B. Staff Troop.

The sound-ranging troop works on the same principle as that in the Corps Locating Regiment but uses less complicated equipment.

The battery is deployed in forward infantry brigade localities and has the closest liaison with the infantry it is supporting.

During the last war, before the shape of the sound-ranging microphone was familiar, the infantry have been known to lift them, using great care, under the impression that they were mines.

Any gunner interested in a close-up view of the enemy will certainly find it in one of these units, a view those now serving in the battery with the Commonwealth Division in Korea can support.

The Counter-Bombardment Staff Troop.

Counter-Bombardment Staff Troops are designed to work at H.Qs.R.A., of corps and divisions, with elements also at the Brigade level. There are separate establishments for the Corps and Divisional Staff Troops.

Owing to the shortage of man-power they are not fully implemented in the regular army except in Korea. In the Territorial army however they are fully implemented in most formations.

The Corps Counter-Bombardment Staff Troop forms part of the C.C.R.A's. staff. It is commanded by a Corps Counter-Bombardment Officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel. Its primary job is the collation and dissemination of C.B. information obtained from the many sources open to it, amongst them the Corps Locating Regiments, the air, Intelligence, and reports of hostile shelling sent in by all arms.

This information is plotted and filed in such a way that the hostile batteries responsible for shelling any particular area can be determined. Retaliatory action on these batteries can be ordered by the C.B. Staff Troop, according to the C.B. policy laid down by the commander. In addition the C.C.B.O. can

produce appreciations of the C.B. situation and intelligence summaries, which, when allied to the other information available at Corps or other headquarters, may well provide the Commander with the most valuable indication of the enemy order of battle, and his future intentions.

The C.C.R.A. may allot the Corps C.B. Staff Troop to the Commander of an A.G.R.A. (Field) and make him responsible for the Counter-Bombardment within the Corps.

The Divisional Counter-Bombardment Staff Troop is commanded by a Major and is part of the C.R.A's. staff.

The D.C.B.O. with the main part of the troop works at H.Q.R.A., there are however elements for decentralizing to Brigades, so that the C.O. of the affiliated field regiment can have a C.B. staff officer (A.C.B.O.) working with him.

In Korea these A.C.B.Os. have become part of the Tac. H.Q. of the affiliated field regiment.

The chief concern of the troop is the short-range weapon, especially the mortar.

As the Divisional Locating Battery is a comparatively new unit and the divisional C.B. Staff Troop is not yet implemented there is danger in these days of shortage of man-power that the Counter-Bombardment task will be overlooked at divisional and brigade level.

On exercises, particularly those involving Armoured Divisions, movement tends to be much faster than would be the case in war. In addition, enemy shelling and mortaring are difficult to simulate and even more difficult to umpire. As a result, calls for the neutralization of enemy weapons are not forthcoming and the importance of the locating units is underestimated. In war however, as is being shown daily in Korea, the demand for an efficient counter-bombardment organization is insistent and the true value of all these units is apparent. The counter-bombardment technique must be known and practised as it concerns Gunners at all levels, if the full range of gunner support is to be offered to the other arms when they really need it.

General.

All these units can only be effective if they are well officered and have good senior N.C.Os.

The National Service intake is excellent but the War Office are finding difficulty in providing suitably qualified officers and sufficient are not coming forward as volunteers.

It is thought that this may be due to a lack of understanding of the units in the Regiment or perhaps a fear that the subjects are too technical for the average Gunner officer.

It is hoped this article may help to rectify to some extent some of these ideas.

As regards the second, any officer who understands a wireless set and knows how to do the ordinary sums done in a gun regiment should find no difficulty in learning sufficient of any of the trades to pull his weight in a locating unit.



— NATIONAL SERVICE INTAKE IS EXCELLENT BUT —

Courses available at the School of Artillery.

The Counter-Bombardment Wing of the School of Artillery runs various courses to assist in the training of officers and O.Rs. for locating units and C.B. staffs.

There are short courses for unit instructors in radar, in sound-ranging and in flash-spotting.

These all last about one month and are intended for officers or O.Rs. who have some knowledge of the subject. Students are regarded as potential instructors.

For those who are new to the trades there is the Elementary Observation course which is a change of category course. On this course students do five weeks R.A. survey and then five weeks of either flash-spotting or sound-ranging according to their requirements. A readjustment in the programme next year will allow an officer to do a short radar course on completion of the survey course as an alternative to the Sound-Ranging or Flash-Spotting Course.

C.B. Staff Duties is a simple subject for any Gunner and the subject is covered in a three-week course.

The two most important courses for officers are the Field Radar Instructors Course and the Long Observation Course.

The aim of the Radar course is to produce an instructor highly qualified in field radar who knows the whole subject well, including basic electricity

and electronics. The course runs in two parts. The first part is taken either at the School of Coast Artillery at Plymouth or the School of A.A. Artillery, Manorbier.

It deals in some detail with basic electricity and wireless as a preliminary to the proper understanding of radar. The course is held at Plymouth or Manorbier since these schools have the organization and equipment to undertake this task.

The second part is held at Larkhill and deals with the particular field radars in use and the practical application of radar in a field role.

Officers qualifying on this course are almost always given an appointment as instructor in field radar at Larkhill and are initially selected with this end in view.

They are entitled to the symbols "*gfr*" after their names in the Army List.

Officers who have completed a tour as instructors in A.A. or Coast, qualified in radar, are very suitable candidates.

The Long Observation Course is probably the most important to the Regiment as a whole in the sphere of counter-bombardment.

Its aim is to train instructors in R.A. survey and in either sound-ranging or flash-spotting. It is a mixed course, half officers and half O.Rs., and it is from this course that the instructors in these three subjects for the School of Artillery are selected.

The course is run annually usually starting in October and finishing in March, about six months in all, and officers who qualify are entitled to the symbol "*y*" after their names in the Army List.

The course is not filling as well as it should and the War Office have decided to introduce several new conditions to encourage volunteers. A tour of duty in the Locating Branch of the Regiment may now be undertaken instead of a tour in the Anti-Aircraft Branch. The tour of duty is normally two years although this may be extended when desirable.

Officers who complete a tour of duty as an Instructor in Survey or with a locating unit will change category to Field Branch, to Anti-Aircraft Branch if they volunteer, or to Staff employment if they are staff trained.

It is not intended that officers qualified by passing a course, or by experience in Locating Units, should remain indefinitely in the Locating Branch unless they wish to specialize in it.

Officer students for the Long Observation Course are selected from the War Office List of officers who have been recommended for a Long Gunnery Staff Course or a Long Observation Course.

When there are insufficient officers who have made the Long Observation Course their first choice, the number is made up to strength from others who have preferred a Long Gunnery Staff Course.

When this is necessary every effort is made to ensure that an officer selected for a Long Observation Course is not thereby deprived of his chance of attending a Long Gunnery Staff Course. Officers who have not chosen the Long Observation Course are normally only selected for it if they are young enough to complete a Long Observation Course and a three-year tour as an Instructor in Survey before they reach the age limit (35) for a Long Gunnery



HAVE DECIDED TO INTRODUCE SEVERAL NEW CONDITIONS TO ENCOURAGE VOLUNTEERS.

Staff Course, or are approaching the age limit and have not been selected for a Long Gunnery Staff Course.

The former remain on the War Office List and may be selected for a Long Gunnery Staff Course after completing their tour in Locating Branch.

An officer who qualifies as an instructor in survey and is then posted to Regimental Duty in Locating Branch, may be required subsequently for a tour as Instructor at the Counter-Bombardment Wing of the School of Artillery.

Counter-Bombardment is such an important task for the Royal Regiment that the methods must be generally known to all officers in it and sufficient numbers must be found to man the technical units concerned. The subject is not only important but also extremely interesting especially for those who are inclined to study modern developments.

It would be much more satisfactory if all vacancies were filled by volunteers, and, if the subject and the situation were fully understood by those suitable for service in this branch, they should be forthcoming in sufficient numbers.

SATURDAY MORNING AT "THE SHOP"—CIRCA 1921.

By "D.D.C.T.".

My slumbers are rudely disturbed by Jerry, my invaluable though scoundrelly batman, shared by me with several other "Gentlemen Cadets". His cheerful grin evokes no answering smile from me, as he reminds me that, although it is still a pitch-dark November morning, I am due on parade in ten minutes time. My two room mates sleep on in inconscious rectitude, for my dawn assignation is in company with other miscreants, who, like myself have got a "Hoxter" to work off. Inventions of the Devil, and presumably named after the original sinner, Hoxters can be earned too easily to my mind. A spot of dust on my rifle, a button undone, a tiepin forgotten, even a comma omitted in official applications for week-end leave; any of these will result in attending this most unpopular parade.

Throwing my pyjamas aside and donning my canvas overalls I join other similar unfortunates and arrive on parade just as night is turning into day.

Our task is to level and construct a new set of tennis courts, and it is certainly preferable to marching up and down the barrack square. My father tells a yarn of a Hoxter parade in his day which was in charge of rather a nervous senior cadet on a foggy morning, and which managed to get lost in the fog, due to a wrong word of command. No chance of this to-day as although there is a fine drizzle there is no fog.

I am given a spade, and when forks, wheelbarrows, and rollers have all been allotted, we set to work with a will, to do the minimum amount that is possible, without incurring the wrath of the N.C.O. in charge. Some light relief is afforded by Roy S. who manages to let his roller get out of control, and all hands down tools and watch joyfully as it gains speed and dashes down the slope, ending up with a crash against the squash courts. This effort was however not appreciated by our taskmaster and resulted in a stiff pull getting the roller back again, and an extra Hoxter to boot for the pair in charge of it. All things come to an end however, and it is not long before I am back in my room cleaning up for roll-call and with a very healthy appetite for breakfast.

After being inspected by an eagle-eyed senior who remarks that my shoulder-pad needs attention, but who does not, on this occasion, throw another Hoxter into the kitty, we file into breakfast. I note *en route*, with gloom, that my rifle is placed butt away from the rack, denoting the fact that, although spotless when put up for inspection, some grain of dust has found its way into a crevice. Another Hoxter to chalk up. Never mind, to-day is Saturday, my week-end pass is signed and is safely in my pocket, and next week seems a long way away.

After breakfast our digestions are given a chance to function by spending a quiet hour solving mathematical problems. Then back to our rooms to change for riding. Breeches and gaiters buttoned and laced respectively, a concerted dash is made, on our bicycles, to the front parade ground. It is the fashion to arrive at top speed and to pull up dead in position by performing a skid turn. As everybody arrives on parade within a few seconds of each other, and not a split second before it is necessary, this manœuvre calls for considerable skill.

We go down to the riding school in pairs in a crocodile. As soon as we

are dismissed there is a rush to choose our favourite horses. I am lucky and manage to grab "Workman", a grand horse and an easy ride. He knows all the cries and I think genuinely enjoys teaching snookers to ride.

Round we go, to the accompaniment of sarcastic and caustic remarks from our instructor: "Cross stirrups—terrot". My liver jolts against my spine and I can feel chunks of flesh being scraped off my thighs. Ah, blessed relief. "Take up your stirrups", and we file out of the school for a short tantivy over some very small "obs" just to give us confidence. Not to all of us, however, for two horses are observed going spare, while their riders rise from behind the dust. "And who told YOU to dismount Mr. T. and Mr. G." is the only sympathy vouchsafed to them. We form up in line opposite an alarming looking series of iron bars, some five feet apart and a foot high. These we go down in turn with stirrups crossed and reins discarded. A good exercise for making the rider swing from the waist; if he doesn't the horse goes on and rider remains behind festooned on the bars. "Workman" goes down so freely that I hardly have to swing at all, but when he gets to the end of the lane his quick turn to get back to the other horses nearly unseats me. The hour goes all too soon; there are very few of us who do not enjoy it. Their lives must be a burden to them during their whole time at the "Shop".

We change on to our iron steeds and pedal back to the "Shop", there to change into our best uniform for battalion parade. Jerry has excelled himself, and my belt, boots and scabbard are irreproachable. As soon as we have fallen in however I become conscious of an unpleasant feeling in the pit of my stomach. Did I put my tiepin on or not? I cannot remember, and this makes it quite certain that I did NOT.! This means more trouble, for "Gilly", our Commandant, has second sight regarding tiepins, and no matter how neatly the tie is tied, or how flat it may be lying he ALWAYS knows. Worse still, I have been caught short in this respect only two weeks ago.

After we fix bayonets and have given the general salute I shiver in apprehension as "Gilly" comes down the line, with a cortège following him who will note, and deal with, any faults he may find. It is a struggle to keep my eyes fixed straight ahead as he approaches. Will he miss it? Not a hope! He stops opposite me, looks me in the eyes and says "Ah, no tiepin again", at the same time flipping my tie out with his forefinger.

My Company Commander gives me a nasty look, for he should have spotted this before we came on to the battalion parade ground, and he notes me for at least one Hoxter. "Gilly" passes on, and I swear that there is a twinkle in his eye! For my part I am relieved that the suspense is over and I now know the worst, so that for the remainder of the inspection I can enjoy the sound of the Gunner Slow March so well played by the R.A. Band stationed behind us. A wonderful tune.

Inspection finished, we advance in succession from the right of Companies and swing by the saluting base to the rousing tune of the British Grenadiers followed by Colonel Bogey, while we hum the bowdlerised version—"Have you ever ——?" under our breath, on our way back to our Company parade ground.

Company DISMISS—and a wild scramble to get into mufti. I race for a tram, my suitcase under my arm, and fight my way onto a train at Beresford Square. Another week is over and Monday with its row of Hoxters seems a long way off.

SHOOTING COMPETITIONS ON LOCAL RANGES.

By Major H. I. P. Gompertz, R.A.

IF one looks at a copy of the Army Rifle Association handbook it is noticeable that outside the Artillery Cup there is little mention of R.A. Regimental teams in the results pages.

One of the main reasons is that as a Regiment we have in the past felt that the firing of any form of hand weapon was too complicated and anyway rather beneath us. Shades of Sanitary Orderlies perched behind Brens on water trucks will bear out this contention!

Most Gunners have no doubt heard of Bisley and many of them have dismissed the thought of taking a team there as being too complicated a business to fit in with the many other activities that summertime calls for. Not forgetting, of course, the possibilities of manœuvres, range shooting, practice camp, etc., etc.!

I wonder, however, how many Gunners realize that the Army Rifle Association (A.R.A.) also caters for all types of units who can only shoot on ranges close to home stations. About twenty competitions, on a postal basis, are organized for Pistol, Sten, L.M.G. and Rifle and combinations of the latter. A dozen of these are open to Gunner Regiments. All ranks are provided for, from young soldiers who must have under two years service, to teams of officers only. Any unit taking part must, of course, be a member of the A.R.A.

Such competitions are labelled NON-CENTRAL.

Not to restrict such activities to the United Kingdom, there are two major series, one "At Home" combining the U.K. with B.A.O.R., Austria and Trieste, and the other "Abroad" covering every station in the world where British Troops may find themselves stationed.

There is nothing complicated in firing these competitions. On joining the A.R.A. and sending in the entrance fee for a particular competition, the unit receives "registers" which are paste boards some three inches by nine, specially marked out so that units, names, scores, etc., can easily be filled in. Supervising officers are required both at the firing points and at the butts. These officers fill in most details on the registers and are there to see fair play and to see that the team shooting fulfils not only the rules, but the spirit of any competition. Full details of the requirements and duties of supervising officers are given in the relevant parts of the A.R.A. handbook.

Once a unit shooting representative has mastered the conditions of any match the rest is easy. No special targets are called for as all Non-Central matches are fired using the normal classification targets. All that is now required is good organization and as much practice as other duties will permit.

Chief of the Non-Central matches as far as Gunners are concerned is of course the Artillery Cup. It is good to see that entries are going up. From

16 entries in the "At Home" series in 1951, the number leapt up to 41 entries in 1952. The Artillery Cup is a relatively easy match consisting of three practices, a deliberate (application), a snap and a rapid. All practices are fired from 200 yards. Compared with Infantry competitions of the same type, the Artillery Cup may be said to be almost in the novice class.

As a full year from 30th November one year to 30th November the next, is allowed in which to shoot the match, no battery has any real excuse for not having a try. It is very easy to combine it with the annual classification which has to be done anyway. For regiments who have a Rifle Shield, it might be a good idea to declare the highest scoring battery in the Artillery Cup, winners of the Regimental Shield.

The other Non-Central competitions are more difficult. However, with a reasonable amount of practice and very little experience, my own regiment managed to win one of the new series open to Gunners and were placed in two others. The Bren is less difficult than it appears at first sight. With little practice at it our regimental team of eight went to a local command meeting and were placed 3rd out of twenty teams in a Rifle and Bren match. Well over half the other teams were Infantry.

While on the subject of shooting, the revolver should not be neglected. The standard of revolver shooting at Bisley is in no way exceptional. The Royal Air Force always beat the Army at this form of sport and I would go so far as to say that if the Gunners took it up with a real effort, the majority of the army team of eight in the Whitehead Cup would be Gunners. Our first representative got into the team in 1952. Let us hope that the number is tripled in 1953.

There is a wealth of talent in the Gunners and it only needs the enthusiasm and organization of a comparatively small number of officers to put that talent to good account. It must be the officers because unfortunately the firing of any weapon requires supervision by officers. I know of many O.Rs. who would spend a great deal of their time on rifle ranges if this supervision was not a requirement of regulations.

The talent is there; that point is not in question and it only needs a little extra zeal, a little keenness, to make those self-same results pages of the A.R.A. handbook look like a supplement to the Blue List or the Order of Battle of a gargantuan A.G.R.A.

AN INCIDENT IN THE CHILDHOOD OF THE AIR O.P.

By Major-General H. J. Parham, c.b., c.b.e., d.s.o.

THE Air O.P. has now become such an old-established concern that one can safely look back and laugh at some of the—at the time—perfectly infuriating "nonsenses" with which its early childhood was plagued.

Casting one's mind back to 1940 and 1941 it is not always easy to recapture the "spirit of the times" and certainly difficult to credit the bitter controversy which raged around the use of this most innocuous light aeroplane.

Briefly the arguments were as follows: Royal Air Force "We can't be bothered with the thing, we're far too busy trying to win command of the air. Anyway the darn things havn't a hope, they'll be shot out of the sky at once". Army: "That's all very well but you *won't* do our artillery observation for us and someone must. And anyway we believe that by flying low and slow enough, and being warned of trouble by look-outs on the ground, our survival rate will surprise you".

The trouble was, however, that mighty few on the Army side really believed this!

I had had a spot of luck in that, when C.R.A. of 38 Welsh Division, we had had a Flight of Charles Bazeley's one and only Air O.P. Squadron attached to us in the summer of 1942. Having a smattering of practical flying experience (of the very low and slow kind!) and an unbounded faith in the possibilities of the Air O.P., I had a vast amount of valuable fun out of that Flight who entered into the spirit of things most nobly.

Late in July that year I was made B.R.A. 1st Army. "Armies" were then a bit of a novelty and being entirely un-house-trained in anything to do with the staff I went there feeling like a small boy joining a prep. school, his first term. Very shortly we were plunged into the chaos of planning a most secret "Big-Ship" long distance invasion, Operation "Torch", and none of us had any experience of such things in those days.

The above-mentioned Air O.P. Squadron came onto the Order of Battle and was promptly buried somewhere up in Scotland. And then the fun began in real earnest!

Was it an Army or a Royal Air Force unit? If any decision was needed on any one of the innumerable problems connected with the wretched unit then, inevitably, it belonged to the Service one didn't ask. But if anything was done to it by us direct then immediately the Service most concerned claimed it as its most beloved and valuable possession.

One major headache occurred when the pilots pointed out, somewhat diffidently, but albeit firmly, that the aircraft were only training aircraft anyway and had no warlike refinements such as a bullet-proof seat or self-sealing tanks. Then again it was discovered at a late and most hectic period in preparations that whilst the Khaki half of the squadron were busy mobilizing the Blue half were going on normal leave.

My Army Commander even got so worn out with my tales of woe that he expressed serious doubts about whether it was worth taking over such a packet of trouble at all!

But of all the "nonsenses" the brightest and best was unearthed last, so much last in fact that it seemed impossible we could defeat it in time.

For it had always been assumed that the Squadron would be transported overseas in an aircraft carrier, and it began to be unpleasantly clear as the plot unfolded that this was daily becoming more and more impossible. Finally the Royal Navy "threw down its musket" and said quite firmly "No". It then transpired that absolutely no one had ever even contemplated how a dozen light and highly fragile aeroplanes could be bundled onto an ordinary ship amongst all the lorries, tanks, stores and what-not with which every ship was to be cluttered up.

This seemed absolutely the last straw, with only five or six weeks to go before loading and everything at that infuriating stage of secrecy when all the people you want most to call on for help are not "in the plan" and express a sublime ignorance of why you must be in such a hurry and why you won't take them into your confidence *properly*!

I went to the Director of Air, Brigadier Gale. He was as always most helpful but didn't see how on earth we could get round this one in the very limited time. I was absolutely desperate because I felt in my bones that it only required a failure to get the outfit overseas for its multitudinous critics, both blue and khaki, to say "I *told* you so—*look* what a useless unit". And that would have been that.

It was nearly lunch-time that day (20th Aug. 1942) when I was with D-Air and finally I asked wasn't there *any* really high-up chap on the Air Staff who I could go and see personally.

"Well, I could get you an appointment with the Controller of Research and Design after lunch, probably". That sounded exciting but slightly alarming and a phone call soon clinched the thing, for 2.30 that afternoon.

When I got to the office I found that Air Marshal Linnell was the incumbent, and was ushered in. It was not, I felt, going to be too easy for a mere Brigadier to put over technical suggestions to a senior Air Force Officer, holding the top technical post! It savoured horribly of grandmothers . . . . and eggs.

He was naturally a bit mystified at first, and I don't wonder. But he was an absolutely grand chap. In desperation I switched the talk somehow to the early days of flying, discovered what he'd learnt to fly on and made some technical comment on that long-forgotten aircraft.

That did the trick—absolutely. We were soon covering odd sheets of paper with sketches of how the Austers might be "broken down" for crating. Very fortunately I had some practical experience as I'd owned a 26 H.P. aeroplane of identical size which (its engine having disintegrated in mid air) I had turned into a glider and "broken down" for transport on a home-made trailer. Then the bomb really burst!

The Air Marshal (who I am sure was putting over a fast one just to see if I was really in earnest) looked up and said "Right-O, we'll have a crack at it. But I'll want an Auster of course . . . . at Boscombe Down".

I said I was sure that could be arranged (though privately I knew it

wasn't going to be all that easy since the only ones 1st Army had a hand on were in Scotland and there were mighty few others about anywhere). I asked *when* he'd like it.

"By tea-time to-day" came the stunning reply. It was then about 1500 hrs. and I was sitting in his office at Millbank.

There was, I suspect, rather a long pause. "Can I ring up the School of Artillery, Larkhill, from here" I asked.

He got me through—almost too quickly. The School weren't of course "in the plan". The Commandant was out. I eventually got onto someone in the then tiny "Air" Wing.

"Its Jack Parham here" I said with more assurance than I felt. "I want you to get someone into an Auster, if you've *got* one, absolutely 'right now' and fly it to Boscombe Down and get it there before tea. I've got no one's permission and there is no time to ask for it. I can't even tell you why. And you mayn't get it back for ages. All I can say is its most frightfully important and I'll take all the blame".

The stout fellow the far end said it was O.K. by him, that they had got just one Auster and he'd get it over to Boscombe Down at once.

I turned to the Air Marshal, who had the suspicion of a twinkle in his eyes, and said in a most matter of fact way "That's all fixed up, Sir".

I left the office feeling I'd just run at least three miles.

* * * * *

This rather comical little episode probably had quite a lot to do with the "life history" of that strange new insect, the Air O.P.

I have jotted it down so far as I can remember it as some small tribute to a very charming, very helpful Air Force officer who I only met once but who did us a *very* good turn.

He died quite shortly after, in India I believe, but I wish he could have seen those little Auster I's being uncrated at the little flying club aerodrome between Algiers and Maison Blanche a few weeks later and have known of the unceasing help which the Royal Air Force gave our new child from the start of that campaign onwards.

THE SKI CHAMPIONSHIPS 1953.

By Major J. L. Jack, R.A.

Foreword by Major-General J. E. T. Younger, C.B.

President of the R.A. Alpine Club.

Success is balm to the proud spirit, but I hope that those who read the following article will realize that the Gunners are tyros in Army Championship Ski-ing, and that the gratifying success which we have registered this year is only a beginning. Spencer has demonstrated the extraordinary results, which enthusiasm and drive can produce, coupled with experience and good organization; and Major Jack himself has shown what keenness and persistence will achieve. We must now go forward in the same spirit and not be satisfied until we have swept the board. We are quite capable of doing this in time, provided we manage to attract promising young skiers to the Regiment. There is no finer material out of which to make good Gunner officers. We need some high-class downhill runners; but in my opinion it is in what I call the "cross-country" races, the "langlauf" and the Patrol Races, that wider scope lies, leading even to an International reputation.

British skiers can never hope to become a match for Continental skiers in downhill and slalom racing. As Rudi Matt, that grand teacher, said to me "the British would be the finest skiers in the world, if they had mountains and snow in their own country". However, we have neither of these requisites to any appreciable extent, and that is that.

But in the "langlauf" and Patrol races it is a different matter. Spencer, and indeed Vincent also, have demonstrated what can be achieved with beginners in their first season. If the "exigencies of the Service" only allowed us to keep a "langlauf" or a Patrol team together for 4 years intensive training we could with confidence face up to any Continental team in the "cross-country" races.

But officers and other ranks must not allow all this talk of championships, races and prizes to mislead them into thinking that the R.A. Alpine Club is only interested in "gladiators" who flash down the mountain, or who think nothing of trudging up hill and down dale in battle order carrying a rifle. These are a splendid minority.

The R.A. Alpine Club is interested in every officer of the Regiment, who wishes to ski, even if he has never done so before. We will send him to a good resort, fix him up with skis and so forth, have him taught by good instructors and ensure a very enjoyable time for him socially as well. And let us not forget that the R.A. Alpine Club helps and encourages officers to go mountaineering as well as ski-ing, and we want more climbers.

SKI-ING in the Army is becoming an increasingly popular sport. This year the attendance at the B.A.O.R. and the Army Ski Meetings was higher than ever. Bad Gastein was again chosen and the arrangements were similar to 1952. The B.A.O.R. Championships took place during the first week while the contingents from U.K. and B.T.A. were assembling. The following week saw the races for the Army Championships. This fortnight was chosen for the R.A. Alpine Club's Winter Meet not only because of the interest provided by the races but also because of the very favourable terms arranged by the Army Ski Association which are available to non-competitors, families and friends as well as the gladiators.

For the Regiment, the meeting was an outstanding success. Altogether some 60 Gunners were present with ranks from Major-General to recently joined Gunner and including also two wives and a daughter. The support from the Regiment for this meeting has grown in an astonishing way. Two years ago we could not raise a team. Last year we had the numbers but the team gained little but useful experience. This time it was a different story and the Regiment carried off an almost indecent number of prizes.

The B.A.O.R. Championships.

The response to the D.R.A's. appeal for Gunner entries was extremely good. Altogether six units entered teams, 22 L.A.A., 44 H.A.A., 12 L.A.A., 19 Fd. and 35 L.A.A. for the langlauf and Military Patrol races and one, 5 R.H.A., for all four events. The B.A.O.R. Meeting is particularly interesting in that the standard is not so high that only teams of experienced skiers stand a chance. In fact, in the langlauf and patrol races few of the competitors, especially the other ranks, had had any experience before this season. In each case an officer, who was sufficiently keen, had got hold of a bunch of likely-looking chaps and turned them into a ski patrol which he led in the race. The success or otherwise of a team did not depend so much on the standard of the skiers as on the energy and organizing ability of the officer who trained and led the team. It may be said that Spencer, who was responsible for training the teams from 44 H.A.A. and 35 L.A.A. and who obtained valuable help from the Norwegian Army, raised this business of training to a level difficult for others to compete with. Nevertheless, Vincent of 22 L.A.A., with no special facilities and with only the odd visit to the Winterburg Leave centre, produced a team which beat 35 L.A.A. and came a close second to 44 H.A.A. Anyway, the Norwegians are our friends and allies as well as being the acknowledged experts at this branch of the sport. Good luck to anyone who seeks their advice.

As far as the Downhill and Slalom races are concerned the position is a little different. It is obviously impossible, starting from scratch, to raise a team capable of standing a chance in the downhill events. That does not mean that unless a unit has four ready-made racers there is no point in entering. 5 R.H.A. were the only R.A. unit to enter a team in the Downhill events and, though Major Pat Cocks and company had done some ski-ing before, they would readily admit that they never previously thought of themselves as racers. Once embarked on the idea they took it seriously and won the Team Slalom and (after an arithmetical error had been detected) the Downhill. These wins, together with the efforts of their langlauf and patrol contingent gained for

5 R.H.A. the B.A.O.R. Unit Championship. To some extent 5 R.H.A. were lucky to be re-inforced by the arrival of Torrens, a very promising young skier just starting his National Service. However, these things are not entirely a matter of luck and those units which are prepared to "have a go" deserve suitable re-inforcements.

Results of the B.A.O.R. meeting as far as Gunners were concerned :—

Langlauf — *Individual Championship.*
1st —Lt. J. Spencer, R.A.
2nd—2/Lt. R. A. Pinnington, R.A.
3rd—Gnr. Barnett.
4th—Bdr. Berry.

Langlauf — *Unit Team Championship*
1st —44 H.A.A. Regt., R.A., "A" Team.
2nd—35 L.A.A. Regt., R.A.
3rd—44 H.A.A. Regt., R.A., "B" Team.

Military Patrol Race.
1st —44 H.A.A. Regt., R.A.
2nd—22 L.A.A. Regt., R.A.

Downhill — *Unit Team Championship.*
1st —5 R.H.A.

Slalom — *Unit Team Championship.*
1st —5 R.H.A.

Unit Team Championship (four events Patrol, Langlauf, Downhill and Slalom).
1st —5 R.H.A.

The Army Championships.

The main object here was to win the Corps Championship against strong opposition from the Sappers, Infantry "A" and "B" and the R.A.C. Two Gunner teams were selected, the "A" team consisting of Major Chilver-Stainer, Major Varley, L/Bdr. Morris and Gnr. Torrens for the Downhill and Slalom races together with 44 H.A.A. team for the Patrol and Langlauf. The "B" team was 2/Lt. Sheldon, Capt. Small, Gnr. Wadham and Lt. Abrahams, plus 35 L.A.A. team, re-inforced for the Langlauf race by Lt. Young.

The first race was the Individual Military Patrol. This is strictly an individual event and does not count towards the team championships. The course is similar to a langlauf but competitors carry packs and rifles and engage a target during the race. This event was won by Spencer of 44 H.A.A. by the wide margin of nearly ten minutes from Sgt. Pierson of the Rifle Brigade.

In the Military Patrol Race besides the two Gunner teams there were the Sappers represented by 11 Ind. Sqn., R.E. from B.T.A., two teams from the Camerons of about equal strength representing Infantry A and B and the 8th Royal Tanks representing the R.A.C. This race decided both the Corps and Unit Patrol Championship and all these teams were eligible for both events. Competitors in the Patrol Race must wear uniform though considerable latitude is allowed. The British Army in peace-time does not readily provide uniforms

for ski-ing but the two Gunner teams paraded beautifully turned out in gleaming white trousers and smocks, loaned by the Norwegian Army.

Early in this race disaster overtook both the Camerons "A" who retired with binding trouble and the Sappers, Tony Petrie, their leader, breaking one of his ski in half. The essential thing about this race is that all four members of a team must complete the course. All teams carry spare tips, screwdrivers and other gear but when a ski breaks beneath one's foot it is just about impossible to improvise a repair. This was a tragedy for the Sappers because it virtually put them out of the running for both the Unit and Corps Championships.

The two Gunner teams were most impressive to watch, especially at the firing point where so much time can be gained or lost. Those who, even subconsciously, associate ski-ing with "plush" resorts and late nights, should have seen these teams in action.

The race was won by 44 H.A.A. in fine style. Watching them it was difficult to believe that, apart of course from Spencer, they had not skied before this season. It would have been interesting to see them race against the West Yorks, winners of this event on so many previous occasions. The Camerons "B" were second, followed by 35 L.A.A. and 8 R.T.R.

For the Downhill race, teams consist of 4 runners nominated, of course, in advance. The best 3 of these count towards the teams' points. The day before the race our No. 1, Chilver-Stainer, was taken sick. It was then too late to nominate anyone else in his place so the "A" team in the Corps Championship had a bare three starters. This meant that if one of them had failed to complete the course the team would have been out of the running. However, all was well, Messrs. Torrens, Varley and Morris coming 5th, 6th and 9th respectively giving the team 2nd place. The R.A. "B" team was 7th.

For the Slalom race the next day, Chilver-Stainer was still out of action. In a Slalom it is very easy for a competitor to miss a gate and be disqualified so Gunner supporters on the touch-line had some anxious moments. This time Torrens, Morris and Varley were 7th, 8th and 9th respectively. The "A" team were 1st in the Corps Championship and the "B" team 5th.

The achievements of the Downhill contingent were particularly encouraging as the Regiment has in the past been rather weak in this department. The "A" team was a mixture of youth and experience, Chilver-Stainer and Varley having learned the art in pre-war days, Morris and Torrens more recently. These last two, together with Wadham, were graduates of British Junior Training teams. This is an excellent arrangement organized by the Ski Club of Great Britain whereby promising young skiers are given expert coaching in Switzerland.

The last race of the Meeting was the Langlauf including the British Langlauf Championship. This event is open to civilians but only one took part. Langlauf is not a popular sport among the British, outside military circles. The individual race was won by Spencer who thus became Army and also British Champion. 44 H.A.A. won the unit team event and, as R.A. "A" team, the Corps Championship.

The British Winter Pentathlon Championship also takes place during the meeting. In the absence of riding it is reduced to 4 events—Downhill,

Langlauf, Pistol and Fencing. Spencer, having found time to do some pistol shooting and fencing among his many other activities, emerged the winner for the second year in succession.

Thus ended a very successful week. Those supporters who had seen the Gunners among the "also rans" on previous occasions were particularly pleased to see the vast pile of trophies collected at the prize giving. Of the individuals, Spencer deserves very great credit not only for his own performances but for the way he trained the 5 A.G.R.A. patrols. The British tend to have an inferiority complex in this department especially in the presence of the French, Swiss, Norwegians, etc., but 5 A.G.R.A. showed what can be done if one really gets down to it. The following members of 44 H.A.A. were selected to represent the British Army at this year's International Military Meeting:—

Lt. Spencer
Gnr. Barnett
L/Bdr. Cairney
with Bdr. Berry and Gnr. Podmore as reserves.

Of the Downhill team, Torrens in particular was a great "find". He was selected to represent the Army in the Inter-Service Meeting at St. Moritz where he apparently struck his best form, coming 8th in the Downhill. He also came 4th of the British entries in the "Inferno", that lengthy race in which Field-Marshal Montgomery takes such a keen interest. Actually it is best described as two Downhill races joined together by a Langlauf in the middle!

GUNNER SUCCESSES IN BRITISH ARMY CHAMPIONSHIPS:—

Individual Military Patrol Race.
1st —Lt. J. Spencer, R.A.

Military Patrol Race: Corps Championship.
1st —Royal Artillery "A" Team.
2nd—Royal Artillery "B" Team.

Military Patrol Race: Unit Championship.
1st —44 H.A.A. Regt., R.A.
3rd—35 L.A.A. Regt., R.A.

Downhill Race: Corps Championship.
2nd—Royal Artillery "A" Team.

Slalom: Corps Championship.
1st —Royal Artillery "A" Team.

Langlauf: Corps Championship.
1st —Royal Artillery "A" Team.

Langlauf: Unit Championship.
1st —44 H.A.A. Regt., R.A.
3rd—35 L.A.A. Regt., R.A.

Langlauf: Individual Championship.
1st —Lt. J. Spencer, R.A.

Corps Championship—(four events: Downhill, Slalom, Langlauf and Military Patrol).

1st —Royal Artillery "A" Team.

2nd—Royal Artillery "B" Team.

British Winter Pentathlon Championship—(four events: Downhill, Langlauf, Pistol and Fencing).

1st —Lt. J. Spencer, R.A.

The Regiment did not compete for the Champion Army (Unit) Team which was won by the 8th Bn. Royal Tank Regiment.

There are a few points which should be borne in mind when considering this year's achievements and planning for the future. A great deal is expected from the Regiment on account of its size, though in fact its size is of no great help in producing skiers. Next year we must expect even stronger opposition from the units in B.T.A. The Camerons will have had the benefit of another year in Austria and the Sappers will make no mistakes about equipment.

There is still an important event for which we did not even enter—The Unit Team Championship. This, like the Corps Championship, involves four events and it is a considerable strain on a unit to maintain a team of perhaps eight or more including, usually, a high proportion of officers. Numbers can only be reduced by sending "all rounders". This does not make for maximum efficiency but is perhaps no bad thing to encourage.

It would appear that in the Downhill races the National Serviceman who has learned to ski in Switzerland during his schooldays will, in the future, come more and more to the fore. The Regiments who do well will be those who have looked to their National Service intakes. The fact that the Gunner teams included three past members of the British Junior Teams cannot be too widely known and may help to encourage others to follow in their footsteps. Once they are in the Regiment, officers at 18 Trg. Bde., Mons, Sandhurst and the Y.Os. wings at Larkhill and Manorbier can do much to ensure that no promising skier is allowed to go unnoticed.

One of the objects of the Royal Artillery Alpine Club is to encourage Gunner participation in these meetings. The R.A.O.R.S.F. has in recent years made a special grant of £50 towards the expenses of the Regimental Ski Team. Moreover thanks to the generosity of an individual member of the Club, there is now a fund from which Other Ranks may be helped.

A second and no less important object of the Club's Winter Meeting was to provide good ski-ing for those who were not competing. This side was taken over by Lt.-Col. Galloway who became "i/c Non-cannonen". The Club hired a guide who took classes and accompanied a Gunner party on two expeditions, one to Hof Gastein and the other to Kitzbuhel. These trips provided an interesting change of scenery.

Among the Gunners who helped to make the Meeting a success were Ballantyne-Evans who organized the administration of the B.A.O.R. Championships. He was kept so busy that no one ever saw him on ski. There was also Major Eddie Stocker, Secretary of the Rhine Army Ski Association who did all the preliminary work for the Rhine Army Meeting and then was unable to attend. Then there was Bill Campbell of the A.S.A. Committee and

Maj.-Gen. Younger with the R.A. Downhill and Slalom Team.

The Royal Artillery "A" Team.

5th Regiment, R.H.A., Team.

Royal Artillery "A" Team at the Firing Point.

lastly, the two Peters—Brookes and Rolles who produced the drinks at the Gunner cocktail party.

The following Gunners were at Bad Gastein :—

Major-General Younger; Brigadiers Hayes, Gore; Lt.-Cols. Dayrell-Browning, Galloway; Majors Chilver-Stainer, Cocks, Gibson-Fleming, Jack, Proudman, Varley; Captains Ballantyne-Evans, Brookes, Campbell, Cousins, James, Rolles, Small; Lieuts. Dyas, Everill, Fursdon, Lovatt, Robinson, Spencer, Vincent, Vine, Young; 2/Lts. Abraham, Sheldon, Pinnington, Stanford; Mrs. Proudman, Mrs. Campbell, Miss Hayes; Gnrs. Cave and Englander.

The Teams:—

44 H.A.A. Regt. "A"	—	Lt. Spencer, Bdr. Berry, L/Bdr. Cairney, Gnr. Barnett.
44 H.A.A. Regt. "B"	—	Lt. Robinson, Gnr. Podmore, Gnr. Muir.
35 L.A.A. Regt.	—	2/Lt. Pinnington, Sgt. Partridge, Gnr. Coull, Cfn. Ross.
22 L.A.A. Regt.	—	Lt. Vincent, Bdr. Hawes, L/Bdr. Green, L/Bdr. Davies, Gnr. Scotcher.
12 L.A.A. Regt.	—	Lt. Young, Sgt. Kelly, Gnr. Cambridge, Gnr. Ford.
19 Fd. Regt.	—	2/Lt. Stanford, Bdr. Heague, L/Bdr. Griffiths, Gnr. Maslin.
5 R.H.A.	—	Major Cocks, Capt. James, Lt. Lovatt, 2/Lt. Lush, Sgt. Bryant, Gnr. Bennett, Gnr. Fraser, Gnr. Torrens.
Corps "A" Team	—	Major Chilver-Stainer, Major Varley, L/Bdr. Morris, Gnr. Torrens, Lt. Spencer, Bdr. Berry, L/Bdr. Cairney, Gnr. Barnett.
Corps "B" Team	—	2/Lt. Sheldon, 2/Lt. Abraham, Capt. Small, Gnr. Wadham, 2/Lt. Pinnington, Sgt. Partridge, Gnr. Coull, Cfn. Ross.

COURTS-MARTIAL APPEALS COURT.

Appeals against convictions by Courts-Martial.

By MAJOR F. L. LEE, M.C., R.A. (Retd.).

(By courtesy of the Editor of "The Army Quarterly.)

SINCE the coming into force of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951, the question of appeal against conviction by Court-Martial to the Courts-Martial Appeals Court is constantly arising for consideration. This is a difficult question in any event but it is doubly so in the case of a new Court—such as the Courts-Martial Appeals Court—as there are no previous decisions of the Court to look to for guidance. This difficulty has now been largely dispelled by an important statement by the Lord Chief Justice when presiding at a sitting of the Courts-Martial Appeals Court.

Lord Goddard, sitting with Mr. Justice Hilbery and Mr. Justice Slade, said, that the Court would follow the same principles as did the Court of Criminal Appeal. His Lordship drew attention to the fact that the provisions of the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951 had been lifted bodily from the Criminal Appeal Act 1907, the only difference being that the Court of Criminal Appeal dealt with civil cases and had power to alter sentences, whereas Parliament had only given the Courts-Martial Appeals Court power to deal with convictions. The Courts-Martial Appeals Court must treat the Court-martial in exactly the same way as a jury. The Court-martial was the judge of fact and the Appeals Court would only interfere if there was some misdirection or if the evidence did not support the conviction in law.

His Lordship recalled that the Court of Criminal Appeal had always acted on the principle that it would not put itself into the position of a jury, because to do so would be to substitute trial by judges for trial by jury. A Court-martial was a proper constitutional Court to deal with questions of fact, and the officers forming it had, what the Lord Chief Justice described as "a priceless advantage not shared by the Appeal Court", of seeing the witnesses and observing how they behaved, and the manner in which they gave their evidence.

It follows therefore that decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal, where relevant, may be applied to appeals to the Courts-Martial Appeals Court from convictions by Courts-martial.

Leave to appeal will only be given if the grounds of appeal are shown to come within the powers conferred on the Court by the Courts-Martial (Appeals) Act 1951. Section 5(1) of the Act states :— . . . . the Court shall allow the appeal if they think that the finding of the Court-martial is unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence or involves a wrong decision on a question of law or that, on any ground, there was a miscarriage of justice, and in any other case shall dismiss the appeal.

It is not a sufficient ground of appeal to allege that the verdict is against the weight of evidence. In order to succeed the Appellant must go further and show, in the words of the Statute, that the verdict is unreasonable, or cannot be supported having regard to the evidence. For example, A. B. C. and D. were convicted of shopbreaking and A. appealed against conviction. The only evidence against A. was that he went from London to Southend with the other three men (against whom there was ample evidence) and spent the day with them and was seen with them at noon and at 9 p.m. that evening. The shop was broken into after midnight. It was held by the Court of Criminal Appeal that the evidence was insufficient and the conviction was quashed. Here, no doubt, the jury arrived at their verdict on the balance of probability, which falls below the standard of proof required by law in criminal cases.

Nor is it sufficient to show that the case against the Appellant was a weak one. If there was evidence to support the conviction the appeal will be dismissed. The Court will not interfere with the finding of a Court-martial unless it is satisfied that the finding is such as reasonable members of the Court-martial, giving due weight to the presumption of law in favour of the innocence of the accused, could not properly have convicted. All questions of credibility of witnesses within these limits and the weight to be attached to their evidence are for the determination of the Court-martial and must be held to have been determined by its finding.

The Court of Criminal Appeal will not interfere with the finding of a jury where there is evidence on which it could so find. As an instance of an appeal, which failed, on the grounds that the verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported by the evidence was the case of a substituted racehorse. W. was convicted of conspiracy with B. and two other men, to obtain by false pretences stake money at a race at Cheltenham. Briefly the facts were :—A horse which did not exist was entered for a selling race of 100 sovs. in the name of "Silver Badge". A horse which had won many races, named "Shining More" and would be known to racegoers, was disguised by paint and run as "Silver Badge". Needless to say this unknown horse, with unknown owner, without a jockey up to a short time before the race and running in the colours worn by the jockey in the previous race, did not attract support from the betting public and long odds were freely offered in the ring. "Silver Badge" won in a canter and in accordance with the Rules was put up for sale. It is obvious that if this horse was bought by an innocent purchaser the disguise would be detected at once, as a white stocking and star were part of the disguise. The horse was purchased by W. for 510 guineas and beyond paying over the price and receiving the delivery note, he did nothing further about the horse. There was evidence that W. had instructed his clerk in London, on the morning of the race, to get all the money he could on "Silver Badge" and together with his bets on the course won £3,000.

W's. explanation was that he met B. (one of the alleged conspirators) ten minutes before the race, who gave him the tip "Silver Badge" only on his undertaking to buy in the horse after the race. The Court of Criminal Appeal held that they could not interfere with the verdict, inasmuch as they could not say that the verdict was unreasonable or against the weight of evidence as given at the trial and the appeal must be dismissed.

The first appeal to succeed before the Courts-Martial Appeals Court—and on that account alone will be of historic interest—was allowed on the grounds that the finding of the Court-martial could not be supported having regard to the evidence and was unreasonable. The appellant, a non-commissioned officer, was found guilty by a District Court-Martial on a charge under section 17 of the Army Act of fraudulently misapplying mess funds of a mess of which he was caterer. The Judge Advocate, in summing up, stated that, as there was a proved deficiency which the Appellant had not explained and as he had the opportunity to dispose of the funds, the conclusion must be that he had fraudulently misapplied them and so was guilty under the section.

No doubt, the Judge Advocate gave that direction to the Court because of a note to section 17 of the Army Act. The note, 7(a) to section 17 in the Manual of Military Law states :— . . . . If no evidence is forthcoming as to the particular mode of misapplication, the Court may, in the absence of explanation from the accused, infer that the property was misapplied from the fact of its not having been properly applied and if . . . . they think it was dishonestly misapplied they can convict the accused.

Mr. Justice Hilbery, giving the judgement of the Courts-Martial Appeals Court, which also consisted of Mr. Justice Streatfeild and Mr. Justice McNair, said that proof of a deficiency coupled with an absence of an explanation by the Appellant did not amount to proof of misapplication within the meaning of section 17 of the Army Act, and therefore the finding of the Court-martial could not be supported having regard to the evidence and was unreasonable.

Referring to note 7(a) (supra) the Court said that the danger of it lay in the fact that it almost lends colour to the suggestion that the burden of proof shifts on to an accused person where, by some process of accounting, there appears to be a deficiency. The Court called attention to it because as it stands, it is unfortunately worded and should be the subject of revision.

The point was later raised by question in the House of Commons and the reply indicated that the matter was being considered.

The words in section 5(1) (supra) :—" . . . . or includes a wrong decision on a question of law" cover a wide field and cannot be dealt with here, though perhaps it is well to say that, in order to avail an appellant, the wrong decision of the Court-martial on a question of law must be a matter of substance. Where it relates to the wrongful admission or exclusion of evidence the Courts-Martial Appeals Court will consider the probable effect on the minds of the members of the Court-martial. Where it has been established that evidence has been wrongfully admitted, the Court will quash the conviction, unless it holds that the evidence so admitted cannot reasonably be said to have affected the minds of the members of the Court-martial in arriving at their finding, and that they would, or must, inevitably have arrived at the same finding if the evidence had not been admitted. So also, where evidence has been wrongfully excluded, the Court have to consider what would have been its effect upon the minds of members of the Court-martial had it been allowed to be given, and unless the verdict would in all probability have been the same, the conviction will be quashed.

As a simple example of the wrongful admission of evidence the following appeal case is of interest. An appellant, who was tried for housebreaking and

robbery, called a witness for the purpose of producing certain letters. This witness, without any question being put to him by the appellant, voluntarily made a statement as to the appellant's good character. Counsel for the prosecution thereupon claimed that, as evidence of the appellant's good character had been given, he was entitled to cross-examine the witness as to the appellant's real character, and he therefore proceeded to ask the witness as to the number of times the appellant had been convicted.

The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the appellant was not, under the circumstances, endeavouring to establish a good character by calling a witness who voluntarily made a statement as to the appellant's good character, and that, therefore, the question as to the appellant's previous convictions was not admissible. Further, that the Court could not say that the jury must necessarily have convicted the appellant if the improper question had not been put and the conviction must therefore be quashed.

As to wrongful exclusion of evidence, which is rare, the following appeal will illustrate the principle.

The appellant was convicted of obtaining goods by false pretences, the false pretence being that he was carrying on a genuine and *bona fide* business. The appellant in the witness box, in endeavouring to show that he was carrying on a genuine and *bona fide* business, wished to produce receipts for payments made by him in other transactions and was not allowed to do so.

The Court of Criminal Appeal held that the receipts, sworn to by the prisoner as acknowledgements of payments for goods purchased by him, other than those the subject of the charge, were admissible in evidence on his behalf that he was in fact carrying on a genuine and *bona fide* business. It was impossible to say that, if the evidence which was wrongly excluded had been admitted, the jury would have come to the same conclusion; consequently the conviction must be quashed.

BOOK REVIEW.

Jan Christian Smuts. By J. C. Smuts. XVI+568 pp. Illustrated, maps, 8vo. Published by Cassell & Co. Ltd., London. Price 25/-.

This is the biography, written by his son, of the greatest man that South African has so far produced and of one of the foremost statesmen of the first half of the twentieth century. The author points out that this book is not the official life of his father, the time is not yet ripe for it, but that it is an interim biography, giving a son's point of view. It is a good book and paints an all round picture of its subject as private individual and family man, statesman, soldier, politician, philosopher and scientist. The author does not display each facet of General Smuts' personality with equal skill. As is to be expected, the son gives his best picture of his father as a private individual and family man. He describes with insight the man who loved his family and his home and who complained that his public life allowed him only too little time to enjoy either

of them; who regarded Doornkloof, the family home-farm in the Transvaal, as a refuge from the toil and bustle of world affairs and politics, and who would tramp over the hills and through the bush-veldt for many miles until he had worked the doubts and difficulties out of his system and regained his peace of mind.

The author depicts Smuts the world-statesman by allowing him largely to speak for himself. He gives several of Smuts' greatest speeches *in toto* and quotes at length from others. Right from the time that Smuts was a member of the National Convention, which was called in 1907 to decide on the future constitution of South Africa, he took the long view and saw beyond the confines of South Africa. It was Smuts' ability to see a problem as a whole, to grasp the essentials of a situation, and to state clearly the remedies required that decided Lloyd George to appoint him in 1917 a member of his War Cabinet. From this time onwards Smuts not only became a leading statesman of the British Commonwealth but also of the world. Lloyd George regarded him as one of the most remarkable personalities of the day. During 1917-18 he was employed on so many different missions, committees, etc., that he became know as the "Handy man of the Empire".

After the war was over, Smuts attended the Peace Conference at Paris with Botha as the representatives of the Union of South Africa. The author shows the influence that Smuts had on the original constitution of the League of Nations by quoting at length from a pamphlet which he wrote at that time called "The League of Nations—A Practical Suggestion". Woodrow Wilson was much taken with the pamphlet and incorporated most of the suggestions made in it into his scheme for the League of Nations.

Between the two wars Smuts was for some years out of office, and it is when we come to the Second World War, when Smuts was again Prime Minister of the Union, that his true majesty as a world statesman is displayed. By this time the author had grown up and was able to accompany his father as aide-de-camp on many of his journeys to England and other countries. It is therefore a closer and more intimate picture which the author gives us of the great man attending conferences, making speeches, offering advice, and coming to decisions. Mr. Winston Churchill said of him "I can hardly recall any occasion when we did not reach the same conclusions by simultaneous and independent travail of thought". There is no doubt that Smuts was a tremendous encouragement to Mr. Winston Churchill throughout the war.

At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 Smuts is seen as the great "Elder Statesman" with his unequalled experience of the Paris Peace Conference at the end of the first war and of the League of Nations. He drafted the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations which set out plainly the hopes and aspirations of the common peoples, and made the penultimate speech on the closing day of the Conference. He said he realized that the Charter was far from perfect but it must be applied with good will and sincerity.

The author is not so successful at presenting his father as a soldier. General Smuts held high command in three campaigns, as leader of the Commando which invaded Cape Colony in 1901, as commander of the Southern force in German South-West Africa in 1915, and as commander-in-chief in East Africa in 1916. The author makes no attempt to give a lucid account of

his father's strategy and tactics. He gives a very rough and ready description of the operations in Cape Colony in 1901 which compares badly with Deneys Reitz's famous book "Commando", practically no account at all of Smuts' part in the conquest of German South-West Africa, and only long quotations from the foreword, written by Smuts himself, to a book by Brigadier-General J. H. V. Crowe, to describe the East African campaign. These are all very inadequate to give a true picture of Smuts the soldier, which is to be regretted because his development from the raw guerilla of 1900 to the conqueror of German East Africa is most interesting. He had no training whatsoever as a soldier and was appointed commander of the raid into Cape Colony after less than 12 months active service as a guerilla. His next experience of soldiering was in 1915 as a major-general and detached subordinate of Botha, commanding some 15,000 troops in German South-West Africa. His final effort was in the following year when, as a lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of 100,000 men, he drove the Germans out of their East African colony. He was a successful soldier on the whole and displayed more dash and took greater risks than a professional would have done in similar circumstances.

The author is rather too close to the South African political scene to give an unprejudiced description of his father as a politician and leader of a great South African political party. He does not pretend to be able to do so and states quite frankly that much of what he has written was done "in a mood of eulogy". He does however make it quite clear that the fundamental cleavage in South African politics was made all but unbridgeable by the rebellion of 1914 and that, from that time onwards, the differences between Botha and Smuts and their political opponents were almost beyond mending. Smuts spent most of his political life in South Africa trying to bridge that gulf. He hoped that he had done so in 1933 when he formed the coalition with Hertzog, but the ill-feeling engendered by the rebellion was too deep to be papered over and soon showed itself afresh.

The author presents us with a villain for each period of Smuts' life as a political leader. For the period before 1914, Milner; for the period 1919-39, Hertzog; and since 1945, Malan. The author is scarcely fair to Milner but uses a comparatively light brush on him; the heavy brush with the blackest paint is reserved for Hertzog and Malan. These were the two leading Afrikaners who opposed Smuts' policy of forming a true Union of South Africa, a lasting union of the two white races who would live together in friendship, peace and prosperity under the aegis of the British Commonwealth. Smuts saw plainly that, unless the two white races co-operated, there was small chance of white civilization surviving in South Africa. The opposing Afrikaners could not—and still cannot—see that that their policy of an Afrikaner republic supported by a mass of black helots is sure to lead to disaster. Smuts realized this only too well, and it was the main object of his life to prevent it coming about.

Smuts was not only statesman, soldier and politician, he was also philosopher and scientist. Half way through the book the author gives us some chapters on Smuts in these roles. In 1924 Smuts wrote his book on "Holism and Evolution". Smuts defined "Holism" as "underlying the synthetic tendency in the universe, and the principle which makes for the origin and progress of wholes in the universe". It was a remarkable book and showed

Smuts' belief in human progress, and humanity's determination to continue the struggle for a kinder, better and more holistic world. In 1931 Smuts was elected president of the British Association for its centenary meetings and gave his inaugural address on "The Scientific World Picture of To-day". Smuts was also an enthusiastic botanist and made a special study of the flora of the bush-veldt.

This biography of a father by a loving son is indeed worth reading. It gives a fine picture of a man who must be regarded as one of the most all-embracing geniuses of our age. There are some faults in the book which should be pointed out. The background of history, given from time to time to explain the scene before which Smuts is playing his part, is sometimes very inaccurate, there are not sufficient maps, many places mentioned in the text are not marked on such maps as are provided, and finally, in a biography such as this, the age of its subject and the year being dealt with should be printed at the top of each page.

K.W.M-J.

CORRESPONDENCE COLUMN.

From Brigadier C. M. Vallentin, m.c. (retd.).

In the third paragraph of Chapter III of an article by Colonel K. W. Maurice-Jones on the R.A. Canteen, Woolwich, printed in the January 1953 issue of the Journal, there is a statement to which I must take exception.

The "incredible answer" made by "this C.R.A." was the perfectly truthful one (as always) made by the then Brigadier-General George Milne. In November 1914 I had the good fortune to join a Brigade of the 4th Divisional Artillery which had been stationed at Woolwich up to mobilization, and the even better fortune to stay with that Brigade until early 1922. When I joined at Nieppe parcels and crates of mufflers, socks, woollies, tobacco, cigarettes, musical instruments, etc., were arriving by almost every mail, thanks to the kindness of the wives, relations and friends of all ranks, and the more senior officers of units. Before Christmas 1914 we had too much, and were transferring "comforts" to units of other Regiments in the Division who were not so fortunate. In fact, we received more from home in that first winter than in any other during the 1914-18 war.

I have no doubt that Colonel Maurice-Jones writes with the best of intentions, but on the point I raise I am sure he writes from heresay and not from knowledge. Brigadier-General Milne's reply to the Woolwich Canteen Committee in 1914 was undoubtedly the right one, and I should hate to see any slur on his period of command of the 4th Divisional Artillery stand uncorrected.

THE BATTLE OF MINDEN.

1st August 1759.

By Brigadier H. B. Latham, late R.A.

THE Seven Years War broke out in 1756, when King George II, who was also the Elector of Hanover, supported Frederick the Great of Prussia against Russia, France and Austria.

No units of the British Army took part in the campaign in Germany till 1758, when a contingent of about 12,000 men, first under the command of the 2nd Duke of Marlborough and later under Lord George Sackville,[1] joined the Allied Army defending Hanover and spent the winter in billets near Munster.

The Allied Commander-in-Chief was one of the ablest generals of his day. General Field-Marshal Ferdinand, Prince of Brunswick and Luneburg was born in 1721 and gained his first experience of active service as A.D.C. to his uncle Frederick the Great in 1741. In 1757 George II especially asked that he should command the Allied Army holding the line of the Weser.

Ferdinand quickly restored discipline and morale in a somewhat shaken force and on the 23rd June 1758 defeated the French in the battle of Crefeld. The British units as they arrived thus joined a well tried, well trained and well led army.

By the time the campaign opened in 1759 the British contingent consisted of six Cavalry Regiments, six Infantry Battalions[2] and the following Companies of the Royal Artillery :—

W. Phillips'	Coy., 1st Bn.	now 32 Coast Battery, R.A.
S. Cleaveland's	Coy., 1st Bn.	Reduced 1819.
F. Macbean's	Coy., 1st Bn.	now 12th A/Tk. Battery, R.A.

In the continental armies of the time the idea of rigidly linking the Artillery to the Infantry in the form of "Battalion Guns" was outmoded and it was the custom to manœuvre the guns, formed into "Brigades", so as to take full advantage of their fire power. It was in fact the emergence of the Field Battery as we now know it, as the tactical fire unit.

With guns of such limited range, concentrations of fire could only be achieved by enhanced mobility and though this had been realized by Frederick the Great, who introduced "Horse Artillery" into the Prussian service,[3] the British Artillery was ill-equipped to achieve it. Their guns were still drawn by horses led by "Hired Waggoners" and the whole detachment marched on foot. In Phillips and Macbean, however, the Regiment possessed two out-

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[1] The former died soon after his arrival at the Allied Hdqs., leaving the command to Lord George Sackville, who was Court Martialled and dismissed the Service for his conduct in the Battle of Minden.

Later re-instated by George III and as Lord Germain he was largely responsible for the loss of the American colonies.

[2] Now represented by the 12th Suffolk; 20th Lancashire Fusiliers; 23rd Royal Welch Fusiliers; 25th K.O.S.B.; 37th Hampshire Regt.; 51st K.O.Y.L.I.

[3] In 1758. The guns were drawn by teams of horses with the drivers mounted. Some of the Gunners rode on the off horses and the remainder on the carriages.

standing officers and under the general direction of the former the 40 guns available were organized into the "Brigades" listed below for the forthcoming campaign.

Captain F. Macbean's "Heavy Brigade"	10 12-Pdrs.
Capt./Lieut. D. Drummond's "Light Brigade"	2 Light 12-Pdrs.
	3 Light 6-Pdrs.
	4 $5\frac{1}{2}''$ Howitzers.
Capt./Lieut. E. Foy's "Light Brigade"	4 Light 12-Pdrs.
	3 Light 6-Pdrs.
	2 $5\frac{1}{2}''$ Howitzers.
"Battalion Guns"	12 Light 6-Pdrs.[1]

Since Cleaveland was "on command", Drummond commanded his Company and since Phillips was acting C.R.A. Foy handled Phillips' Company. The "Battalion Guns" were manned by 6 officers and 101 men drawn from the following Companys R.A. :—

1st Bn. Gregory's;	Rattison's;	Inne's and Phillips.
2nd Bn. Brome's;	Smith's;	Ennis's.

The campaign of 1759 opened inauspiciously. Prince Ferdinand, with about half the Allied army being defeated by de Broglie at Bergen, north-east of Frankfurt. Thereafter the Allies slowly withdrew before the superior numbers of the French, now commanded by M. de Contades, till Minden was captured by de Broglie on the 9th July and the whole French army concentrated in the vicinity. Ferdinand realized that if Hanover was to be saved, the French must be defeated, but from his camp at Petershagen Heath it seemed impossible to achieve this for the French had taken up a position with Minden on the right, the Bastau brook across their front and an impassable morass on their left. The corps commanded by de Broglie was on the eastern bank of the Weser. Something had to be done to make de Contades move and Ferdinand determined to do this by the old ruse of offering him a "bait".

On the 27th July he detached a strong contingent to move *via* Lubbecke and threaten the French communications and on the 29th leaving General Wangenheim and his corps isolated at Todtenhausen, he marched with the rest of the army to a new camp near Hille. But should the French concentrate to attack Wangenheim, careful arrangements were made to move to his assistance in eight columns.

In such an eventuality the right wing was to be predominantly British and the four columns composing it were to contain the Cavalry under Lord George Sackville; Macbean's Heavy Brigade[2] and the British Infantry accompanied by two Regiments of Hanoverian Guards and the Hanoverian Regiment of Hardenberg. On their left the other four columns consisting of Allied troops were detailed to form the centre and to link up with Wangenheim's corps.

Just before midnight on the 31st July, the whole French army began to defile through Minden and this information quickly reached Ferdinand who gave the order for his columns to move east at 4 a.m. The French were slow

[1] Two 6-Pdrs. were attached to each British Battalion.
[2] The two Light Brigades of Foy and Drummond were in the outpost line near Hartum.

in deploying and at about 6.30 a.m., just as de Broglie began his attack on Wangenheim, the Allies formed on the general line Hartum—Stemmer.

The Light Brigades of Foy and Drummond had already come into action about 300 yards west of Hahlen and the former had detached his two howitzers to support an attack on that village. Facing them was the French left wing mainly composed of Saxon troops supported by a battery of 30 guns. On their right and holding the French centre was the dark mass of French cavalry and forming in front of them were the six British and three Hanoverian battalions.

Macbean was hurrying up on their right, even "putting his teams to the trot" when the "famous six" began their amazing attack against the 63 squadrons[1] ranged against them.

Controversy surrounds the launching of their attack but nothing can detract from the glory they won that day, which was summed up by M. de Contades in these words: "I never thought to see a single line of Infantry[2] break through three lines of Cavalry ranked in order of Battle and tumble them to ruin".

As the British infantry began to advance in two lines with three battalions in each, the Saxons swung round 18 guns to rake the leading line, but Macbean dropped into action about 200 yards to the north-east of the eastern end of the long fir wood and engaged them and for the loss of two guns eventually managed to silence them.

Whilst so occupied the three charges made by the French cavalry were thrown back, but the first of these had swept away the right company of the Suffolks, over-running the battalion guns on that flank and scattering the tumbrils.

When the last French cavalry charge[3] had been repulsed, Macbean swung his guns onto the cavalry attempting to reform and then when the Saxons altered formation to attack the leading British line in flank, engaged them and prevented any such attack developing.

With the French cavalry in disorder and the centre of their line breached, now was the time for the British cavalry to attack and turn victory into a rout, but Lord George Sackville appeared unable to understand the repeated messages which he received from Prince Ferdinand to this effect and they remained uncommitted. So it fell to the Artillery to gather the laurels of the pursuit. Foy and Macbean "limbered up their guns and moved with astonishing rapidity along the border of the marsh, halting from time to time to pound the retreating masses of the enemy; till at last they unlimbered for good opposite the bridge of the Bastau and punished the fugitives so heavily that they could not be rallied until they had fled far beyond their camp".

The French Army of 51,000 had been defeated by Prince Ferdinand and had suffered the loss of 7,000 casualties and 43 guns. The Allies numbering 33,000 had lost 2,800 casualties of which the British total was 1,394, and of

[1] Numbering more than 7,000 mounted men and containing all the most famous regiments in the French army.

[2] Suffolks, Hampshires and Royal Welch Fusiliers.

[3] The first charge was made by 11 squadrons from a distance of about 150 yards and was routed by the infantry who withheld their fire till the horsemen were only 5 yards off. The second by 14 squadrons took the same course and suffered the same fate. The third by 18 squadrons delivered further to the left was partially engaged by the Hanoverians and the second line and similarly repelled.



this the Royal Artillery lost 2 O.Rs. killed; Lieutenants Rogers and Harrington and 10 O.Rs. wounded and Lieutenant Carden and 2 O.Rs. missing.[1]

On the 2nd August, Prince Ferdinand issued a "Compliment of Thanks" in which the following passage appears :—

"His Serene Highness is extremely obliged to the Count of Buckebourg[2] for all his care and trouble in the management of the Artillery, which was served with great effect; likewise to the Commanding Officers of the several Brigades of Artillery, viz—Colonel Braun, Lt.-Colonel Hutte, Major Hasse and the three English Captains Phillips, Drummond and Foy".

It was quickly realized that the name of Captain Macbean had been inadvertently omitted and Prince Ferdinand immediately wrote to him "in his own hand" the letter which is quoted in full in Chapter XIX, Vol. 1, of Duncan's "History of the Royal Artillery". In his he refers to "The talents you possess in your profession did not a little contribute to render our fire superior to that of the enemy, and it is to you and your Brigade that I am indebted for having silenced the fire of a battery of the enemy which extremely galled the troops and particularly the British Infantry".

There can in fact be little doubt that if the part played by the British Infantry in this battle was decisive and unique, the other feature worthy of note was the efficiency of the British Artillery.

[1] Taken prisoner when the Battalion gun on the right of the Suffolks was over-run.
[2] "Grand Master of the Artillery" in the Allied Army.

INKERMAN. 5 November 1854.

By Lieut.-Colonel Alfred H. Burne, d.s.o., R.A. (Retd.).

AT the beginning of November 1854 the allied army of British and French troops was investing the fortress of Sebastopol, which was defended by the Russian general Menschikoff. The British held the right of the line, the French the left.

Early on the morning of the 5th November, Menschikoff suddenly launched an attack on the right of the British lines. Owing to thick fog it came as a complete surprise, and the battle that ensued was naturally patchy and confused. Thus it has come to be called "The Soldier's Battle". It might in a special sense be called "The Gunners' Battle", without in the least belittling from the splendid service of the infantry on that day. Indeed, the Russians outnumbered our troops by four to one yet were utterly defeated in the end and lost nearly eight times as many casualties.

The 2nd Division Camp was the Russian objective, and at daybreak on November 5th, the whole division, which held the extreme right of the Allied line, was hastily called to arms. It was holding a position 300 yards north of Home Ridge, which was immediately north of the divisional camp. (See sketch-map.) Its artillery, under Col. J. Fitzmayer, consisting of two batteries commanded by Captain J. R. Pennycuick and Captain J. Turner, took up a position on the Home Ridge, and in spite of the fog commenced firing. This cannonade achieved two objects, it deflected the Russian assaulting column to its right, a spot from where it could be more effectively assailed, and it delayed and held back the enemy's centre while this attack was being made. The Russians also ignored the fog and shelled the 2nd Division Camp, but as there were no troops left in camp no harm was done.

Meanwhile Captain S. P. Townsend's battery was coming up on the left, personally led by Colonel David Wood, commanding the 4th Division Artillery. It advanced in column of route, and as the leading section, commanded by Lieutenant Frederick Miller, was pushing through some brushwood it was met by a party of our infantry who were being pressed back by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. Miller, who was riding along in front, requested these men to form up in the rear of the guns, but the infantry believing the capture of the guns was inevitable did not comply. By this time the leading three guns had been brought into action and the limbers were going to the rear. In this predicament Colonel Wood, being asked for orders, tersely replied, "Fire Case"! By now the enemy, favoured by the mist, were almost on top of the battery; there was only time to fire one round, and there seemed nothing for it but retreat or death. But then a surprising thing happened.

Left without any kind of support, Miller, in last resort bade his gunners draw swords and charge, and he himself under a shower of bullets rode straight at the nearest of the advancing Russians. As though bewildered by the novelty of the challenge and the sudden necessity of having to encounter a horseman, these men for a moment stopped short in their onset. Then there followed a

conflict of a singular kind between on the one hand, a great weight of advancing infantry and, on the other, a few score of artillerymen, finding vent for some part of their rage in curses and shouts of defiance, but wildly striving besides to beat back the throng from their beloved guns with swords, with rammers, with sponge staves, nay even one may say with clenched fists, for the story of the mighty Clitheroe bruiser felling man after man with his blows, and then standing awhile unmolested and seemingly admired by the enemy, is not altogether a fable.

But the oncoming tide of Russians was irresistible and for the time it swept over Townsend's three leading guns. The Major himself was shot dead in the act of uttering the words "You won't disgrace me, men"!

However, the Russian attack soon spent itself, and the English troops pushing forward, recaptured the guns. We are told that "immense was the joy of many a gunner of Townsend's battery when he clasped his nine-pounder once more and found, as he presently did, that the attempt to spike her had failed".

In the centre of the field our pickets were slowly retiring before immense masses of the enemy, till at last they masked the fire of Turner's right half-battery. The enemy were now getting close, so Turner sent a non-commissioned officer out to the front, who shouted to the infantry "lie down, men, lie down". This injunction the infantry hastened to obey, whereupon Turner lost no time in plying the enemy with case shot, to such good purpose that the leading battalion was driven back and the remaining four battalions so shaken that on the pickets rising to their feet and charging down the hill, the whole force was put to flight.

The leading Russian army having been driven from the field, a second came up and took its place with no less than ninety-seven fresh guns, making one hundred and thirty-five pieces in all. This prodigious force of artillery, placed in line along the crest of Shell Ridge, from now onwards exerted considerable influence in the battle.

To reply to it the British had only eighteen guns actually in action, and three more batteries commanded by Captain E. Wodehouse and Captain D. N. Paynter, of the First Division, under Col. R. J. Dacres and Col. C. H. Morris of the Light Division, were coming up, making thirty-six guns all told. Thus the British were outnumbered by four to one in guns, and in addition our guns were of smaller calibre. All these guns joined those on the Home Ridge with the exception of three of Paynter's, which were led by Captain E. B. Hamley to the right and advanced with great judgment and dash to the support of the Guards. The latter were being hard put to it to hold their position. The arrival of this fresh force of artillery in this part of the field restored the situation and the Russians' advance was checked with case shot. This happy manœuvre on the part of Hamley was noted by the great Russian General Todleben, who wrote that "the English Artillery sustained its infantry perfectly. It followed them everywhere, and opened fire at sufficiently close distances against the assailing columns of the Russians".

This part of the field was the scene of the great struggle for the famous "Sandbag Battery". It must not be imagined that this was a battery of artillery. In reality the Sandbag Battery was a small unoccupied emplacement,

weakly constructed and unoccupied by guns. Still the Guards attached great importance to it, and the battle here took the form of a tussle for the possession of this earthwork.

While this fight was going on on the right, the Home Ridge in the centre was again being attacked, covered by the devastating fire of the massed Russian Artillery on Shell Ridge, only 600 yards away. Powerful though it was, however, it was powerless to silence the British Artillery, and at one critical point on the left of the Ridge the Russian columns, encountering no infantry, were driven back simply and solely by the "merciless case-shot" of Turner's left half-battery. But the batteries on the Home Ridge were suffering severely. Colonel Dacres had his horse shot under him, whereupon he mounted the horse of Trumpeter McLaren of Captain E. Wodehouse's battery, telling the trumpeter to go back to camp. This the boy was very loath to do, and he remained with his battery throughout the action, working as a gunner: he afterwards received the French Medaille Militaire for his gallant conduct.

The third period of the fight commenced with a great Russian attack on the Home Ridge. Turner's left half-battery, under Captain J. G. Boothby, was placed on the extreme left of the ridge, in fact on the slope, and the left-hand gun, commanded by Company-Sergeant[1] A. Henry, was encompassed by tall brushwood which prevented it seeing to fire until the branches in front had been cut down. A portion of the Russian host now detached itself from the main body and came down upon the battery from the left front, through the brushwood. Consequently they were on top of the left-hand gun almost before any warning could be given, as they did not encounter any of our infantry in their onset. It was impossible to limber up any of the guns as the teams were not on the spot, but Henry vowed never to leave his gun and resolved to sell his life dearly.

"The throng of the Russians came closing in . . . . numbers of them, in the words of a victim, 'howling like mad dogs'. Henry with his left hand wrested a bayonet from one of the Russians and found means to throw the man down, fighting hard all the time with his sword arm against some other assailants. Soon both Henry and Gunner Turner were closed in upon from all sides and bayoneted again and again, Taylor then receiving his death wounds. Henry received in his chest the upthrust of a bayonet, delivered with such power as to lift him almost from the ground, and at the same time he was stabbed in the back and stabbed in the arms. Then from loss of blood, he became unconscious, but the raging soldiery influenced by religion, did not cease from stabbing his heretic body. He received twelve wounds, yet survived".

The Russians then swept over the guns and attempted to spike them. They appeared satisfied with the capture of these guns and did not push on any further. But they were not destined long to remain in possession of their prize. A small body of Zouaves, who had left their camp without orders on hearing the sounds of the fight, saw what had happened. Seeing an enemy in view meant to them that he should be attacked whatever the odds. Led on by General Sir George Brown they dashed forward into the battery, driving back

[1] Equivalent to Battery Serjeant-Major.



the intruders pell mell. At the same moment six hundred men of our 4th Division were advancing in line on its right, and the whole force pushed back all that lay in front of it, thus making good the recapture of the three English pieces.

And now came the death of the Artillery Commander, the celebrated General T. Fox-Strangways, "a fine soldier, whose name should be remembered by every Artilleryman". He was sitting on his horse beside Lord Raglan when a shell burst near him, severing his leg below the knee. Without a complaint, his face as placid as though nothing had occurred, the brave old man, in his usual gentle manner said "Will anyone be kind enough to lift me off my horse?" and then as he was lying on the ground he besought those who were tending him "Take me to the gunners, let me die amongst the gunners". Lord Raglan himself hurried off the battlefield, towards the close of the battle, to see him and informed the dying general of the success of the day. A faint smile flittered across his face. "At least I die a soldier's death" he said a few minutes after, and then his spirit fled.

The *coup de grace* of this third period of the fight was given by Pennycuick's battery on the right of the Home Ridge. Such a shower of cannister shot did they pour into the Russian column opposed to them, that, totally unaided by infantry, they put the Russians to flight.

In each of the previous phases the Russians had been worsted in the fight, but they had ample forces of infantry not yet engaged and, even more important, they still had an overwhelming superiority in gun-power. But the event that decided the fortunes of the day was now at hand. Lord Raglan, the Com-

mander-in-Chief, had already ordered forward two eighteen-pounder guns from the Siege Park the detachments being formed from Nos. 6 and 7 Companies, 11th Battalion. But the order had been by some mistake delivered to Colonel Fitzmayer who commanded the guns on the Home Ridge. He replied that it was "impossible" that the order could be intended for him, and the message was conveyed to Raglan that it was "impossible" to bring up the guns. Owing to this misunderstanding much valuable time was lost, though as a matter of fact the two indicated guns had been kept in readiness for such action since daybreak. They possessed no horses but the man-harness had been placed in position and when the order to advance did eventually reach them they were on the move almost at once.

It should be explained that these guns were very much heavier than the later eighteen-pounder field gun, weighing 42 hundred-weight each. The advance entailed ascending a long hill, and it took one hundred and fifty men, all working their level best, to draw these monsters up the hill. Fortunately, when nearing the position selected for them some field-gun horses were obtained and hooked in, thus reducing the labour of the detachments.

On approaching the position Lt.-Col. G. Gambier who was in command, was struck down wounded and Lt.-Colonel Collingwood Dickson, son of the famous Sir Alexander Dickson, took charge. Accompanied by Captain H. L. Chermside, Gambier's adjutant, the Colonel rode forward to reconnoitre a position. He selected one at the junction of the Home and Fore Ridges at a point where some light gun-epaulments, only two feet in height, had been occupied by three field guns, which now gave way for their heavier sisters.

Now began the fight of the two against the hundred and thirty-five. A very uneven fight, one might suppose; but these eighteen-pounders were much larger and more effective than any guns the Russians possessed that day, and they were served with astonishing speed and accuracy, each being laid by an officer. Moreover the range was short for such guns—under 700 yards.

"By the fire thus raging against it from a numerous and powerful artillery Colonel Collingwood Dickson's small band of one hundred and fifty men was at first heavily stricken, and within one quarter of an hour there fell seventeen of their number, a proportion of more than one tenth. But as often as any man dropped whilst working one of the guns his place was taken eagerly by another. All were glowing with zeal and exulting as only gunners can do in a sense of artillery power. Each of the guns was laid every time by an officer and visibly every shot carried havoc into the enemy's batteries. Lord Raglan stood watching the development of the new artillery force he had been able to bring into play and admiring the ardour and skill with which our men fought these two guns against all the ordnance strength of Ordnance Hill". He then went up to the Colonel and exclaimed "Dickson, my brave fellow, you are your father's better!"

Meanwhile the duel proceeded. After the first quarter of an hour it became evident that our guns were gradually obtaining the mastery. During the next quarter of an hour only three of Dickson's men fell, while the devastation in the Russian batteries was appalling. "Whether tearing directly through a clump of the enemy's gunners or lighting upon some piece of rock, and flinging abroad right and left its dangerous splinters, whether bounding into a team of

artillery horses or smashing or blowing up tumbrils, the terrible eighteen-pounder shot never flew to its task without ploughing a furrow of ruin. The havoc was fast becoming so dire as to be more than the enemy's gunners could endure . . . . and battery after battery were moved from one spot to another in the hope that the fell eighteen-pounders might not come to search out its prey on the new and less exposed ground".

The seemingly incredible had now come to pass; in under half-an-hour two single guns had obtained the complete ascendancy over one hundred and thirty-five.

That was practically the end. Ammunition was failing, and both English and Russian guns became silent. But the Russian infantry were beginning to retreat, and to cover the movement they threw out a column 2,000 strong. Fresh ammunition had now come up and the eighteen-pounders opened once more. It required a few well aimed round-shot to disperse this, the last Russian column, and the victory was won.

That the victory was directly due to our eighteen-pounders we have the best possible evidence—that of the Russian commander, General Dannenberg. In his official report on the battle he wrote "Soon the murderous fire of the enemy's artillery forced us to retire back to the town".

Colonel Dickson, for this and another action, received the Victoria Cross, one of the very earliest recipients—and he in his turn mentioned several men of the detachments, notably Gunners John Morton and Hugh Davis. The latter, though wounded, had declined to leave his gun and went on serving it until another shot took off both his arms. Nowhere in the whole course of our Regiment's history can we point to such decisive effect of the fire of two guns as that of the eighteen-pounders in the grim battle of Inkerman.

Nor had the Field Artillery, as is evident from the above account, failed to distinguish itself throughout this famous fight, and three further Victoria Crosses were awarded—to Lieutenant F. Miller, Company Serjeant Henry and Serjeant Symons. It was indeed a great day for the Gunners.

[Unless stated to the contrary, quotations are from "The Invasion of the Crimea", by A. W. Kinglater.]

LIST OF BATTERIES PRESENT AT THE BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

Short Title.	*Full Title.*	*Present Title.*
PENNYCUICK'S BATTERY	8 Coy., 3 Bn., manning B Fd. Bty.	17 Fd. Bty.
TURNER'S BATTERY	4 Coy., 11 Bn., manning G Fd. Bty.	49 Fd. Bty.
TOWNSEND'S BATTERY	4 Coy., 12 Bn., manning P Fd. Bty.	152 L.A.A./S.L. Bty.
WODEHOUSE'S BATTERY	5 Coy., 11 Bn., manning H Fd. Bty.	153 H.A.A. Bty.
PAYNTER'S BATTERY	2 Coy., 8 Bn., manning A Fd. Bty.	94 H.A.A. Bty.
MORRIS' BATTERY	1 Coy., 3 Bn., manning E Fd. Bty.	8 Fd. Bty.
"6/11"	6 Coy., 11 Bn.	154 H.A.A. Bty.
"7/11"	7 Coy., 11 Bn.	156 Locating Bty.

MARTINIQUE 1809.

By Lt.-Col. M. E. S. Laws, o.b.e., m.c., R.A. (Retd.).

IN 1808 the only French possessions in the West Indies were the islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe, which were both strongly held. The existence of these two enemy strongholds compelled the British to keep relatively large military garrisons in the Windward and Leeward Islands, and required a considerable naval force to maintain a close blockade. But Britain was then suffering from a shortage of man-power which was to become more and more acute as the Peninsular War developed, and the West Indian climate was deadly for Europeans. For these reasons it was particularly desirable that the French should be evicted from their last remaining foothold in the Caribbean. Only then could the British garrisons in the West Indies be safely reduced to a minimum sufficient only for internal security duties.

Early in November 1808, Lieut.-General George Beckwith, who was the military commander in the Windward and Leeward Islands, agreed to the suggestion of Rear-Admiral Hon. A. F. I. Cochrane that Martinique should be attacked by a combined naval and military expedition based on Barbados. A strong brigade under Major-General Sir George Prevost was to join from Halifax, Nova Scotia, since the reserve for the West Indies at Barbados was not strong enough for so considerable an operation as the reduction of Martinique.

In preparation for the expedition a Field Train and a Battering Train were prepared at Barbados under the orders of the C.R.A., Brigadier-General E. Stehelin. The former was organized into 9 brigades (i.e. roughly the equivalent of the modern Troop) each of four guns or howitzers; four brigades were each armed with two light 6-pdrs. and two $5\frac{1}{2}$-inch howitzers, one had heavy 6-pdrs., one had 12-pdrs., one had 8-inch howitzers, and two had mixed armament of 3-pdrs., 6-pdrs. and $5\frac{1}{2}$-inch howitzers. The Battering Train was composed of 33 heavy mortars from 13-inch to $4^{2}/_{5}$-inch. This was by far the greatest artillery armament which had ever been prepared in the West Indies and involved the loading of 2,600 tons of guns, ammunition and ordnance stores in a period of fifteen days.

The artillery in the Windward and Leeward Islands command consisted at that time of six Companies, Royal Artillery and two Companies of the Royal Foreign Artillery. After leaving small garrisons in the various colonies, the following force was made available for the expedition against Martinique:—

Commander: Brigadier-General E. Stehelin.
Brigade Major, R.A.: Second Captain S. Du Bourdieu.
Ordnance Medical Department: 1 surgeon, 4 assistant surgeons.

Royal Artillery Unit.	*Capts.*	*Second Capts.*	*Lts.*	*Sgts.*	*Corpls.*	*Bdrs.*	*Gnrs.*	*Dmrs.*	*Total.*
[1] Capt. C. Keane's Coy., 1 Bn., R.A.	—	—	2	3	3	4	37	—	49
[2] Capt. C. Younghusband's Coy., 4 Bn., R.A.	—	—	1	2	—	1	40	1	45

Royal Artillery Unit.	*Capts.*	*Second Capts.*	*Lts.*	*Sgts.*	*Corpls.*	*Bdrs.*	*Gnrs.*	*Dmrs.*	*Total.*
[3] Capt. R. S. Brough's Coy., 7 Bn., R.A.	—	1	1	1	2	2	37	1	45
[4] Capt. J. Power's Coy., 7 Bn., R.A.	—	—	2	2	2	1	34	1	42
[5] Capt. C. Gold's Coy., 8 Bn., R.A.	—	1	—	—	—	7	44	—	52
[6] Capt. G. W. Unett's Coy., 7 Bn., R.A.	1	—	2	1	3	4	42	1	54
Unposted	1	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	3
Total Royal Artillery	2	3	9	9	10	19	234	4	290
Royal Foreign Artillery.									
[7] Capt. L. Prevost's Coy.	1	1	—	1	1	2	39	1	46
[7] Capt. H. de Villicy's Coy.	—	—	1	—	1	2	26	—	30
Total Royal Foreign Artillery	1	1	1	1	2	4	65	1	76
Total Artillery from West Indies	3	4	10	10	12	23	299	5	366

On 29 December 1808 a naval squadron with a fleet of transports arrived at Barbados from Halifax carrying Prevost's Brigade, consisting of 3 infantry battalions and the following artillery detachment:—

Unit.	*Capts.*	*Second Capt.*	*Lts.*	*Sgts.*	*Corpls.*	*Bdrs.*	*Gnrs.*	*Dmrs.*	*Total.*
[8] Capt. W. Stewart's Coy., 7 Bn., R.A.	1	1	2	3	4	6	90	1	108
[9] Capt. H. Phillot's Coy., 5 Bn., R.A.	1	—	1	1	—	1	11	1	16
Total Royal Artillery from Halifax	2	1	3	4	4	7	101	2	124

There was also a detachment of the Royal Artillery Drivers consisting of 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 1 Shoeing Smith and 39 Drivers. Captain Phillot acted as C.R.A. of the Halifax Brigade, and the detachment of his own Company was attached to Capt. Stewart's Company, 7 Battalion, to bring the latter up to full strength. Capt. Stewart died at Barbados on 29 January, 1809 and the command of the Company devolved on its Second Captain (J. P. St. Clair): it should, however, be remembered that the official designation of the Company after 29 January became "Late Captain W. Stewart's Company, 7 Battalion, R.A.", and so remained until a new Captain was posted by the authorities at Woolwich several weeks later.

The expedition finally sailed from Carlisle Bay, Barbados, on 28 January, 1809, being organized in two Divisions—the 1st under Major-General Sir George Prevost and the 2nd under Major-General T. Maitland. It is known

[1] Disbanded w.e.f. 31 Jan. 1819 as Capt. H. Light's Coy., 1 Bn., R.A.
[2] On 1 April 1947 became 40 Field Bty., R.A.
[3] On 1 April 1947 became 13 (Martinique 1809) Field Bty., R.A.
[4] On 1 April 1947 became 69 Field Bty., R.A.
[5] Disbanded w.e.f. 28 Feb. 1819 as Capt. J. A. Clement's Coy., 7 Bn., R.A.
[6] Disbanded w.e.f. 31 Jan. 1819 as Capt. W. Cleeve's Coy., 7 Bn., R.A.
[7] Disbanded 1816. For further details of the Royal Foreign Artillery see R.A. Journal, Vol. LXXV, No. 1, Jan. 1948, p. 57, *et seq.*
[8] On 1 April 1947 became 74 (The Battle Axe Company) Medium Bty., R.A.
[9] On 1 April 1947 became 67 Field Battery, R.A.

that the late Captain Stewart's Company, 7 Battalion, was under 1st Division, but no further detail of the allotment of R.A. units is known. The British plan was for 1st Division to land on the east coast of Martinique, and by a rapid march to seize Morne Bruneau north of the capital town of Fort Royal. Meanwhile 2nd Division was to land on the south-east coast and to secure the anchorage of Fort Royal bay for the use of the fleet. Thereafter, both Divisions were to close on the formidable Fort Desaix, which was known to be the enemy's chief centre of resistance. The French garrison of Martinique was known to consist of the 26th (2 Bns.) and 82nd (3 Bns.) Infantry Regiments reinforced by 3,500 Militia organized in 6 battalions and by the crew (350) of a frigate.

At 4 p.m. on 30 January, Prevost's Division landed at Bay Robert and made a difficult night march westward of 7 miles. Pushing on next day with some light troops, Prevost drove off the Militia, and by the evening of 31 January had seized the important high ground of Morne Bruneau, north-east of Fort Desaix. Reinforced early next day, Prevost—still without any artillery—drove the French into the outer works of Fort Desaix. Meanwhile Maitland's 2nd Division had landed on the morning of 30 January at St. Luce on the South coast, and advanced during the next three days through Riviére Salée to the coast of Comé du Lamentin. The local Militia surrendered without a fight.

Simultaneously with General Maitland's landing, a large body of artillery supported by the Royal York Rangers landed at Grande Anse d'Arlet with the object of seizing Pigeon Island which commanded the anchorage of Fort Royal bay. The C.R.A. was himself in charge of this force, which captured a coast defence battery at Cape Salomon and gained the high ground south-east of and overlooking Pigeon Island. After 36 hours continuous work the artillerymen, aided by seamen, carried three $5\frac{1}{2}$-inch mortars and a howitzer on bamboo poles into position 400 yards from the island and dragged four 8-inch howitzers and two 13-inch mortars into another position within effective range. By 7 p.m. on 3 February the bombardment opened, and after 4 hours the French garrison surrendered after receiving 250 shells. This was a very creditable performance by the Gunners and resulted in the fleet being able to enter Fort Royal bay and there to land supplies for Maitland's division at Comé du Lamentin.

Having replenished his supplies from the fleet, General Maitland moved northward on 5 February to join Prevost's Division, and by that evening Fort Desaix was fully invested by the 2nd Division on the west and south, and by the 1st Division on the north and east. Fort de France and the town of Fort Royal were occupied by Maitland's troops without serious resistance. Fort Desaix, however, was garrisoned by over 2,000 regular troops and mounted 40 field and 60 heavy guns, and 20 heavy mortars and howitzers: it was a very strongly constructed work, and it was obvious that its reduction could only be achieved by regular siege operations.

The chief difficulty confronting the attackers was the task of landing their heavy guns, ammunition and stores, and of transporting this mass of equipment to the siege works. The two landing places were at Case de Navire for the 2nd Division and Comé du Lamentin for the 1st Division. There were no roads and very few horses, so that the immense labour of landing and transporting


St Pierre
Trinité
Carbet
63 REGT
9 Feb
1 DIV
30 Jan
Bay Robert
1 Feb
Morne Bruneau
1 DIV
1 DIV
31 Jan
2 DIV
Fort Desaix
Fort Royal
Lamentin
Case de Navire
Comé du Lamentin
R. Lezard
Fort Royal Bay
Pigeon I
Riviére Salée
Cape Saloman
Grande Anse d'Arlet
2 DIV
St Luce
Marin
2 DIV
R. YORK RANGERS
30 Jan
MARTINIQUE CAMPAIGN
1809
0
5
10 Miles

the artillery and engineer stores had to be performed by the fighting troops aided by some 400 seamen from the fleet. The climate was very trying to Europeans and there was almost incessant rain. Yet despite the difficulties, the British were able to open fire on Fort Desaix on 16 February from five[1] different batteries, mounting in all 15 heavy guns, 18 mortars and 13 howitzers. From 6 to 16 February the French had done their best to interrupt work on the besiegers' batteries by constant artillery fire and by small scale sorties which led to continual skirmishing around Fort Desaix.

On 16 February the British bombardment opened, and from then onwards it never ceased (except for a few hours of truce) so long as the French flag still flew over Fort Desaix. In the first five days and nights of the bombardment 4,000 shot and 10,000 shell were fired into the fort, and the working parties laboured to replenish the ammunition stocks. Moreover, work continued on five new siege batteries which it was planned to have armed and ready to open fire on 26 February: these were to mount an additional 12 heavy guns, 8 heavy mortars and 2 howitzers.

The effect of this relentless bombardment on the garrison of Fort Desaix was soon apparent as casualties quickly mounted. On the first day of the bombardment the French lost 21 men, but from then onwards the daily casualty list began to increase so that on 21 February it totalled 44 and next day 50. At noon on 23 February a flag of truce entered the British lines to offer capitulation, but the terms were not acceptable to the besiegers and the bombardment was resumed at 10 p.m. and went on all night. At 6 a.m. next morning a shell penetrated the main magazine of the fort resulting in a tremendous explosion, and the enemy again offered to surrender. At 10 p.m. on 24 February the capitulation for the whole colony of Martinique was duly signed, and next day the garrison marched out of Fort Desaix "with drums beating, Colours flying, matches lighted, having in their front four field pieces with their artillerymen" and surrendered.

The French had fought with great gallantry and were accorded generous terms in consequence. The Governor, Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, and his two A.D.Cs. were at once released unconditionally and were sent back to France by a British warship. It was intended also to repatriate the remaining 155 officers and 2,069 other ranks who surrendered (as well as the 600 sick and wounded in hospital) on the promise of their not serving again until properly exchanged, rank for rank. Unfortunately Napoleon refused to accept this humane and sensible agreement with the result that the unfortunate Frenchmen had to be sent to the prisoner-of-war camps in England.

To have reduced Martinique so speedily under the existing conditions was rightly regarded at the time as a remarkable feat of arms, and one achieved at extremely small cost. The British casualties in the whole campaign were just over 550, of which total the killed amounted to 3 officers and 116 other ranks. The Royal Artillery lost 16 killed and 11 wounded, and the whole force had only 32 deaths from sickness—a truly remarkable record for a West Indian campaign.

After the surrender of the French, large stocks of food and ammunition were found intact in Fort Desaix, so it was obvious that it was the intensity

[1] Batteries were erected at Morne des Capuchines, Martin, N.W. of Fort Desaix, Folleville and on Morne Tortenson.

and volume of the artillery fire which forced the enemy to capitulate and not lack of supplies or munitions. This fact was generously recognized by the General, who undoubtedly presented certain trophies to some—probably all—of the artillery units present during the campaign. The so-called Battle Axe—really a French pioneer's axe of fine workmanship—presented to the late Captain W. Stewart's Company, 7 Battalion is still with the unit, though the story about it given by Duncan in his "History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery" (Vol. I, p. 419) is based merely on heresay evidence and is clearly inaccurate in almost all details.

It is an interesting speculation whether any other Royal Artillery unit at Martinique received a similar award. It should be remembered, however, that the Halifax brigade was treated through the campaign as an independent force only temporarily under Beckwith's command, and indeed it returned to Halifax almost immediately after the fall of Fort Desaix. Moreover, the late Captain W. Stewart's Company had only recently arrived at Halifax from England and was virtually at full strength, whereas the West Indian Companies, R.A., had been long in that deadly climate, scattered in small detachments among the various islands, and were all much below establishment. In training, as in strength, the unit from Halifax must have been far more effective than were the West Indian Companies. Under these conditions it seems probable that the presentation of the Battle Axe trophy may well have been made to the late Captain W. Stewart's Company, 7 Battalion, only—perhaps as a courteous gesture to a guest who had contributed greatly to a common victory.

There is some evidence to suggest that a brass drum from the spoils of Martinique may also have been presented to the late Captain Stewart's Company, 7 Battalion, and perhaps to other R.A. units. The 1st West India Regiment claimed that it was "permitted to retain two brass side drums and five battle axes" from the spoils of Martinique ("History of the First West India Regiment", by Major A. B. Ellis; page 125), but unfortunately produced no evidence to support the statement. But the single Battle Axe certainly exists to-day, and is traditionally "trooped" on 25 February every year before the Battery Commander; by a pleasant tradition the Battle Axe is carried on all ceremonial parades by the tallest man of the unit irrespective of rank, who "by virtue of his honourable office is permitted to wear a moustache". Long may the Battle Axe continue to remind the unit of the great feat of arms in which it took part in 1809.

NOTE:—The story of the Martinique campaign is told in various unpublished documents in the Public Record Office—chiefly the R.A. Muster Rolls and Pay Lists (War Office Series 10), the Monthly Returns for the Windward and Leeward Islands (War Office Series 55, Vols. 1190 and 1194). General Beckwith's despatches are in War Office Series 1, Volumes 39 and 95. For the French side of the story see "Les Guerres des Antilles de 1793 à 1815", by Colonel H. de Poyen. W. L. Clowes "History of the Royal Navy" (Vol. 5, p. 283), and Hon. J. W. Fortescue's "History of the British Army" (Vol. VII, pp. 11-17) and The Naval Chronicle (Vol. 21, p. 323) provide excellent information, and the Regimental histories of the units engaged may be consulted for details.