Shortly after commissioning into the artillery, Kron’s superiors found him to be an officer of very high caliber. He was quiet but energetic, particularly on field problems, and often exposed a keen sense of humor. He had studied journalism at University of Louisiana and after departure from academia became inclined for military service, applying his bright and inquisitive mentality to all aspects of his duties, ultimately finding a great interest in survey. Most importantly beyond his technical skills was his courtesy and tact which evoked hearty cooperation from men and officers. This was only the beginning of his lengthy career through which he carried these qualities.
FONDOUK
On March 5th, the same day that General Fredenall relinquished II Corps to Patton, the 2d Battalion, 36th Field Artillery began their 700-mile motor march into the combat zone. Their sister 1st Battalion had been firing since December 1942 while the 2d Battalion spent those months training in Chanzy, a small French village seventy miles south of Oran. The battalions were constantly separated because they were the only field artillery in theater with a 25,000 yard range and both British and American commanders eagerly sought their services.
The latter part of their four-day journey was done at night in black-out conditions to elude air raids. They finally moved into position four miles north of Sbiba with a battalion of the 17th Field and a detachment from the 1st Field Artillery Observation Battalion to form the 13th Field Artillery Brigade. It would be the first ‘13th’ for Jack.
The battalion occupied several positions in the area over the next two weeks providing defense for the 34th Infantry Division. When moving into the combat sector, only one battery traveled at a time and officers traveled together in one jeep due to constant air attacks. The battalion commander rode with his three battery commanders to reconnoiter positions and assign the battery commander positions who in turn would select areas for each gun with consideration for defiladed areas, routes of approach, ammunition dumps, and camouflage netting. The main danger of moving into these positions were the mines. Batteries often just missed German Teller mines and British Hawkins mines alike.
Guns spread over areas spanning as much as a thousand yards and were staggered in depth to obstruct bombing run lines. Large flat top nets were always used for deception as there was no natural cover in Tunisia. Only sparse patches of cactus dotted the wide terrain. The heavily garnished 35x70 foot nets did not necessarily conceal, but deceive, as the enemy could see the positions but not what lay behind the scrim.
After several registrations and no missions, they waited in anticipation through rainy days that mired roads and deterred enemy aircraft. The 34th finally received their first attack orders to take Fondouk Pass and push on to Kairouan and Sousse in order to cut off Rommel. On the night of March 26th to 27th, under cover of darkness to avoid hawkish Stuka dive bombers, Kron’s D Battery moved sixty miles from Sbiba to Sbeitla, just southwest of Fondouk. The five-mile-wide valley before them funneled into the flat and barren thousand-yard Fondouk Pass. It was rocky, sandy earth void of vegetation. Except for isolated cactus patches, all cover and concealment was unattainable.
The Germans occupied the high ridges along the Pass and had very adequate observation over all movement for miles. They exhibited their prowess while Kron was making a daylight check of a proposed gun position. A single 88 round screamed overhand and landed 200 yards behind him. Within seconds, another round landed 200 yards laterally. He became very nervous that a third round would bracket right where he was, but it never came. Their display was enough to prove they were well aware of the arrival of the battery and Kron expected to receive a smashing barrage that night. Throughout the rest of the day, these 88s touched all 34th Division positions and it was on a visit to Division command post that Jack was nearly hit by another barrage.
For four days, the 34th attacked and failed four times while 2d Battalion dropped 569 rounds in support – 205 were from D Battery. Attacks by Stukas became predictable at 0700, 1200, and 1700 hours, but they deviated on the third day after F Battery completed a mission. Six Stukas appeared on the horizon tearing towards D Battery just as the executive officer, Lieutenant William Dougherty, received a mission direction from battalion. The gun tubes went up before Kron could intervene. Battalion called again to cancel the mission having spotted the Stukas themselves, but they were already diving out of the sun. All the Battery .50-calibers opened up as the pilots dropped fifteen bombs and it was just enough to keep the Germans high and their strike went fifty yards over target. Only a few bombs hit on the edge of the battery area with little damage and no casualties except for Sergeant Cannon from HQ Battery who was killed on Highway 3 when a fragment went through his head.
When the infantry pulled back on the night of April 1st, they left the supporting artillery exposed – something Kron would face again eight years later. He strengthened his perimeter with rocket launchers, anti-aircraft machineguns, and rifleman as well as an observation post and listening post a thousand yards forward. Colonel Walker of the 813th Tank Destroyer battalion also assured protection to the gunners – luckily their bolstered defenses were not tested and the next morning they retaliated against the 88s that had been harassing the entire Division for days. After three volleys they pulled out, only to be hit again the following day. The Americans finally figured out that the particular guns they faced were self-propelled, allowing them to roll out and take up different positions rapidly enough to harass the entire division with only a few guns.
The 2d Battalion continued to fire missions while the 34th Division rested for a week. On the night of April 7-8th, they tried again for Fondouk Pass hoping to take Von Arnim’s men in the north and trap Rommel’s Afrika Korps who were likely to get cut off by the British Eighth Army. Once again, the 34th’s attack failed due to misunderstanding over who was responsible for taking the objective of Djebel Rhorab – the British or the Americans – but by April 10th the finally succeeded in forcing the Axis into the mountains out of southern Tunisia. The battalion marched back to the 13th Field Artillery Brigade bivouac area and to rest areas near La Celle.
The battalion commander noted that he could reoutinely count on Kron’s Battery to accomplish a mission no matter what the difficulties. On reflection, he recalled one instance in which he received orders one afternoon to reconnoiter three possible battalion areas of which one was to be assigned to Halliday the next day. His reconnaissance was limited and as the situation changed rapidly, near midnight he was ordered to have one battery in position in one of those areas by dawn. He chose to send Jack, who had never seen the area, and by starlight chose a route and selected gun positions so effective that no further changes were needed, culiminating in a superior battery position and mission accomplished.
The 36th Field moved with II Corps for the final battle for Tunisia to drive the Axis entirely out of North Africa. The firing batteries remained active for the month, but air raids and counter battery fire alike became quiet and almost non-existent. They had fewer and fewer missions with a brief pick up in aerial attacks until the enemy ultimately quit on May 9th to end the campaign.
SICILY
The Sicilian Campaign was very brief for Jack, but not without notable credit. In early July under the unbearable Tunisian sun, the battalion began going through the motions to pack up and depart the continent. They marched to a staging area where they spent time waterproofing vehicles and equipment before proceeding to the docks. They embarked for a destination that remained unknown until they anchored at Gela, Sicily. At that time, D Battery was attached to the 45th Division for landing at Scoglitti on D+5 and they moved inland in a quick series of laying guns, fire missions, and receiving march orders almost immediately after only to repeat it all again and again over the next several weeks. Jack experienced only about a week of this activity until his orders came on July 23d to return to the United States.
He expected another week before his actual departure. It was just enough time commanding D Battery for an old friend from Louisiana State University, Troy Middleton, who commanded the 45th Division, and Raymond S. McLain to note his performance as a battery commander. He wrote that Kron’s ‘command of the battery and his general efficiency in carrying out missions was the best I have ever witnessed.’ Despite a crippling lack of transportation and other facilities, Kron managed to keep up with the fast-moving infantry and was always prepared to carry out missions when they called. On one occasion, he moved the battery across a stretch of ‘desperate mountainous road through Montaomagorie, Sicliy in the night without lights, a route where a lighter battalion lost a piece of equipment in the same movement. I consider him an outstanding officer.’
CHINA
The war in Asia was very different for the Americans than it was in Europe. It took Kron from the battlefield to the classroom where he applied his knowledge, interest and experience to promoting success for the Chinese against the Japanese in their vast theater of operations. They focused on training, which the American officers believed was the key to success. Personnel at the Chinese Training Center focused on the education of individuals and in some cases small groups of specialized units.
There were seven service schools located in or around Kunming. The largest of these was the Field Artillery Training Center which hosted about a thousand Americans in charge of instructing up to ten thousand Chinese in their artillery supplied by the United States. The theater also offered a Command and General Staff School and an Army War College, all in an effort to educate as many Chinese senior officers as possible, though only a small number of them were actually able to attend the schools.
Between May and September 1945, Jack was an instructor in the Department of Gunnery at the Field Artillery Training Center where he was most valuable in academics. Just as he excelled as a battery commander, his superiors noted his knowledge of gunnery as ‘remarkable.’ ‘A result of his tireless energy, inquisitive mind, and unbounded enthusiasm is the Observed-Surveyed Fire Chart which he originated and tested during the past months at this Center. Captain Kron has, in addition to the regular gunner classes, taught on War College Class and is at present devoing his energies to the compilation of a history of the Center.’ His efforts were well recognized by the Chinese who awarded him an Order of the Cloud and Banner and subsequently a Bronze Star Medal by the United States.
KUM RIVER
Field artillery units in the first year of the Korean War were fraught with difficulties not often faced by cannoneers since the turn of the century. Often overrun, constantly attacking and retreating, understrength, undersupplied, and completely overwhelmed, after two weeks in combat the three 105mm battalions had been combined into just one provisional battalion for the defense of Taejon. Major Kron saw that the situation was grim for the 13th Field. As the battalion executive, he normally commanded the column when they moved as a whole and in July and into August, moves were frantic and frequent.
The 13th Field, known as Q Clan and emblazoned as such on all vehicles, supported the 19th Infantry when they entered Korea on July 10th. At Kimch’on, they opened their command post in a tobacco factory just after midnight. Their stay was brief and the next night they departed for Taejon and then the Kum River to fire their first round in combat on the night of July 12th.
The battalion commander, Colonel Stratton, had rated Kron highly shortly after his assignment as executive. He noted his ‘highest type of moral qualifications,’ that he was willing to make decisions and accept full responsibility, and had a ‘keen insight into human nature as proven to be a decided assed in the handling of junior officers and enlisted men.’
Kron departed the next morning for a visit with the 19th Infantry Regimental Command Post and began fire missions against enemy artillery and tanks. The gunners took credit for five tanks destroyed during the day. In those first days, the guns were the only defense against tanks which deflected 2.36” rockets with terrifying nonchalance. Already he saw how tight the forthcoming battles would be, if he even made it through the first, and quickly became sharp and terse, a departure from his typical genial attitude, and he had brief, professional instructions for many of the forward observers going up to the line. A scarcity of maps meant he sent them forward without relinquishing his own.
After the infantry fought by the light of flares throughout the night and early morning into July 16th, Q Clan received a call from Colonel Perry of the 52d Field. He warned them that an enemy force was approaching and an hour later a messenger arrived notifying them that they had been surrounded and needed help. Stratton left at once with a tank to visit A Battery and was knocked out at B Battery where he was trapped for the next seven hours. Soon after Stratton left Kron with the battalion, they came under fire from everything the North Koreans had to throw at them.
In an effort to coordinate fire, he kept in contact with the adjacent battalions to keep up fire from their untenable positions. By late afternoon, the attack intensified and within an hour, Kron decided the position was untenable, issued his march order, and in twenty minutes they were off for Taejon. There was only one escape route which was fully covered by enemy mortars, small arms, and four devastating machine gun emplacements. Only once Jack was sure all of his men, vehicles and equipment had completely withdrawn from their area did he follow and rejoin the lead element.
Three hours later they arrived in Taejon without any loss of weapons of vehicles. The 11th Field fared just as well, but the 52d lost all but one howitzer and three vehicles. The 19th Infantry Headquarters and 1st Battalion also lost almost all of their vehicles and equipment. It was a considerable achievement during those days for a withdrawing unit to reach their destination with such success, and Jack was appropriately recognized with a Bronze Star Medal.
NAKTONG BULGE
Replacements finally arrived at the end of July while the battalion was at Chinju. About a hundred men went to the 13th Field, but between the four artillery battalions they have only seventeen 105mm and twelve 155mm howitzers to stretch over a 32-mile front. All of the 24th Division artillery had been reduced to about forty-percent effectiveness by August. Rains beginning in the mornings prevented air strikes, so the Division’s guns in the low grounds west of Yongsan were all the support available. Stratton had command over all of them.
The situation was tight especially inside the operations tent. Kron occasionally stepped out to glance up the adjoining road only to return to the quiet, stuffy interior where by the hum of the radio, they calculated fire missions. The 34th Infantry was on the verge of collapse and desperate for support.
At the height of their fighting in August, the provisional battalion was in direct support of the 9th, 19th, and 34th Infantry Regiments as well as the 5th Marines. Under the eerie red and yellow glow cast by flares over the shores of the river, the enemy attacked in a near repeat of the Kum, except the 24th Division held the line for several days. During the night of August 7th to 8th, observers reported the enemy on the high ground waving white flags during artillery strikes, only to discard them when artillery lifted and pick up arms against the infantry again. Among the infantry and boats crossing came swaths of civilians in white garb seeking refuge. While the batteries scattered along the river kept up fire, Kron’s battalion command post was not spared shelling itself. While at Yongson, heavy artillery concentrations forced many groups north out of town, but the 13th remained resilient.
By the end of August, Stratton again praised Kron on his efficiency report as ‘an ideal combat soldier’ with an intimate knowledge of Field Artillery. ‘He is absolutely fearless,’ he continued, ‘His judgement is excellent and decisions sounds. He has a rare sense of humor and is understanding in his dealings with his subordinates. He is not afraid to work and does not hesitate to make decisions…He has the knack of securing wholehearted cooperation through desire rather than through driving.’
HWACHON
In mid-May, Kron took over command of the 52d Field Artillery from Marshall H. Armor, a handover which his new unit graciously welcomed. Armor had not earned much respect among his men who did little to see him off after the change of command ceremony. During his entire tenure as commander of the 52d, Armor had recommended only one man for an award of the Bronze or Silver Star: himself. In contrast, though he was said to have viewed the battalion ‘through rose colored glasses,’ Kron cared much more for his subordinates and was genially welcomed into the new battalion. He was just as aggressive, energetic, and imaginative, running the battalion well in battle and improving it. They immediately drove north to retake lines along the 38th parallel.
The 52d Field remained entirely committed to the 21st Infantry Regiment – not just on paper, but in dedication and spirit. The regimental commander in turn had a great deal of respect and confidence in them. Much of this was due to Kron assigning people to jobs with the infantry regardless of their core responsibilities. He understood personalities quite well and when individuals did not get along, it cut down on efficiency, so he sometimes placed personality over skill or duties which resulted in no difficulties at all.
He also encouraged every bit of survey work that the terrain and time permitted. They always ran a position area survey and in cases where their position was stable for a time, they ran a connecting survey and part of the target area survey. Perhaps it stemmed from his own interest and passion, but Kron was very adamant about surveying.
Soon, the artillery war in Korea became much more predictable and stable once a stagnant front was established. The battalion never moved far from the Hwachon Reservoir where they spent another sweltering Korean summer in support of the 21st Infantry Regiment. While the 24th and 7th Divisions alternated on the line, at times the 52d Field accumulated a mass of consecutive days in combat when they remained on duty to support one of the ROK regiments. Only outposts frequently changed and a hill or ridge might be contested over by the infantry, but the cannoneers could rest a bit easier knowing that they would no longer need to defend their guns in brutal close combat, hand-to-hand fights, and harrowing retreats across miles of bitter terrain, stinking rice paddies, and crippling barrages and gunfire. It was a relatively peaceful close to Jack’s Korean experience.